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Abstract
Set in the context of labor market restructuring, public policy reform, and blurring
government/nonprofit boundaries, this study examines the functions, adaptation, and
performance of Boston’s three One-Stop Career Centers between 1996 and 2002—a time period
encompassing distinct eras of changing policy and labor market conditions. Along with other
types of labor market intermediaries (LMIs), One-Stop Career Centers have arisen as sites of
organizational and institutional innovation in mediating the labor matching process. However,
compared to other LMIs, much less is known about career centers’ employment brokering
operations. This study helps address this research gap by providing a detailed analysis of three
career centers. This investigation answers three research questions related to the 1) functions; 2)
adaptation; and 3) performance of career centers with differing organizational sponsorships. In
doing so, the study develops a conceptual framework based on three strategic orientations—
community, bureaucratic, and entrepreneurial—that helps to clarify and categorize
organizational processes, change, and outcomes. The study finds that different strategic
orientations are related to variation in organizational planning, practice, networks, and
performance. Strategic orientation is also found to influence organizational adaptability during
both a tight labor market and an economic recession, as well as during implementation of major
federal policy changes related to welfare reform and workforce development reform. The study
contributes to scholarship on employment brokering and labor market institutional change by
offering an empirical analysis and theoretical framework that highlights the emergent role of
One-Stop Career Centers as publicly-funded labor market intermediaries. The study is also
immediately relevant to policymakers and practitioners involved in the more than 1,900 career
centers across the country. For them, this study provides a better understanding of the
programmatic trade-offs associated with career center operations and therefore may help them
improve the labor matching process for both employers and job-seekers—especially those with
barriers to employment.
Thesis Supervisor: Paul Osterman
Deputy Dean and Nanyang Technological University Professor of Human Resources and
Management, MIT Sloan School of Management
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8CHAPTER ONE
Study Description and Context
Introduction
Research Problem and Rationale
This dissertation is about regional institutional reform driven by federal, state, and local policies.
On one hand it describes an experiment in Boston to improve labor market functioning by
restructuring a regional workforce development system through the development of new
organizations and relationships to better connect job-seekers and employers. On the other hand,
it is a cautionary tale of conflict and adaptation as the high expectations of ambitious public
policy are translated into practice with limited resources and mixed interests. Overall, this study
provides an institutional history of Boston’s workforce development system through the focal
lens of three One-Stop Career Centers between their founding in 1996 and 2002—a period
covering changing labor market and institutional conditions.  In examining the relationships
between organizational strategies, adaptation, and networks with the planning, practice, and
performance of One-Stop Career Centers, this dissertation helps address research gaps regarding
publicly-funded labor market intermediaries. The study’s specific contribution is a conceptual
framework and analysis that helps clarify and categorize diversity, adaptation, and outcomes
among career centers. Insights from this investigation are relevant to scholars researching labor
market intermediation as well as to policymakers and practitioners concerned with employment
9brokering—especially involving disadvantaged job-seekers—and with the promises and
problems associated with the more than 1,900 One-Stop Career Centers across the country.1
This study reveals that each of Boston’s One-Stops has a distinctive strategic orientation derived
from their different joint-venture operating partnerships. In documenting the development of the
One-Stops, this research finds that strategic choices and network relationships had implications
for their planning, practices and performance. As context for this argument, this study provides
an analysis of three interacting transformations: changing labor market institutions, shifting
federal policies, and evolving public and nonprofit relations. It is the interplay of these factors
that have increased the importance of strategy and networks in the workforce development
environment.
Economic restructuring, federal employment and welfare policy shifts, and evolving
nonprofit/public interactions are transforming the organizational forms, functions, and
relationships of regional workforce development systems. These changes have raised the
importance of intermediaries in the labor market, especially for disadvantaged workers. In recent
years, the need for intermediation in the labor market has increased due to collapsing internal
labor markets, shifting work and employment patterns, and weakening employment outcomes for
disadvantaged workers (Osterman 1999).2 These trends result from the evolving global,
distributed, technological economy that is changing relationships among workers and firms
towards increasingly flexible, contingent, and network arrangements  (Benner 2000);
                                                
1 In 2003, there are 1,968 comprehensive One-Stop Career Centers—including Boston’s three career centers—and
7,523 offices that provide limited career center services.
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(Herzenberg, Alic and Wial 1998). Instead of the post-World War II labor market institutional
structure defined by “internal labor markets”—relatively stable, long-term associations providing
skills training and internal career ladders—the worker-employer relationship is now increasingly
flexible, contingent, and mediated by intermediary structures (Benner 2000; Herzenberg, Alic
and Wial 1998; Osterman 1999).3 4One dimension of the current economic restructuring is higher
employment mobility—both voluntary and involuntary job shifts—and attempts to remake
institutions to help workers increasingly maneuver through multiple-firm careers in a more
dynamic labor market.  Central to this issue are questions about what kinds of institutions and
intermediary structures are adapting to changing labor market conditions and whether they are
influencing employment outcomes (Osterman et al. 2001).
In addition, federal policy changes involving the devolution of government programs have been
transforming the local landscapes of public service delivery. For example, welfare reform
(Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 1996), workforce
development (Workforce Investment Act 1998), and housing (Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act 1998) are devolving responsibilities to state and local levels, shifting federal
support from job training to job placement, and encouraging labor market participation as a
                                                                                                                                                            
2 While there is consensus that labor market conditions have changed, researchers disagree about the extent of this
change as well as the advantages and disadvantages for workers, employers, and the economy (Carré 2000).
3 Other trends influencing adaptation in intermediary structures include: shifting work and employment patterns,
weakening employment outcomes for disadvantaged workers, more voluntary and involuntary job shifts, and the
evolving global, distributed, technological economy (Herzenberg, Alic and Wial 1998; Osterman et al. 2001).
4 In their literature review examining  whether connections between employers and employees has weakened in the
1990s, Kruse and Blasi (1998) found increased risk of worker displacement, declining proportions of men but not
women in long-term employment relationships, increased temporary help agency employment, and decreased job
satisfaction, employer commitment, and loyalty measures.
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means towards economic self-sufficiency.5 These three “policy shocks” signal not only a
retrenchment of the welfare state but also reveal an increased reliance on competitive market-
based mechanisms for resolving public policy dilemmas. Whether called “privatization,”
“marketization,” “new public management,” or “market-based governance,” many researchers
suggest that such changing public policies increasingly rely on notions of competition in
government practices as a means to spur efficiency, effectiveness, and innovation (Barzelay
2001; Donahue 1989; Donahue and Nye 2002; Gruening 2001; Kettle 1997).6
Concurrent to the growing “marketization” of the welfare state has been the increasing
“commercialization” of the nonprofit sector (Weisbrod 1998). Together, these transformations
have contributed to a broad trend among public and nonprofit organizations of increasingly
sharing discretionary authority over the operation and delivery of publicly financed services
(Boris and Steuerle 1999; Salamon and Elliott 2002). In recent decades, there has been a marked
increase in the scope of interactions between nonprofit organizations and government agencies at
federal, state, and local levels.7 Nonprofits now routinely help enact and implement public
policies through a variety of direct and indirect governmental contracts, grants, incentives, and
subsidies. Researchers studying the rise in this sectoral inter-penetration have observed blurred
organizational boundaries between nonprofits and government and an associated tendency
                                                
5 For example, welfare reform ended a 60-year old program of income transfers as entitlements in favor of a time-
limited program emphasizing job attachment, with the presumption that labor market participation will lead to
economic self-sufficiency. At the same time, public agencies and nonprofit employment and training providers
previously focused on “supply-side” job-seeker skills and supports must now also address “demand-side” employer
needs.
6 See Lynn (1998) for a theoretical critique of new public management and similar notions of market-oriented
governance.
7 One indication of this trend has been the dramatic growth in the number of organizations with nonprofit, tax-
exempt status. Relatedly, a majority of publicly-financed social services are now delivered through nonprofits rather
than directly by government agencies (Salamon 1993).
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towards inter-sectoral relationships in both developing and implementing public policies
(Kamerman and Kahn 1989; Kettl 2002; Kramer 1998; Musolf and Seidman 1980; Salamon
2002).
Alongside these shifting policy and organizational trends has been a transforming labor market
institutional landscape and the emergence of new labor market intermediaries (LMIs): third-
party organizations involved in labor matching, training, and career mobility.8 Although LMIs
have functioned for several decades—primarily brokering information and services between
jobseekers and employers—some researchers suggest that newer LMIs reflect organizational
experimentation and innovation in an era of institutional restructuring. Researchers find that
LMIs engage in a range of activities that include: 1) conducting passive job-brokering; 2)
supporting social networks among workers; 3) improving the efficiency of the labor-matching
process; 4) reforming supply-side workforce development institutions; and 5) trying to change
employer demand or firm behavior through bargaining or altered power relations (Benner 2000;
Kazis 1998; Osterman 1999). Analysts have examined a variety of intermediary forms including:
temporary agencies (Nollen 1996); internet-based job brokers (Autor 2000); union and
membership-based initiatives (Benner 2000); community-based staffing services  (Carre et al.
2003; Seavey 1998); and employer associations (Richards and Herranz Jr. 2001). Yet, despite
growing scholarly and policy interest in LMIs, there is still relatively little known about their
                                                
8 Labor market intermediaries are not new and have operated for many decades in the form of public sector
Employment Services, union hiring halls, and temporary staffing agencies. Yet these LMIs did not account for
significant labor market activity because of the dominance of a post-War employment institutional framework
emphasizing long-term attachments between workers and firms, internal job ladders, and intra-firm and inter-firm
consistent wage setting practices (Kazis 1998; Osterman 1999).
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institutional and public policy context.9 In particular, much less is known about the roles of
publicly-funded new LMIs: One-Stop Career Centers.10 The result is an incomplete
understanding of the LMI phenomenon and its implications for public policy.
One-Stop Career Centers warrant examination for several reasons. Career centers represent an
important yet under-analyzed form of the LMI phenomenon. More so than other LMI types,
career centers are directly related to federal and local policies regarding labor matching and
employment and training. Federal policy designates career centers the centerpieces of local
workforce development systems across the country. Consequently, career centers are widespread
                                                
9 Following North (1990), “institution” refers to the practices, norms, tangible and tacit rules that are shared by
organizations in a common environment. This definition is consistent with the interpretation of researchers of  “new
institutionalism” that tend to emphasize an institutional field (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). However, this
dissertation also draws upon the analytical approach of  “old institutionalism” that suggests that organizational
behavior may influence institutional context. In this dissertation, “system” and “institution” are used
interchangeably, except in cases where “system” refers to the dynamic flows of information and resources  among
bundled organizational networks with shared objectives. For example, the “employment and training system” refers
to nonprofit, governmental, and commercial organizations involved in providing publicly-subsidized employment
training. Further, a system may be comprised of “sub-systems” of organizational networks. For example, health care
training providers comprise a subsystem of the employment and training system. A system is distinguished by
dynamic information and resource relationships among organizational networks. However, organizational networks
are not necessarily systems. An organizational “network” refers to a set of connections, links, ties that form a
relationship structures and include multiple organizational types such as partnerships, alliances, and coalitions.
Organizations within a network may have varying degrees of relationships (e.g., formal to informal, strong or weak)
with other organizations in that network. Consequently, “inter-organizational ties” and “network ties” are used
interchangeably. In this study, institutional ties, relationships, and connections refer to transactions between
organizations operating as part of system in an institutional environment. I distinguish these transactions as
information exchange (i.e., legal, political, procedural, fiscal, social) or resource exchange (i.e., money, labor,
supplies, facilities).
10 By publicly-funded new LMIs I refer to One-Stop Career Centers legislated by the federal 1998 Workforce
Investment Act. These publicly-funded new LMIs supplanted the public Employment Service which was a nation-
wide system of local employment offices established in 1933. The Employment Service did passive job-matching,
had little connection to employment and training services, and focused on the least skilled jobseekers. In contrast,
the One-Stops cultivate employer relationships, connect to the employment and training system by administering
vouchers; and serve a broader population of jobseekers. Unlike the federal Employment Service which received
most of its operating resources by administering unemployment benefits and had few legislated or funding ties to
other organizations, the One-Stops are mandated to act as the institutional and funding hub for the local workforce
development system. The public Employment Service was characterized by weak relations to jobseekers and
employers and historically did not perform well for either job seekers or employers in terms of the quality of its
information or its function as a public labor market intermediary.  For indications of its poor performance, see
Seavey and Kazis (1994), and Holzer (1996). For an historical and institutional explanation of its poor performance
from a national perspective, see Weir (1992).
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across the country—numbering 1,900 locations in 2003—affecting large numbers of workers and
employers. They also encompass varied organizational types due to sponsorship by government,
nonprofit, and commercial operators, suggesting that their institutional connections and activities
extend throughout the state, market, and civil society sectors. Moreover, many career centers
function as hybrid organizations that operate within the blurred boundaries of public and
nonprofit entities. Related to their legislative mandate, career centers provide employment
brokering services to the general public—anybody who walks in the door—as well as must
provide targeted services to very disadvantaged job-seekers—people with employment barriers
including welfare recipients and disabled people. Finally, more so than most other LMIs, career
centers are directly connected to the institutional employment and training networks that are
particularly important to the employment outcomes of disadvantaged workers (Herranz Jr. 2001).
Not only do most existing analyses tend to overlook publicly-funded LMIs, but they also over-
emphasize LMIs as single organizations mediating between jobseekers and employers thus
neglect to fully account for institutional ties in the labor matching process.11 According to Wolf-
Powers (2001, p.31),
scholars and practitioners should avoid thinking of LMIs simply as the sponsors of
programs and incorporate analysis of them as institutions, examining the sociological and
historical literatures on craft and industrial unions, community colleges, community
                                                
11 For example, Bernhardt, et. al. (2001) do not include One-Stops in their analysis of LMIs operating in the Silicon
Valley and Milwaukee. However, they conclude that the demand-side strategies of  LMIs are limited in changing
firm employment practices and will require public policy intervention. In a companion paper focusing on job
placement and career mobility, Benner, et. al. (2001) similarly do not include One-Stops in their analysis. However,
they find that "individual LMIs provide some valuable services, but no single organization is able to provide the full
range of services necessary to have a significant impact in building career mobility for a large sector of the labor
market." They conclude that increased coordination of labor market intermediaries and tracking workers over time
could contribute to an overall system of supported career mobility (Benner, et. al., 2001, pp. 24-25). These are key
functions assigned to the One-Stop Career Center system as part of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998. In her
study of non-profit LMIs in the telecommunications sectors in New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, Wolf-
Powers (2001) similarly does not examine whether publicly-funded LMIs play a role.
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development corporations and even public sector agencies. By looking at the missions,
organizational structures and histories of institutions more closely, we may be able to
account for their strengths and weaknesses.
The result of not accounting for such factors is an under-conceptualization of the role of LMIs
within the institutional structure of the labor market. This makes the theoretical and policy
implications of new LMIs both incomplete and indeterminate, particularly regarding the
employment prospects of disadvantaged workers.
Institutional ties are especially important to the employment outcomes for disadvantaged
workers.12 Compared to other workers, disadvantaged workers face skill and spatial mismatches,
have less access to good job connections through social networks, and tend to have less access to
education and training opportunities (Briggs 1998; Holzer 1996; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996;
Montgomery 1992; Neckerman and Fernandez 1997; Pastor and Adams 1996; Wilson 1987).
Consequently, such job-seekers tend to depend more on the organizations and services
comprising the employment and training system and the institutional ties that connect the overall
workforce development network (Harrison 1998; Molina 1999).
One-Stops provide appropriate subjects to study publicly-funded LMIs within an institutional
structure because they are centrally embedded within a dense network of governmental,
nonprofit, and private organizations involved in labor market and employment policy. In fact, the
One-Stops are intended to be flexible organizations with the explicit purpose of developing and
mediating the institutional connections of the local workforce development system. For example,
the Boston One-Stops are not government agencies but independent non-profit entities that
16
receive public funds for the purpose of mediating between private employers, jobseekers, and
workforce development institutions.13 Public policies direct One-Stops to change local labor
market institutional arrangements to improve labor exchange, particularly for low-wage low-
skilled workers. As a result, the One-Stops provide an excellent focal lens for better
understanding the changing dynamics of local institutional reform.
Current research about publicly-funded LMIs is inadequate for several reasons. One reason that
there has been little research to date on career careers is that they are relatively new. Many of the
more than 1,900 career centers across the country were officially and formally organized in 2001
as result of the 1998 WIA legislation. Consequently, with the exception of Boston and several
other “implementation” career centers that were formed in the mid-1990s, there has been little
data available to examine career centers. Another reason that career centers are surprisingly
under-researched considering their large numbers and prominent local institutional roles is
related to conceptions of them derived from the legacy of their predecessor the Employment
Service. Many researchers tend to under-emphasize career centers because the centers are
assumed to operate similarly to Employment Service offices that were all administered via state
governmental bureaucratic structures. In contrast, however, One-Stop Career Centers may be
operated by single organizations or partnerships among city or state government departments,
community based or regional nonprofits, and local or national for-profit commercial firms. As a
                                                                                                                                                            
12 By “disadvantaged workers” I refer to those with low-skills, low-education, little work experience, or who may
live in low-income neighborhoods.
13 As such, One-Stop Career Centers are not appropriately described by the literature on: 1) public administration
and management (Borins 1998); 2) public-private partnerships (Brooks, Liebman and Schelling 1984); 3); or on re-
inventing (also known as re-organizing)  government (Osborne and Gaebler 1992). Other conceptions more
appropriate to the One-Stops include “joint venture” or “network organization” (Powell 1990); or “heterarchy” that
describe emergent organizations with interdependent relations, blurred private and public boundaries, flattened
hierarchical internal coordination, and competing and coexisting value systems (Stark 2001).
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result of this variability in organizational sponsorship and structure, career centers are more
complex publicly-funded LMIs than former Employment Services offices. Furthermore, this
organizational and institutional complexity poses a challenge for scholars and policymakers
interested in understanding the operations and performance of new publicly-funded LMIs. To
date, no framework has been offered to adequately conceptualize organizational diversity among
the more than 1,900 career centers operating across the country since 2001. Consequently, most
existing research on career centers tends to be more descriptive than analytical. This dissertation
offers a theoretical framework to help explain career center variation in activities, adaptation,
and performance.
Three Research Questions
To help address gaps in research about new publicly-funded LMIs, this study asks and answers
three main research questions:
• What are the functional roles of career centers under varied operational sponsorship?
• How and to what extent do career centers change in relation to shifting policy and
labor market conditions?
• How do career centers perform as labor market intermediaries and does this
performance relate to differences in organizational processes and adaptability to
changing policy and labor market conditions?
The first question is: what are the roles and functions of One-Stop Career Centers? Apart from
their basic similarity to other LMIs as employment brokers between job-seeker and employers,
little is known about the specific operations of career centers and whether these have any
relationship to a career center’s role as hub within a local workforce development system. To
answer this question, this study examines the organizational processes of career centers as a
means to reveal the characteristics of their organizational management and activities, as well as
the interaction between the two. A process examination enables an investigation of
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organizational dynamics. Such an approach is especially necessary in an analysis of
organizational and institutional change, which is a major focus of this dissertation. This study
examines process along two dimensions: planning and practice. Planning refers to the set of
organizational processes that include governance authority; managerial structure; administrative
control; staffing and resource coordination; strategy development and enactment; information
management, technology, and processing; and organizational feedback and learning. As proxies
for these factors, this study focuses on three indications of organizational planning: governance
(i.e., operator oversight, advisory board interactions), management coordination (i.e., staffing
structure, Continuous Quality Improvement activities), and information processing (i.e., data
management and analysis, information technology systems).
The second dimension of the process analysis—practice—refers to the set of organizational
processes that include program design; service delivery mechanisms; substantive content of
services; flows of services; and services-focused organizational network relationships (e.g.,
information and resource interactions and partnerships; tie weakness/strength; relationship
formality). As proxies for these factors, this study focuses on three indicators of organizational
practice: job-seeker services (i.e., categorical and universal service delivery; program design),
employer services (i.e., free and fee-based services; customized services), and network activities
(i.e., information or resource transactions; strength and recurrence of ties). Examining the three
planning indicators and the three practice indicators yield an understanding of organizational
processes that answer the question of career center roles and functions.
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In addressing the question of career center operations, it is worth noting that more than 50 years
of past research on publicly-funded LMIs—Employment Service offices—found widespread
evidence of labor brokering activities characterized by passive services, ineffective matching,
bureaucratic processes, focus on disadvantaged job-seekers, and weak connections to job-seekers
and employers (Jacobson 1995; Weir 1992). Based on these studies, a plausible “null”
hypothesis to the question of career center functions is that—like the Employment Service—
career centers are bureaucratic, ineffective, passively connected to job-seekers and employers.
However, in contrast to the Employment Services administered by state bureaucracies, career
centers may be operated by a community-based organization, by a government agency, by a for-
profit firm, or by combinations of these organizational types. Little is known about whether such
differences in sponsorship influence planning or practice. In answering the question of career
center functions, this study also asks the sub-question of whether these roles and functions are
related to differences in organizational type.
To addressing the sub-question of whether organizational types are related to career center
functions, this study develops a framework of organizational archetypes built upon the idea of
three distinct “strategic orientations” that encompass the principal organizational types involved
in operating career centers: “entrepreneurial,” “bureaucratic,” and “community.”14 This
framework is a reformulation of three basic mechanisms of organizational control: markets (i.e.,
                                                
14 The notion of “strategic orientation” is consistent with research suggesting that there are patterns of organizational
behavior, expression and common understanding (Louis 1985) that may also be interpreted as ideology (Van
Maanen and Barley 1985) or strategy (Weick 1985). These patterns may be interpreted as cognitive schema that are
derived from surface level indicators (e.g. language and behavioral norms, espoused values) and structural level
indicators (e.g., decision-making process, internal coordination, formalization) (Martin 1992). Moreover, the
different types of strategic orientation may be considered as metaphors (Morgan 1998) for the dominant form of
control in some organizations. Identifying the main form of coordination in order to comprehend organizational
performance in these organizations (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983).
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“entrepreneurial”), bureaucracies (i.e., “bureaucratic”), and clans (i.e., “community”) (Wilkins
and Ouchi 1983). In this strategic orientation framework, entrepreneurial refers to a shared
orientation that is market-focused, opportunistic, and places high normative value on quid pro
quo benefits; bureaucratic refers to a shared orientation that is hierarchically-focused, rule-
driven, and places a high normative value on legal authority; and community refers to a shared
orientation that is collective-oriented, relational, and places a high normative value on moral
authority. This study finds that distinct strategic orientations among the career centers are related
to their organizational processes. That is, the strategic and tactical choices made by career
centers influence their planning and practice of labor market intermediary activities.
Investigating career centers’ planning and practice is relevant because such analysis yields
insight about the antecedents and consequences of organizational adaptation.
Consequently, the second main research question is: to what extent do career centers change in
relation to shifting institutional conditions? Most research about LMIs under-emphasizes their
connections to changing institutional and policy context. Understanding this context is important
because one purpose for examining new LMIs is to document labor market institutional change
and innovation and the implications for public policy. And, although new LMIs are argued to be
adaptive organizational responses to institutional change, few researchers have explicitly
examined organizational dynamics and change among LMIs. Most LMI research tends to be
static and ahistorical in its organizational analysis. Though describing the origins of LMIs, many
studies emphasize cross-organizational comparisons during a one or two year time period.
Moreover, many of these studies were conducted during the mid- to late 1990s—during
relatively low levels of unemployment—when intermediaries tended to have higher levels of
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leverage with employers. In some cases, “model” intermediaries diminished or disappeared
following the economic downturn of 2001.15 There is little information yet available on how
LMIs function during a weakened labor market, arguably a period when job-seekers need such
intermediaries the most. Organizational change is especially relevant to career centers because
publicly-funded LMIs are generally considered inflexible and non-adaptive, per the legacy of the
Employment Service. Therefore, a plausible hypothesis about career centers is that they—like
the Employment Service—are non-adaptive.
To answer the question of adaptation or non-adaptation among career centers, this dissertation
examines whether their organizational processes changed relative to shifting labor market and
institutional conditions. To answer this question, this study analyzes change among the six
process indicators previously discussed. Regarding indications of organizational planning, this
study investigates changes in operator governance, management coordination, and information
processing. Regarding indications of organizational practice, this study investigates changes in
job-seeker services, employer services, and organizational network relationships. More
specifically, this study examines whether career centers with distinct strategic orientations
experience varying adaptability of their organizational processes in relation to changing
institutional and labor market conditions. That is, to what extent do career centers with different
strategic orientation change in relation to a shifting institutional and labor market environment.
                                                
15 For example, an internet and membership-based intermediary examined by Benner (2000), disbanded in 2001
following the collapse of many “dot com” companies.
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In answering the question of whether career centers are adaptive, this study focuses on
organizational change during six years encompassing federal policy reform—welfare reform and
workforce development reform—as well as a tightened and loosened labor market.
The historical analysis is formulated around three eras with distinctly associated environmental
opportunities and challenges. The analysis of “Era 1”—corresponding to the period including
1996 and 1998—examines the initial conditions and start-up of the centers. The analysis of “Era
2”—corresponding to the two-year period of 1999 and 2000—examines the career centers during
the era of welfare reform implementation and of a tightened labor market.16 The analysis of “Era
3”—corresponding to the two-year period of 2001 and 2002—examines the centers during the
era of WIA implementation and a weakened labor market. Whether and how the career centers
change in relation to these shifting conditions raises in relief the limits and possibilities of their
respective organizational processes.
An understanding of career centers’ functions and adaptation certainly broadens existing
conceptions of labor market intermediation. However, especially from a public policy
perspective, it is also important to know more about the outcomes and performance of career
centers. Therefore, the third main question of this study is: how do the variations in career center
orientation and their responses to the changing policy and labor market environment relate to
performance? Based on past research on the Employment Service that found poor performance
in terms of placement rates and services to job-seekers and employers, it is plausible to
hypothesize that career centers also exhibit weak outcomes in these regards. In answering this
                                                
16 Welfare reform refers to the implementation of Transitional Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which
replaced the former welfare program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).
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question, this study analyzes two dimensions of career center performance.17 One level of this
analysis examines operational performance based on a set of indicators related to the annual
outcomes of labor exchange that includes job placement rates, number of job postings, and job-
seeker education levels.18 This study uses placement rates as a primary indicator because it is the
most reliable and consistent indicator collected since the Boston career centers began operating,
and because it is the only performance benchmark available to compare the career centers with
former Employment Service offices. Another level of analysis examines organizational
performance based on a qualitative investigation of indications of organizational learning,
service innovation, and systemic robustness.19 Analyzed together, indications of operational and
organizational performance provide a means to assess the career centers’ historical effectiveness
during each of three time periods. As part of this longitudinal analysis, the career centers’
performance is compared and contrasted with one another. By examining the historical
interaction between career centers’ strategic orientation and their planning, practice, and
performance, this study is able to explore the public policy implications associated with career
centers’ strategic orientation. Table 1 presents a matrix of the analytical framework used to
                                                
17 As of 2002, neither Boston nor Massachusetts had developed information systems to reliably and consistently
collect career center data about wage rates, job tenure, or detailed job placement demographics. Massachusetts plans
to implement such a system in 2004. As mandated by the US Department of Labor per the implementation of the
Workforce Investment Act, Massachusetts (along with all other states) began issuing reports in 2000 on its WIA
performance, but these reports focused on the relatively small numbers of WIA voucher recipients. Consequently,
the annual documentation that serves as a main data source for this study is the most consistent and reliable data on
career center activities and performance for the Boston career centers since they began operating in 1996.  
18 When data are available, this study analyzes other relevant indicators such as number of employer accounts, job-
seeker race/ethnicity and gender, sub-populations such as welfare recipients, or contract performance (i.e., job
placements of welfare recipients).
19 Organizational learning refers to modifications made to organizational processes based on internal or external
(i.e., environmental) feedback (Argyris and Schon 1978; Senge 1994). Service innovation refers to the development
of services or products based on recombinant knowledge or capacity. Systemic robustness refers to the stability or
growth of organizational processes relative to changing institutional and labor market conditions. In contrast to the
other sets of indicators that rely upon annually-available quantitative data, this third dimension of performance is
analyzed in the context of the career centers’ operations during each of the three eras, and their change from era to
era. Moreover, information for this analysis is derived from the process indicators discussed previously.
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answer the three research questions related to career center functions, adaptation, and
performance.
Table 1: Analytical Matrix
Organization Dimension
of Analysis
Indicators ERA 1
Start-Up
(1996-1998)
ERA 2
TANF &
Tight Labor
Market
(1999-2000)
ERA 3
WIA &
Loose Labor
Market
(2001-2002)
Planning i. governance;
ii. management coordination;
iii. information processing.
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
Practice i. job-seeker services;
ii. employer services;
iii. network activities.
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
One-Stop
Career
Centers
Performance A. operational:
i. job placement rates;
ii. number of job postings;
iii. jobseeker education levels;
B. organizational:
i. organizational learning;
ii. service innovation;
iii. systemic robustness
Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5
This dissertation is structured to provide integrative analyses and answers to the three main
research questions. As a context for answering the question of career center roles and functions,
chapter two provides an institutional background for publicly-funded LMIs as well as a
“strategic orientation” framework that theorizes each Boston career center as an archetypal
“community,” “bureaucratic,” or “entrepreneurial” organization. This framework is the analytical
lens used throughout the subsequent chapters to clarify and categorize the diverse sets of career
center roles and functions, adaptation, and performance. To answer the question of career center
adaptation, this study offers three data analysis chapters that each correspond to distinct eras of
policy and labor market conditions. During each time period, the career centers are examined and
contrasted regarding their different responses to changing policy and labor market environments.
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As part of this historical investigation, the three data chapters also analyze the centers’ changing
organizational processes and performance during the different eras. The final chapter provides a
summary and synthetic analysis of the career centers’ functions, adaptation, and performance as
well as a discussion of the public policy implications of this thesis.
Research Approach: Multi-method Analysis
This study is based on a multi-method approach combining qualitative and quantitative data that
were analyzed to develop three comparative cases studies of One-Stop Career Centers (Miles and
Huberman 1994; Yin 1994). Following Ragin (1987, p. 106), the “cases are treated as an
interpretive combination of characteristics, not as arrays of sample variables.” Qualitative data
was collected through three mechanisms. One method included semi-structured interviews—
identified by “snowball sampling”—that lasted between one and two-and-one-half hours with the
directors and staff of One-Stops, partner organizations, and allied organizations. Qualitative data
were collected via 50 semi-structured interviews with representatives of the career centers,
public agencies, nonprofit organizations, and private sector employers during 1998, 2000, and
2002. A second method was a textual analysis of annual organizational documentation
assembled by the Boston Workforce Investment Board (WIB) as part of each One-Stop’s charter
review process that includes strategic plans, program budgets, customer satisfaction surveys,
employer focus groups, and monitoring reports by the WIB.20 A third method is participant
observation in staff meetings of the One-Stops as well as in their sponsored career workshops,
industry briefings, and job fairs. Quantitative data was collected from annual review
                                                
20 Charter Review is a re-certification process for each One-Stop that is conducted every three years. The process is
information intensive and includes documentation such as budgets, strategic plans, WIB monitoring reports,
procedural flow charts, inter-agency memos, demographics, and job placement data.  In addition to the Charter
Review, the PIC conducts Annual Reviews that rely on similar information.
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documentation reports as well as the One-Stop Career System's administrative information
system that contains customer databases and placement data.
The investigation included three levels of inquiry: descriptive, relational, and evaluative. The
descriptive inquiry involved analyzing the history, characteristics, and services of the One-Stops.
The relational inquiry examined the organizational ties of the One-Stops in terms of 1) supply-
side organizations (e.g., employment and training providers, public and nonprofit social services,
public housing authority); 2) demand-side organizations (e.g., employers and employer
associations); and 3) labor exchange organizations (e.g., temporary staffing agencies, job referral
services). The evaluative inquiry included interpreting quantitative outcome data such as
placement rates for different types of job-seekers, and qualitative data from employer and job-
seeker focus groups.
Research Setting: A Natural Experiment
Boston provides an appropriate location for this study because it combines “new economy”
attributes with an "old economy" industrial structure. Boston is not typical of other locales and so
its characteristics can not necessarily be generalized. However, its economic patterns raise in
relief and so provide insights into the changing nature of labor market institutions. The Boston
One-Stop Career Centers (One-Stops) are particularly relevant because they were established in
1996, making them among the first such publicly-supported new LMIs in the country and, after
several years of experience and maturation, provide rich sources of data for analysis.21 The
Boston One-Stops are appropriate sites to study publicly-funded LMIs within an institutional
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structure because they are centrally embedded within a dense network of governmental,
nonprofit, and private organizations involved in Boston's labor market and employment policy
environment.22  In fact, the One-Stops were created as new flexible organizations with the
explicit purpose of developing and mediating the institutional connections of the local workforce
development system.23  Moreover, the One-Stops were selected through a process encouraging
competitive, distinctive, and innovative approaches while sharing four goals: universal access,
customer choice, integrated services, and accountability. One consequence is that each One-Stop
is a strategic venture partnership between different types of organizations that emphasize
different institutional relationships. For example, The Work Place—operated through a
partnership between an entrepreneurial non-profit (e.g., it offers many fee-based services) and
the city agency designated to promote economic development—has most aggressively cultivated
connections and services to employers. Boston Career Link—operated by three community
based organizations—was embedded in dense networks of nonprofits serving specialized
populations and communities. JobNet—operated by the Massachusetts Division of Employment
and Training and New England’s largest nonprofit social services agency—maintained strong
ties to public agencies providing services to the unemployed, welfare recipients, and publicly-
assisted housing residents.24 These differences in organizational partnerships among the One-
Stops provide rich and varied sets of institutional relationships for study. Consequently, the three
                                                                                                                                                            
21 The federal WIA One-Stop Career Center concept was informed by Massachusetts’ Boston One-Stop Career
Centers, which received implementation grant funds from the Department of Labor in 1994 to develop the approach.
22 One-Stops warrant examination because recent federal policy designates them the centerpieces of local workforce
development systems across the country. Public policies direct One-Stops to change local labor market institutional
arrangements to improve workforce development, particularly for low-wage low-skilled workers.
23 The One-Stops are not government agencies but independent entities that receive public funds. As such, these
organizations are not appropriately described by the literature on: 1) public administration (Borins 1998); 2) public-
private partnerships (Brooks, Liebman and Schelling 1984); 3); re-inventing government (Osborne and Gaebler
1992); or 4) inter-governmental decision-making (Christensen 1999).
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different Boston career centers provide a natural experiment to examine how their distinct
strategic orientations influence their planning, practice, and performance. Due to the particularity
of Boston’s institutional and labor market context, the this study’s findings regarding the specific
organizational functions and performance of the three career centers are not generalizable to
other locales or career centers. However, because the strategic orientation framework is stylized
and based on organizational archetypes, the theoretical implications of this examination may be
extended to other career centers and, to some extent, to other labor market intermediaries.
Outline of Dissertation
Chapter One provides a framework for analyzing the activities of the publicly-funded labor
market intermediaries. The context is that economic restructuring, federal policy shifts, and
evolving government-nonprofit relations are concurrent transforming processes that have
increased the importance of publicly-funded intermediaries in the labor market. In order to
understand these LMIs, an institutional and network approach is required. This is because
publicly-funded LMIs function in political environments, have blurred government-nonprofit
boundaries, and also serve disadvantaged job-seekers.
Chapter Two sets the federal, state, and local context for workforce development. This chapter
provides an overview of the federal Employment Service, describes the Workforce Investment
Act, and explains the competitive One-Stop system in Massachusetts and Boston. The Boston
Workforce Investment Board is highlighted as an intermediary that oversees the One-Stop Career
Centers as well as facilitates their adoption of reflective practice and learning organization
                                                                                                                                                            
24 The private placement firm of Drake, Beam, and Morin was JobNet’s co-operator until it was replaced in early
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approaches. This chapter also provides brief histories of the operators that run Boston’s career
centers. This information is the foundation for the subsequent analysis linking the operators’
distinct histories and organizational attributes with the strategic orientation of each career center.
Chapter Three is first of three chapters that examines the career centers historically. This chapter
reviews the start-up period of the centers that started in 1996 and ended in 1998. This chapter
establishes the basic approach of each center to employment brokering. In this and the next two
chapters, three dimensions are investigated. The first area is planning and includes issues related
to operator governance, organizational management, strategic planning, and the use of
information. The next area of analysis is practice and includes development and delivery of
services, as well as network ties with other organizations involving information and resource
transactions. A third domain involves outcomes indicators such as number of job-seekers placed
in employment, placement rates, and populations served. The three dimensions of analysis are
subsequently explored in the following two chapters. Chapter Four examines the career centers
during the era of welfare reform implementation and of a tight labor market, a period
approximately encompassing the years 1999 and 2000.  Chapter Five investigates the centers
during the era of WIA implementation and a weakened labor market, a period approximately
encompassing the years 2001 and 2002.
Chapter Six provides an analysis of the three career centers focusing on the advantages and
disadvantages of the centers’ strategic orientation on their planning, practice, and performance.
This explores how reduced resources and mixed interests framed the institutional options
                                                                                                                                                            
1999 by Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD).
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available to the One-Stops, thus amplifying the consequences of the strategic decisions made. It
also reviews the role of strategic orientation in organizational and systemic adaptation and
discusses implications for research and policy. Finally, the chapter offers general principles for
public policies aimed at improving the functions of publicly-funded labor market intermediaries
specifically, and local institutional reform in general.
Context
Changing Labor Market Institutions
For several decades after World War II, the U.S. economy grew rapidly.  During this time, labor
productivity was high and many American workers were able to participate in the prosperity.
From 1946 to 1973, average wages, adjusted for inflation, grew at 2 to 3 percent per year.  Such
rapid wage growth fueled upward mobility as many workers experienced large income gains
during their careers (Levy 1998).  Workers were able to benefit from the booming economy
partly as a result of labor market institutions that supported relative stability in worker
attachments to firms.  Osterman (1999) describes the postwar institutional framework of the
labor market as characterized by 1) implicit assumptions that firms and employees had long-term
attachments to each other; 2) dominant images of internal labor markets; 3) wage setting
practices that placed emphasis on internal equity in firms’ wage structure and external wage
consistency among firms and industries (i.e. unions).  On the whole these institutional
arrangements emphasized stabilizing internal labor markets rather than facilitating job search and
information exchange.
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By the end of the 20th century, the postwar institutional framework had collapsed.  It has been
replaced with a labor market structure characterized by some of lowest and highest
unemployment rates in more than 30 years and the highest levels of income inequality since the
Depression.25 Along with tremendous economic growth and low unemployment, the new
economy is characterized by new forms of work organization and changing labor market
institutions (Herzenberg, Alic and Wial 1998; Osterman 1999).26  The associated transformation
of relations between workers and employers towards more flexible and contingent arrangements
has contributed to relatively stagnant wage gains, increasing income inequality, as well as
declining job security, increased workplace-related stress, and difficulty in balancing work and
family (Heldrich Center for Workforce Development 1999).  One dimension of the current
economic restructuring is higher mobility—both voluntary and involuntary job shifts—and the
institutions that are helping workers increasingly maneuver through multiple-firm careers.
For example, temporary services are expanding in numbers and importance.  Increases in the use
temporary agencies are an indication of a more flexible, dynamic, contingent labor market.  The
number of temporaries employed by staffing companies tripled from 1984 to 1994 according to
U.S. government statistics (Nollen 1996).27 Not only have flexible staffing arrangements
                                                
25 There are several explanations for increased income inequality. Levy argues that the culprits are 1) slow wage
growth since 1973; 2) upwards skill bias; 3) long-term to services; 4) loss of worker bargaining power (Levy 1998).
Danziger and Gottschalk point to technological changes, globalization of markets, and other structural changes in
the economy that created more demand for higher-skilled workers (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995).   
26 Osterman (1999) suggests that the postwar labor market structure collapsed due to 1) increased international
competition; 2) technological change due to computerization as well as due to organizational design; 3) increased
influence of capital markets on management; 4) breakdown in internal labor markets; 5) decreased employment
tenure; 6) changes in wage determination practices; 7) decreased union influence; and  8) changes in patterns of
corporate control. He argues that these changes are increasing turbulence in the labor market. As evidence he cites
falling job tenure, the rise of contingent work, and the growing industry of temporary staffing firms.
27 Danziger and Gottschalk (Danziger and Gottschalk 1995, p. 147) note that the number of employees in temporary
staffing agencies increased sevenfold between 1972 and 1991 from about 200,000 to more than 1,400,000 but still
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expanded in the 1990s, there is widespread use of flexible staffing arrangements among
establishments of all sizes and across all industries (Houseman 1997; Houseman 1999).  Some
researchers suggest that temporary services have advantages such as 1) lowering worker and
employer search costs; 2) decreasing transaction costs and improving the functioning of the
“chaotic” and “inefficient” low-skill labor market; 3) giving workers multiple opportunities to
develop skills; and 4) giving employers and workers more flexibility to choose job assignments.
At the same time, temporary services have disadvantages such as 1) offering lower wages; 2)
furnishing fewer and smaller fringe benefits that those provided by permanent employment or by
temporary work covered by collective bargaining agreements; 3) providing little or no job
security; 4) encouraging less human capital development (Mangum and Mangum 1986; Nollen
1996).  Also, there is inconclusive evidence about the extent to which temporary workers are
“promoted” to full time employment.28
There is more consensus on the emphasis that temporary firms place on information and the job-
matching process.  For example, Manpower Inc., the largest temporary help firm in the world,
has developed sophisticated systems around their core business: quality and reliable data about
information and workers.  As a result, the company generates large volumes of detailed
information that is used to help make each job match including information about temporary
employees, available jobs, local labor markets and employer’s business needs (Seavey and Kazis
                                                                                                                                                            
represent less than 2 percent of the workforce. “The ‘temp’ industry was as large as the steel industry by 1982. By
1986 it was the size of the auto industry, and in 1992 it was roughly as large as these two industries combined.”.
28 In a survey of 2,189 temporary employees conducted by the National Association of Temporary Services, 38
percent reported being offered full-time jobs by the companies where they went on assignment (Nollen 1996).
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1994).29  The emphasis on information helps the company customize each job match to ensure a
good fit between its customers: jobseekers and employers.  Such an approach is in contrast to the
bureaucratic, passive, automated job referral system of the Employment Service, which did not
offer individualized service.  Seavey and Kazis (1994) argue that the proven success of
Manpower offers several lessons to public labor market intermediaries such as 1) focusing on
quality and detailed labor matching information; 2) customizing services; 3) offering specialized
computer training programs; and 4) effectively brokering information.
Labor Market Institutions and Networks
If competitiveness in the labor market is a function of skill qualifications as well as information
and job search, then the quality and structure of information and job connections are likely to
influence getting a job.  There is considerable economic and sociological literature about how
personal and institutional networks are used to obtain jobs (Briggs 1998; Granovetter 1995;
Holzer 1996; Kasinitz and Rosenberg 1996; Montgomery 1992; Neckerman and Fernandez
1997).30 For example, in his classic study on recruitment and hiring, Granovetter found that job
information traveled along a web of informal and sometimes circuitous paths among
acquaintances.  Having a wide array of these extended “weak” ties often produced more
opportunities to learn of job openings—and lead to successful employment outcomes—than a
denser set of “strong” ties.  According to Granovetter, “the structure and dynamics of this
network, though elusive and difficult to analyze, largely determine what information will reach a
                                                
29 Seavey and Kazis (1994) note that Manpower invested more than $15 million in information technology to
improve their skills assessment, training, job search, and referral systems.
30 Some researchers suggest that there is a potential disadvantage to minorities as a result of employer reliance on
informal methods of recruitment (Falcon and Melendez 1999; Holzer 1996).
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given person, and, to that extent, what possibilities will be open to him” (Granovetter 1995, p.
18).
Researchers have noted that job search is not just an individual effort.  In addition to familial and
friendship ties, a person’s social and institutional relationships also matter.  People living in poor
neighborhoods face extra challenges to find work due to social isolation, weak job networks, and
local institutions that are often disconnected from the labor market (Wilson 1996). As a result,
residents and whole communities drop from the information loop about job leads, necessary
qualifications, and behavioral expectations.  In time, even schools and job training programs in
these areas can similarly become disconnected to the market and perpetuate secondary labor
markets (Pastor and Adams 1996).
This suggests that to be competitive in the labor market, a job-seeker must have—in addition to
employable skills—personal and institutional relationships that connect to employers.
According to Molina (1999, p. 16), even if they have skills, some job seekers may be challenged
by limited institutional relationships of organizations such as employment and job training
programs:
In short, rather than a “free market” or level playing field where jobs go simply to the
best qualified, the reality is that persons with contacts and relationships, and whose
communities are served by educational and training institutions with close relationships
with employers, are likely to be more competitive in pursuit of work.
Institutional and Network Theories
Increasing recognition of the institutional context of workforce development has resulted in a
proliferation of initiatives and research around this issue in the 1990s. Corresponding theoretical
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advances have been constrained, however, by an over-reliance on market-based models of firm
alliances, a fragmented literature on inter-organizational relations, blurred nonprofit and
government organizational boundaries, and the general atheoretical nature of network studies.
In recent years there have been several efforts to bridge the institutional divides acting as
employment barriers for the disadvantaged. Across the country, public agencies, employers,
unions, and community-based nonprofit organizations have increasingly developed regional
networks to more effectively manage workforce development efforts connecting job seekers and
employers (Harrison and Weiss 1998, Kazis 1998, Osterman 1999). Other case-study research
has also documented institutional linkages across private, public, and non-governmental
organizations such as multi-stakeholder comprehensive community building collaboratives (Pitt
1998), and interest-based regional alliances among government and nonprofit service providers
(Wallis 1994). Even with the proliferation of such examples and associated case-study reports,
existing theoretical analyses remain underdeveloped regarding networks of community-based
organizations and government. According to Ferguson and Dickens (Ferguson and Dickens
1999, p. 590), “despite the importance of alliances, there are no standard frameworks in urban
change or community development studies for guiding the analysis, design, implementation, or
evaluation of alliance-building processes.”31
One explanation for this is an over-reliance on market-based models of developing and
managing business alliances that may not always extend to governmental and nonprofit alliances.
                                                
31 Another problem is that alliance tend to look at two-sector alliance and not three-sectors. For example, the
Drucker Foundation's latest book, The Collaboration Challenge: How Nonprofits and Businesses Succeed Through
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As Harrison and Weiss (1998) indicate in their book, Workforce Development Networks, many
of the theories of organizational networks informing their research are derived from corporate
strategy and regional economic development. For example, most research about strategic
alliances focuses on inter-firm behavior from two perspectives.32 One view is concerned with
firm behavior in terms of maximizing the resources contributed to the alliance while minimizing
the risks from such involvement (Ring and Van de Ven 1992). The other strand of research
generally emphasizes documenting the conditions for and the advantages of strategic alliances,
such as helping firms to effectively manage networks, share information, and operate at scale
(Fombrun 1992). These types of studies may provide general lessons and insights for public and
nonprofit organizations, but they are limited in their applicability because firms differ from
governmental and nonprofit organizations in important ways.
To begin with, differences between public and private sector organizations have been long
discussed by organization and public administration theorists offering an array of typologies to
classify the distinctions (Dahl and Lindblom 1953; Nutt 1999; Perry and Rainey 1988; Rainey,
                                                                                                                                                            
Strategic Alliances (2000)discusses how businesses can strengthen their bottom lines by partnering with nonprofit
organizations -- and how nonprofits can use such partnerships to further their charitable work.
32 There is no consensus on precise definitions of strategic alliances. On one-side of the discussion, some researchers
argue that all kinds of inter-firm arrangements should be called strategic alliances (Borys and Jemison 1989; Forrest
1992; Lei and Solcum 1991; Murray Jr. and Mahon 1993). In this view, strategic alliance includes relationships such
as joint ventures, equity investment, licensing, joint research and development arrangement, technology swap, and
buyer-supplier relationship. On the other side of the discussion, some researchers adopt a restricted view of strategic
alliances in which independent firms are tied to each other in a substantive manner, i.e., long-term, shared control,
and continued contributions (Devlin and Bleackley 1988; Yoshino and Rangan 1995). In this narrower conception,
strategic alliances include joint ventures, equity investment, joint research and development, and joint marketing.
Furthermore, there is no central theory of strategic alliances. Instead, there are a variety of theories applied to
strategic alliances including transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985), game theory (Parkhe 1993), exchange
theory (Gulati 1995), strategic behavior model (Hagedoorn 1993), and resource and risk management (Das 1998).
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Backoff and Levine 1976; Ring and Perry 1985).33 In general, scholars find that public and
nonprofit organizations behave differently than do private organizations due to their reliance on
government funding, coercive operating rules, differing incentive structures, and regulatory and
accountability procedures (Fogarty 1996; Meyer, Scott and Strang 1987; Perry and Rainey
1988).34 In addition, compared to the private sector, the public sector faces different challenges
in strategic management such as policy ambiguity (versus stable goals such as growth,
profitability, or market share), government openness (versus private decision making), and
competing stakeholder interests (Ring and Perry 1985). Moreover, strategic alliances among
commercial enterprises often arise from firm-level cost/benefit analyses and risk/reward
calculations. In contrast, “strategic alliances” involving public organizations—and to a lesser
extent, nonprofits—often develop as much by internal decision as by external coercion. Public
and nonprofit organizations may form alliances to leverage expertise, reduce risk and costs, or
respond to complex demand for services. However, public and nonprofit organizations may also
obligatorily participate in alliances as a result of legislated mandates or governmental and
philanthropic funding requirements. In these situations, the expected advantages of public and
nonprofit alliances may be undermined due to shifting policy goals, conflicted interests, and
constrained resources.
Complex relationships between government and nonprofit organization also challenge
conventional theories of interorganizational relations. There are limitations to approaches that
                                                
33 The most widely accepted categories of public-private differences are external/environmental (e.g., market versus
politics), transactional (e.g., bargaining versus regulatory), and organizational processes (e.g., analytical versus
influential decision making) (Nutt 1999; Nutt and Backoff 1993; Rainey 1989; Rainey, Backoff and Levine 1976).
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deal generally with inter-organizational exchanges as well as limitations on approaches
specifically addressing governmental and nonprofit relationships. Scott and Meyer (1991)
identify three main inter-organizational analysis approaches that are analytically limited due to
restrictive conceptualizations. Organizational set models tend to emphasize single focal
organizations and their direct economic interdependencies with other organizations. This
perspective directs attention away from the institutional structure and context within which the
organization operates. Organizational population models tend to emphasize ecological
competition among organizations characterized as having similar forms or functions. This
approach tends to ignore the supportive relations and conditions under which organizations
cooperate. Interorganizational field models tend to examine horizontal relationships among
organizations not having formal authority over one another. This view overlooks vertical and
extra-local linkages (e.g., local organizations influenced by state and federal agencies).
Galaskiewicz (1985, p. 298) reviewed the literature on interorganizational relations and found it
“highly fragmented,” and argued that
“different theories are appropriate for explaining interorganizational relations in different
arenas. Power dependency theory and theories of uncertainty reduction seemed most
appropriate in explaining patterns of interorganizational relations in arenas of resource
procurement/allocation. Theories of collective action were most appropriate in explaining
interorganizational relations in political arenas.”
Galaskiewicz (1985, p. 300) also stated that “it is difficult to model organizational and
interorganizational behavior when arenas intersect and overlap.”  This lack of satisfactory
models is especially problematic for understanding public and nonprofit organizational inter-
                                                                                                                                                            
34 Moreover, some researchers argue that there is behavioral variation among public and nonprofit organizations that
corresponds to their dependence on funding, regulation, and degree of “publicness” (Bozeman and Bretschneider
1994; Perry and Rainey 1988).
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relationships because such entities often operate at the intersection of overlapping political, civil,
and commercial sectors.
Public policy implementation studies provide some relevant—though limited—research
involving government and nonprofit relations. Much of this research resulted from the dramatic
expansion in federal programs to improve the conditions of disadvantaged groups and the
functioning of locally provided services. The sudden increase in programs spawned new
government and nonprofit organizations as well as new and different relationships among
existing organizations. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) documented the “complexity of joint
action” among independent and semiautonomous organizations in trying to implement one
program to support public improvement projects and provide employment for minority workers.
Downs (1967) wrote of “leakage of authority” as programs move down into agencies attempting
to gain support of diverse officials with varying goals and interests. To this process Bardach
(1977) added multiple constituencies and their interests.  Marris and Rein (1982) discussed
conflicting interests among difference levels of government, foundations, and community based
organizations. Most of this research is pathologically oriented in that the studies emphasize the
lack of coordination among different agencies often isolated from one another and following
different policies.  Many of these researchers observed that policies, programs, and agencies tend
to be defined in limited, functionally differentiated terms. Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) called
this the “sectoralization” of policies, and today is sometimes referred to as “silos. Moreover,
many of these studies examined how far a program strays from original policy expectations. This
research tends to overlook the mechanisms of local policy interpretation and adaptation as well
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as the interaction of public and nonprofit organizations in their attempts to accommodate public
policy implementation to local circumstances.
Theories of implementation and inter-organizational relations are often under-conceptualized
because not only do interorganizational relations often cross arenas, but the organizational
boundaries between government and nonprofits have also become blurred as they have become
more interdependent. Recent studies have documented the extensive interdependence among
nonprofit and government organizations resulting from all levels of government exponentially
increasing the use of nonprofits to implement social policy since the 1960s (Boris and Steuerle
1999; Kramer 1998; Salamon and Elliott 2002). Part of this phenomenon is related to the
increased privatization or “marketization” of government services. Proponents of privatization
hold up the market model as an example of how government should conduct its business to
improve efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and accountability (Savas 1987; Savas 2000). Opponents,
acknowledging the metaphorical power of the market, fault privatization on historical and
empirical grounds (Henig 1995).
Salamon and Lund (1989) argue that the debate over the role of government overlooked a
“technological” revolution in the scope of government action.  This transformation includes
many features of decentralization and privatization and is evidenced by the proliferation of tools
now used by the public sector, such as grants, direct loans, loan guarantees, interest subsidies,
contracting out, vouchers, tax expenditures, government corporations, and more in addition to
direct action.  A key feature of this transformation has been the development of an elaborate
system of “third-party government” where the federal government operates through other
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entities—states, cities, counties, banks, industrial corporations, hospitals, nonprofit
organizations, and other nonfederal third parties.  In the human service field, for example,
government-funded services are delivered more through nonprofit organizations than through
government agencies (Salamon 1993).
The increased level of interdependence between nonprofits and government is complicated by a
wide range of interorganizational interactions. Government and nonprofit relations may be
supplementary (nonprofits fulfilling demand for public goods left unsatisfied by government);
complementary (nonprofits as partners, helping deliver goods/services largely financed by
government), or adversarial (nonprofits seeking to influence government policies and programs,
or government trying to modify nonprofit behavior) (Young 1999). As a result, conventional
analytic distinctions of organizations as either nonprofit or government may be imprecise, and in
some situations empirically incorrect when those organizational boundaries are blurred or veiled.
The diversity and complexity of nonprofit and government relations were reframed by many
researchers in the 1990s under the encompassing notion of networks (Kickert, Klijn and
Koppenjam 1997).  However, policy networks have also been criticized as evidence of the
incompetence of government because they are said to refer to “non-transparent and impenetrable
structures of interest representation which prevent necessary innovations in public policy and
form a threat to the effectiveness, efficiency, and democratic legitimization of the public sector”
(Marsh and Rhodes 1992, p. 9).
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Another way to understand the complex relationships between government and nonprofit
organizations is to examine the institutional setting in which they occur. An institutionalist
framework provides an analytic perspective that includes the constellation of organizational
participants as well as their formal and informal relationships, rules, and tacit norms (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991).35 However, this research tends to use the institutional field as the unit of
analysis and to under-emphasize the role of power36 (Perrow 1986) and politics (Christensen
1999) that are important elements of urban policy environments.37 Political scientists have used
institutionalist frameworks to explain processes such as governmental resilience (Clemens and
Cook 1999) and public sector innovation (Thelen 1999). However, this research shares similar
disadvantages as other studies investigating inter-governmental decision-making (Christensen
1999) or public agency collaborations (Bardach 1998), in that they tend to over-emphasize
government organizations in the analysis.38 Expanding the field of organizational actors to
include nonprofits and for-profit organizations would provide a more complete institutional
                                                
35 “The new institutionalism in organization theory and sociology comprises a rejection of rational-actor models, an
interest in institutions as independent variables, a turn toward cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in
properties of supraindividual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of
individuals’ attributes or motives” (Powell and DiMaggio 1991, p. 8). Institutionalist theorists argue that customs,
social norms, or legal procedures constrain choices, autonomy, and flexibility. “Old institutionalists” like Selznick
(1949) highlighted influence patterns, coalitions and cliques, and particularistic elements to show how informal
frameworks deviated and constrained formal structure, and demonstrated subversion of an organization’s rational
mission by parochial interests.
36 Pfeffer (1992) summaries the literature on power noting that there is evidence that power affects outcomes
ranging from allocating budgets to organizational subunits to designing formal organizational structures. However, it
is important to distinguish between political activity and administrative action as well as to distinguish between
outcomes produced by social power and outcomes occurring by chance, precedent, or the application of rational
decision procedures.
37 The “old” institutionalist school of organizational sociology was more concerned with the form and functioning of
institutions as viewed from the analytical perspective of organizations (Selznick 1949).
38 For other literature on governmental organization related to: public administration and management, see Borins
(1998);  public-private partnerships, see Brooks, Liebman, and Schelling (1984);  re-inventing (also known as re-
organizing) government, see Osborne and Gaebler (1992);  privatization of government services, see Savas (1987);
inter-governmental organizations and intra-governmental policy, see Christensen (1999); nonprofits as delivery
mechanisms of government services, see Salamon (1989); nonprofits as supplementary or complementary
government service providers, see Boris and Steurle (Boris and Steuerle 1999).
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analysis of a complex, multi-stakeholder policy environment such as a workforce development
system.
Taking a system-level view of workforce development is not new. Previous research has
discussed the appropriateness and challenge to such a view. According to Grubb and McDonnell
(1991, p. v):
the system of education and training institutions that has emerged in response to
government funding has become increasingly complex and variegated. Yet because this
system has been unplanned and largely uncoordinated, developing incrementally in
response to constituent pressures and the inadequacies of past policies, it is in fact a
collection of separate institutions, with varied motives and funding incentives and
without the integration that the term ‘system’ implies. For this reason, vocational
education and job training is not commonly thought of as a system; rather, policymakers,
practitioners, and analysts have tended to concentrate on one institution or program at a
time, with those studying vocational education, for example, isolated from those
concerned with JTPA or welfare programs…This report finds that not only do these
institutions show substantial regularities in their interactions, in some communities at
least, they are quite interdependent, with a clear division of labor.
The conceptual challenges of examining the interorganizational complexities of workforce
development systems are shared across a spectrum of substantive areas such as regional health
services, and land, resource, and environmental management. The 1990s saw a proliferation of
theoretical and empirical studies from different disciplines examining interdependent
organizational relations. Though these relations were not new, many analysts suggested that the
existence and importance of such relations had increased in recent times due to societal and
organizational shifts resulting from the transformation to an information-based economy. To
describe the emergent inter-connected organizational landscape, researchers have offered such
theories as “generalized political exchange” (Marin 1990a; Marin 1990b), “advocacy coalition
framework” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993),  “systems thinking” (Senge 1994),
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“collaborative planning” (Healey 1997), “communicative planning” (Innes and Booher 1999),
and “complex adaptive systems” (Comfort and Kapucu 2002). 39
While there is no single network theory, there is a broad assortment of research employing
network concepts, terms, and methods to describe networks of people, of organizations, and of
societies.40 Most network studies, however, tend to be atheoretical, ahistorical, and formalistic in
that they over-emphasize structural descriptions (Monge and Contractor 2003). However,
network approaches suggest alternative formulations of organizational coordination relevant to
the issue of blurred boundaries between government and nonprofit organizations. For example,
Powell (1990) makes high-contrast distinctions of network forms of coordination as independent
from markets and bureaucratic forms. Stark (2001) posits a hybrid “heterarchic” organization
characterized by distributed authority, interdependent relations, blurred private and public
boundaries, flattened hierarchical internal coordination, and competing and coexisting value
systems.
According to some researchers, such network organizations have advantages over formal
hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational forms. In their literature review of corporate
networks studies, Podolny and Page (1998, p.57) found evidence that network forms of
organization "foster learning, represent a mechanism for the attainment of status or legitimacy,
                                                
39 Complex adaptive systems refer to interacting agencies and jurisdictions that are argued to adapt more
appropriately to internal and external threats to a given region than separate, uncoordinated efforts by agencies
acting independently to meet the same challenges. Adaptive systems depend upon an information infrastructure that
has sufficient structure to hold and exchange information, but sufficient flexibility to adapt to the changing
conditions. See Comfort and Kapucu (2002).
40 For an overview of individual and organizational network approaches, see Nohria and Eccles (1992). For an
integrative view of individual, organizational, technological, and societal networks, see Castells (Castells 2000). For
an argument that patterned networks operate in physics, biology, society, and the economy, see Barabasi (2002).
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provide a variety of economic benefits, facilitate the management of resource dependencies, and
provide considerable autonomy for employees." In general, network theorists such as Powell
(1990) and Uzzi (1996) describe network forms as facilitating 1) knowledge exchange among a
labor force, 2) speed and flexibility, and 3) reciprocal and repeated interactions of trust.  When
present, these allow networks to foster collaborative agreements that reduce risks associated with
uncertainty, minimize transaction costs, and support an equilibrium exchange. However, less
research has explored negative dimensions and costs associated with networks.
Although most network research has occurred in market settings, there has also been some recent
research examining network advantages in community based and workforce development
settings. In his literature review of studies of nonprofit community-based organization networks,
Cordero-Guzman (2001) found that successful networks provide substantial additional services
to residents and increased resources for organizations. However, such networks require
significant amounts of time, effort, and resources to design, develop, and maintain.41 He also
reviewed the role of community-based organization network in workforce development and
found that they have played five key roles: 1) providing program development, funding, and
management; 2) stimulating the creation of networks with organizational actors inside and
outside the community; 3) facilitating information gathering and analysis on program processes,
interventions, and outcomes; 4) serving as job-matching service between employers and
residents; and 5) advocating for community residents. A growing body of research suggests that
                                                
41 In their literature review of social service networks involving community-based organizations, Mattessich and
Monsey (1992) distinguish between collaboration (formal relationship), coordination (informal relationship), and
cooperation (project-specific relationships). They identify multiple factors related to successful collaborations.
Keyes et al. (1996) suggest that the successful operation of nonprofit community development corporations depend
institutional support networks.
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network arrangements are increasingly key forms of organization for emergent labor market
institutions (Harrison 1998). However, there has been relatively little focused attention on the
role of managerial and policy drivers such as strategy and practice on the development and
effectiveness of workforce networks.
One of the findings of this study is that current transformations are increasing the importance of
strategy, adaptive learning, and networks in workforce development. One result of these changes
is the emerging importance of network forms of coordination by hybrid government/nonprofit
organizations. By highlighting organizations that are dynamically embedded in information and
resource networks, this study shows that there are emergent patterns to network formation and
participation by government, nonprofits and private employers in the evolving workforce
development institutional environment. Moreover, the study finds that such links and patterns of
involvement have implications for labor exchange and for employment outcomes. One challenge
involves managing hybrid government/nonprofit/market network forms of organization.
Different strategies reflect values that may alternatively be supplemental, complementary, and
adversarial. Over time, these values may coalesce or conflict leading to several organizational
and network outcome options such as stagnation, homeostasis [static or dynamic equilibrium], or
adaptation.
Summary
This chapter provided a framework for analyzing the activities of publicly-funded labor market
intermediaries. The context is that economic restructuring, federal policy shifts, and evolving
government-nonprofit relations are concurrent transforming processes that have increased the
importance of publicly-funded intermediaries in the labor market. In order to understand these
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LMIs, an institutional and network approach is required. This is because publicly-funded LMIs
operate as part of workforce development networks—including blurred government-nonprofit
boundaries—that bridge the institutional divides often separating disadvantaged job-seekers from
employment opportunities. The next chapter reviews the federal, state, and local contexts of
workforce development policy, and sets the stage for the emergence of career centers as
intermediaries in workforce development networks.
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CHAPTER TWO
Federal, State, and Local Workforce Policy
Overview
This chapter provides an overview of federal, state, and local institutions involved in providing
employment, training, and brokering services in the United States. Since originating in the early
1900s, the evolving employment policy institutional landscape has grown more complex,
interdependent, and locally determined. During the past several decades in particular, institutions
and organizations educating, training, and matching people for employment have grown in
number and complexity. Local networks of employment and job training services have grown
through a succession of federal programs such as the Comprehensive Employment and Training
Act (CETA), Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), and the Workforce Investment Act (WIA).
Federal and state funding targeting specific populations have expanded the range of publicly
subsidized job training to include community-based organizations, unions, proprietary vocational
schools, and private firms. Despite their growth, publicly-funded training programs have
generated mixed success. And until recently, the U.S. Employment Service served as the
government’s primary labor broker for almost sixty years, perennially providing essentially
unchanging services with poor results.
The Workforce Investment Act (WIA) is the federal government’s most recent attempt to reform
public workforce development and labor exchange  initiatives. One-Stop Career Centers are
WIA’s main vehicles for reform, emphasizing coordination of programs, customer choice, and
universal access to services. Massachusetts’ One-Stop Career Center initiative, particularly
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Boston’s innovative “competitive” One-Stop Career Centers, represent one of the nation’s most
far-reaching experiments in restructuring local workforce development institutions.
While federal and state programs provide most of the funding and policy parameters of local
workforce development systems, it is the local institutional context that provides the key to
understanding system practices and performance. Evidence for this was provided by Grubb and
McDonnell (1991) based on their national study of local vocational and training systems. First,
the education and training system is experienced at the local level by both individuals seeking
training and by firms searching for well-prepared employees. Second, the interdependencies
among institutions and programs that create local systems are more the product of local factors
than the result of federal and state policies. Federal and state policies help shape institutional
interdependencies through federal coordination requirements and state-funding mechanisms, but
the extent of coordination reflects local practices and initiatives that have little to do with federal
and state requirements (Grubb, Brown, Kaufman, and Lederer, 1990). A third reason is the
extensive variation across localities in the nature of the education and training systems. On the
one hand, Grubb and McDonnell (1991) found little variation among cities in the basic activities
of specific types of institutions. Community colleges performed relatively similar functions
everywhere despite being distinctly local institutions, and variations among other institutions
were similarly minor.42 On the other hand, Grubb and McDonnell (1991) found that particular
types of training programs (e.g., short-term, intensive, entry-level) may be provided by different
                                                
42 Grubb and McDonnell (1991, p. 4) identified four patterns of institutional interaction: 1) a “standard model”
where linkages among institutions are relatively well-articulated and inter-connected; 2) a “parallel systems model”
where educational institutions are well-articulated but relatively independent of JTPA and welfare-to-work
programs; 3) a system where community colleges are dominant, providing most forms of education and training,
including noncredit adult education, short-term job training for JTPA and welfare clients, and customized training
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types of organizations (e.g., community college, vocational school, community-based
organization) in different cities.
As a result, understanding workforce development requires examining the institutional context of
federal, state and local institutional actors and processes. At the same time, an in-depth study of a
local workforce initiative such as Boston’s One-Stop Career Center system provides insights for
comprehending the institutional dynamics in other locales. This does not suggest that the patterns
and findings from the Boston experience may be generalized to other locations. Rather, since
many institutions function similarly across different regions as Grubb and McDonnell suggest,
then knowledge about local institutional context, relationships, and development may yield
perspectives transferable and applicable to other regions.  Subsequent chapters provide a six-year
analysis of Boston’s One-Stop Career Centers. The resulting historical and institutional
knowledge offers a foundation for other studies of One-Stop Career Centers. Boston’s early start
and substantial experience with One-Stop Career Centers yields interesting perspectives and
lessons for the more than 1,000 One-Stop Career Centers across the country that were mandated
by WIA and that were formally implemented in July 2000.
                                                                                                                                                            
for economic development initiatives; and 4) a locality of autonomous institutions where components of education
and training system is relatively independent of other institutions.
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Federal Policy and Labor Market Mediation
US Employment Service
Despite recognition among most economists and policy researchers that labor matching is a
significant factor in how workers actually connect to jobs, this aspect of how labor markets
function has historically received relatively little policy attention compared to the emphasis
placed on skills training and human capital development.  One reason for this may be that the
principal agency traditionally responsible for local labor matching, the U.S. Employment Service
(ES), has often been perceived as ineffectual.43 There is a general consensus among most
researchers commenting on the ES that it has historically not performed well for either job
seekers or employers in terms of the quality of its employment information and in terms of the
effectiveness of its labor matching. As a consequence, the share of all job seekers and employers
served by the ES gradually shrank to the point where clients consisted mainly of those most hard
to place in jobs (Jacobson 1995). For example, the share of job seekers using the Employment
Service dropped from 30 percent in 1978 to 21 percent a decade later, and the share of
Employment Service referrals that were hired dropped from nearly 20 percent in the 1960s to 8
percent in the early 1970s where it has remained (Seavey and Kazis 1994). More recent evidence
of ES’ poor reputation was provided by a national survey of employers’ recruitment methods that
                                                
43 The Employment Service was established in 1933 by the Wagner-Peyser Act to respond to Depression-era
unemployment. It created a nation-wide system of local employment offices. Following the Social Security Act of
1935, the Employment Service also took on the task of administering state-run unemployment insurance programs.
Main ES activities have included the Unemployment Insurance work test, job interview referral, counseling, skill
and aptitude testing, job development (soliciting job vacancy listings from employers), job clubs, job search skills,
job search workshops, and job fairs. Wagner-Peyser Act labor exchange services are delivered in three tiers: (1) self-
service, (2) facilitated self-service, and (3) staff-assisted service.
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found that employers used the Employment Services very little and that they considered
Employment Service information of low quality (Holzer 1996, pp. 51-52).44
One explanation for the historically poor performance of the ES is offered by Weir (1992, p. 81)
who argues in her book “The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States” that
political and institutional factors contributed to under-emphasizing labor matching in favor of
programs with larger budgets and more political capital:
Because they were strongly dominated by officials responsible for administering
unemployment insurance, the employment services devoted little attention to job
placement.  They functioned much more as passive labor exchanges than as the
aggressive screening and placement agencies that the advocates of labor market policy
envisioned.  Moreover, to the extent that the employment services did connect workers
with jobs, they did so in a highly prejudicial manner.  They were particularly remiss in
serving the “disadvantaged” and minority clients who were less attractive to employers.
Other researchers have observed that throughout is history, the ES was used a vehicle for a
variety of “un-funded mandates” and programs. As a result, the ES had responsibility for many
and mixed services but did not have matching levels of funding and support. Although no formal
evaluation studies were ever conducted, a variety of studies have documented low to mixed
success regarding placement outcomes. At the same time, even with relatively poor performance,
some suggest that ES was cost effective for the services it did provide in terms of average cost
per placement. Overall, ES has had limited resources and limited success in moving people from
poverty and unemployment to better jobs.
Despite its mediocre to poor performance, the Employment Service has successfully resisted
                                                
44 Holzer (1996) found that employers most often found new employees by using informal methods (35-40 percent)
such as current employee referrals (25 percent) and acquaintances (10-15 percent) over newspaper advertising (25-
30 percent) and Employment Services (5 percent).
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attempts to improve its operations or integrate it into comprehensive labor market policy.45
More recently, some observers have suggested that the ES has been undergoing a major renewal
as a consequence of the 1994 Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) system and
the new Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 (Eberts and O’Leary 1997; O’Leary and
Straits 2000).46  Even with such optimism, the ES has yet to overcome other consequences of its
long-lasting legacy of ineffectual performance.  As suggested by Weir (1992), popular
perceptions of ES’ failure fueled political interests that helped shape the institutional context in
which other public labor market programs such as job training programs were unlikely to deliver
on ambitious policy goals such as reducing poverty.  The result has been a widespread perception
that similar government interventions in the labor market perform poorly.47 Indeed, as the next
section describes, federal employment and training programs were often developed
incrementally, in fits and starts, as political compromises, with limited resources, yet with high
expectations for addressing large-scale labor market and institutional challenges. Predictably,
like the Employment Service, these employment and training programs could be cast as failures
by political foes and as “mixed successes” by political friends.
                                                
45 According to Weir (1992, p.81), part of its independence is due to being funded from employer contributions to
the Unemployment Trust Fund account, diminishing the administrative funding leverage of federal agencies. Weir
goes on to suggest that the Employment Service has also been able to block reform because it developed political
alliances with the national association Interstate Conference on Employment Security Agencies, which in turn
derived its strength from state-level industrial development interests concerned with keeping the unemployment
insurance tax rate low.
46 In the WPRS system, those UI beneficiaries who are most likely to exhaust UI are referred to ES services.
47 Weir argues that a series of political and intellectual battles over national employment policy in the 1960s ended
with the defeat of an “active labor market policy” approach and with labor market policy being subsumed into the
War on Poverty.  As a result, government-supported job training programs became focused on remedial job training
at the lowest end of the labor market and then became identified with welfare programs and African-American
inner-city poverty (Weir 1992).
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Long and Winding Road: Brief History of Publicly-funded Employment Training
Early Employment Related Legislation
The United States did not have major federal labor legislation until 1917, when Congress passed
the Vocational Education Program in an attempt to deal with the influx of unskilled workers to
urban areas. Soon after, in 1920, Congress passed the Vocational Rehabilitation Act to assist
returning veterans and others in finding employment.  Prior to these federal policies, Congress
felt that both education and help for disadvantaged people were the responsibility of the states.
The states, in turn, passed the responsibility to local communities. With little federal or state
support, local communities and voluntary efforts had initiated much of the activity related to
employment mediation. The economic crisis begun in 1929 led to unemployment for one quarter
of the workforce and overwhelmed the resources of cities and states. In 1933, the Federal
government implemented the Wagner-Peyser Act which set up the U.S. Employment Service and
established a nation-wide system of employment offices.
The 1960s saw a series of federal employment and training legislation beginning with the 1962
Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) that aimed to retrain workers whose jobs
had been eliminated by technological change and economic change. Then in 1963, increased
youth unemployment led congress to pass the Vocational Education Act, which strengthened the
vocational education system. Also in 1963, Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act
(EOA), umbrella legislation encompassing several categorical programs focused on the
disadvantaged. The Emergency Employment Act (EEA) of 1971 created a massive public
employment program which subsidized jobs in the public sector for disadvantaged individuals.
The EEA also began the concept of decentralizing decision making authority closer to the local
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areas. As the programs expanded, so did duplication and overlap. Congress attempted to
consolidate and decentralize programs through the next major revolution in job training in 1973,
the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act or CETA.
CETA: Strengths and Weaknesses of Consolidation and Decentralization
More than previous programs, CETA represented an attempt to bring decision making down to
local areas where the services were provided, and a need to consolidate programs under a single
administrative structure. As a first effort to consolidate and coordinate the provision of services,
CETA had some success, though critics pointed to several system weaknesses. Among its
advantages, CETA consolidated duplicative job training programs, emphasized decentralization,
permitted program design flexibility to meet local needs, and emphasized local coordination and
linkages to avoid duplication with other human resource agencies. Among its weaknesses, CETA
developed regulations that became rigid and reduced flexibility, recreated "categorical"
separations by adding components to fit special needs; generated negative publicity due to abuse
of the Public Service Employment program, and lacked a strong state role to help coordinate and
advocate state-local relationships.
JTPA: Creating the State/Local System
While CETA was aimed at consolidation, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) of 1982 was
an effort to give state and local communities increased responsibility for program design and
operation.  State Governors provided program oversight while local partnerships between
business and community in the form of Private Industry Councils (PIC's) designed and operated
programs at the local level. In this way, States interpreted the law and applied its principles
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within the state with guidance from the federal government while local programs enjoyed
considerable autonomy with regard to actual program operations.
Among its strengths, JTPA increased local flexibility in program design and service provision,
decentralized program development to the State and local level, enhanced community
involvement through PICs, and strengthened State role and resources that provided consistency
within the State while allowing local diversity. However, JTPA also had some weaknesses such
as reducing inflexibility and innovation, involving PICS so closely in operating programs that it
reduced their objectivity and ability to provide oversight, and encouraging high variation in
levels of coordination and integration.
Mixed Results among Employment and Training Programs
Eventually, reformers began calling for modifications to JTPA to address its institutional
weaknesses and to create an integrated and seamless system accessible to users via “one-stop
shopping.” In addition to improved coordination, there were several other factors that contributed
to efforts to once again restructure federal employment training policy.  Chief among these was a
growing body of evidence that job training programs were not producing the expected results.
Though there has been a wide variability in job training programs and their outcomes, the
general research consensus was that they have performed modestly—with some small earning
gains—but that they have not led to long-term economic self-sufficiency or reductions in
poverty.  For example, the Department of Labor commissioned a large-scale, long-term
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evaluation study of JTPA that found modest (though statistically significant) earnings increases
that exceeded training costs.48
In his review of job training evaluation studies, LaLonde (1995) states that the best summary of
the evidence about the impact of past programs is that “we got what we paid for.”  According to
LaLonde, public sector investments in training were exceedingly modest compared to the
magnitude of the skill deficiencies that policymakers tried to address.  Not surprisingly, modest
investments usually yielded modest gains—too small to have much effect on poverty rates. The
Department of Labor (DOL) found similar mixed results in the first comprehensive review of
one-hundred evaluation studies of employment, training, and education programs for youth,
disadvantaged adults, and dislocated workers (US Department of Labor 1995).49 However, of all
the approaches assessed, the DOL found that job search assistance was found to have positive
effects for nearly every population and was one of the most cost-effective and inexpensive.
Grubb (1995) summarized his review of employment training evaluations as “small programs
with small effects.” By the mid 1990s there was a substantial body of research painting a mixed
but generally discouraging portrait of the effectiveness of workforce programs.
                                                
48 Researchers examined 16,000 applicants to JTPA programs—in 16 locations over a 18 month period—that were
divided into a “treatment” group that received training services and a “control” group that did not receive services.
Adult women trainees had a 7.2 percent earnings increase compared to women who did not receive training, while
men experienced an 2.8 percent increase. JTPA training has no statistical effect on the earnings or employment of
youth. See (Bloom et al. 1993).
49 Overall, the DOL found mixed results among mixed populations. Among its findings were that 1) short-term
classroom training had mixed results but was mostly not successful; 2) long-term classroom training had better
results overall than short-term training; 3) subsidized employment had modest effects but was very successful for
single-mothers receiving public assistance; 4) some populations had larger net impacts; 5) where they existed,
positive gains in employment or wages were modest (US Department of Labor 1995). Note that meta-evaluation
studies such as the ones conducted by LaLonde (1995) and the DOL provide a means to assess general program
outcomes. However, though they do not address the underlying evaluation issues of program comparability,
implementation variability, participant selection criteria, data collection, and measurement issues noted by
evaluation researchers (Gueron et al. 1991).
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Systemic and Political Issues
As labor market and institutional conditions changed, policy discussions about training shifted
from the addressing the particular needs of disadvantaged individuals to restructuring training to
accommodate the increasing and continuing training requirements of workers in the “new
economy.”  In contrast to prior legislation emphasizing training for particular disadvantaged
individuals, efforts to revise federal employment policy emphasized addressing the training
needs of a broader population through a “universal” approach. However, much of the
constellation of training providers that evolved via CETA and JTPA tended to focus on
specialized, usually disadvantaged populations. Many of the previous debates about training
policy swung between whether employers or training providers should have greater influence in
developing an orientation for services. That is, part of the discussion involved questions of the
appropriate ways to balance and coordinate the various stakeholders. As Donahue (2000, page
13) describes,
Whether federal, state, or local government takes the lead on the public-sector side,
workforce investment involves at least three other players: training providers, employers,
and individuals themselves…In practice, debates on the focus and structure of training
programs always turn on questions of balance—how much, and how, to incorporate the
interests of and the information commanded by each party.
In the early 1990s, the debate about reforming federal training policy shifted from emphasizing
providers or employers to focusing on individuals. Several issues propelled this redirection.
Many policymakers were frustrated with the JTPA status quo as being too fragmented, too
bureaucratic, and felt that training providers were unlikely to be efficient and accountable
without competition. To remedy this situation, two forces were recommended that would spur
effectiveness, improve services, and foster coordination. The main key element involved
empowering individuals with purchasing power and information and allowing them to choose
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among providers. The second factor was supporting individual choice with up-to-date
information technology that provided individuals with better data about available jobs and skill-
demands as well as a range of alternative training providers and their performance. According to
Donahue (2000, p. 14), there was considerable skepticism about these ideas in Congress:
Many legislators were reluctant to see special programs for military veterans, or workers
who lost their jobs due to new trade agreements, or the disabled, or laid-off timber
workers, or ex-offenders, or Native Americans subsumed into a single system. While
some were motivated by simple turf-consciousness, many were honestly convinced that
the disadvantaged would inevitably be short-changed in any universal training system
geared to market principles.
The Democratic Clinton Administration and a Republican Congress wrangled over the
legislation for several years before agreeing on a “messy compromise, shaped by the themes of
devolution and consumer choice as well as the inertia of the status quo and the commingling of
job training and welfare-reform agendas…[encouraging] a larger role for choice, competition,
consolidation, and consumer information” (Donahue, Lynch and Whitehead 2000, page 15).
Workforce Investment Act: “A Messy Compromise”
Signed into law on August 7, 1998, the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) represented a change
from previous federal employment policies along several dimensions. Implemented on July 1,
2000, WIA provided increased flexibility for state and local officials to establish broad-based
labor market systems using federal job training funds for adults, dislocated workers and youth.
One purpose of the legislation was to create a streamlined system from more than 70 federal job-
related programs. The law mandated coordination among a range of federal job training
programs, including the Employment Service, adult education and literacy programs, welfare-to-
work, vocational education and vocational rehabilitation. WIA’s goal was to provide workforce
development services to employers and workers through a universally accessible, information-
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driven, one-stop career center system. State and local Workforce Investment Boards were
instructed to have majority employer membership in the belief that the business community
could help steer local workforce development systems to more effectively and efficiently
improve labor market functioning.  WIA’s emphasis on private sector influence extended beyond
management to the actual delivery of services. It encouraged private training provides rather than
state-sponsored programs.
Key features of WIA are distinctly different from JTPA. In contrast to JTPA and previous federal
employment programs that focused on the training needs of workers, WIA aims to serve both
job-seekers and employers. Instead of JTPA’s federal mandates, WIA and the US Department of
Labor (USDOL) provide state and local WIBs with extensive “local discretionary authority” to
determine the kinds of services to provided and the extent to which particular groups of
individuals will be targeted. Unlike JTPA, WIA emphasizes coordination of services rather than
consolidation of funds into “block grants.” In the one-stop delivery system, many partners are
required to coordinate in creative ways to achieve the performance-driven goals mandated in the
legislation. Moreover, WIA promotes “universal” access to all job-seekers instead of focusing on
particular groups of job-seekers that may be eligible for special categories of government
employment and training funds. And, unlike JTPA, which continued until changed, WIA has a
five-year sunset provision that requires reauthorization. State and local plans are encouraged to
undergo ongoing modification.
Federal employment and training programs include an array of services usually targeted to
individuals meeting federal eligibility requirements for specialized categories. The terms
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“categorical services,” “categorical programs,” and “categorical system” are often
interchangeably used to describe complex, bureaucratic programmatic and funding structures.
There are more than 100 federal and state employment and training programs.
WIA’s Structure: Workforce Investment Boards and One-Stop Career Centers
There are three main organizations authorized by WIA to plan and implement the new workforce
development system: the State Workforce Investment Board (SWIB), Local Workforce
Investment Board (LWIB), and One-Stop Career Centers.  WIA requires that each governor
establish a SWIB that replaces the State Private Investment Council or Human Resource
Investment Council. Membership must meet federal guidelines, with 51 percent representing
business.50
Local WIBs replace local Private Investment Councils and are precluded from operating
programs so that they operate only as policy setting groups. Local WIBs provide strategic
planning, policy development and oversight of the local workforce investment system. Members
are appointed by the chief elected official or mayor, and like the state WIB, the local WIBs
require 51 percent business membership.51 A local WIB has jurisdiction over a Workforce
                                                
50 Federally mandated SWIB members include the Governor; two members of each chamber of the State legislature
appointed by the presiding officer of each such chamber; representatives of business in the State (such
representatives must comprise a majority of the members of the board and the chairperson must be elected from
among this group); representatives of labor organizations, who have been nominated by State labor federations;
representatives of individuals and organizations that have experience and expertise in the delivery of workforce
investment activities (e.g. chief executive officers of community colleges and community based organizations within
the state); local chief elected officials;  lead State agency official responsible for carrying out "one-stop" operations
(or, in any case where there is no such official responsibility, a state official with expertise relating to such
operations); other representatives and State agency officials as the Governor may designate (e.g. State agency
officials responsible for economic and juvenile justice programs in the State).
51 At a minimum, a local WIBs members include: representatives of business in the local area (such representatives
will comprise a majority of the board and the chairperson will be elected from among this group); representatives of
labor organizations nominated by local labor federations; representatives of local educational entities (e.g. local
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Investment Area, an administrative region.52 A Workforce Investment Area is effectively a name
change for the Service Delivery Area (SDA), a term used under JTPA.
One-Stop Career Centers are the foundation and the hub for the delivery of services in the local
workforce system. The state WIB sets the criteria for the one-stop system while the local WIB
selects, oversees, and monitors the one-stop operators. In selecting a one-stop operator, local
boards may choose from a range of eligible organizations including non-profit entity,
government agency, business organization (e.g. Chamber of Commerce), private-for-profit
entity, Employment Service, or post-secondary institution. One-stop operators enter into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the local WIB and are formally certified.53 The
MOU between the WIB and each One-Stop operator and partner specifies the financial and
service expectations of the WIB and any additional agreements. There can be "umbrella" MOUs
or individual MOUs between the local WIB and each partner, and any number of other formats.
The WIB signs a MOU with each of the 19 mandatory partners (and any optional partners)
specifying the funds to be allocated and the services to be delivered.
One-Stops are the entry point for any person seeking job training or employment services
throughout the state. The One-Stop concept replaces the previous public system of services
                                                                                                                                                            
educational agencies, school boards, adult education and literacy providers, post- secondary educational institutions
or community colleges) selected from among individuals nominated by regional or local educational entities; ting
such entities representatives of community-based organizations (e.g. those organizations serving individuals with
disabilities and veterans); representatives of economic development agencies (e.g. public and private sector
economic development entities); representatives of each of the "one-stop" partners; other individuals and
representatives as determined appropriate by the chief elected official in the local area.
52 A regional designation is either requested by local officials or designated by the Governor. Regions with a
population of 500,000 or more are automatically designated as local workforce investment areas. States can request
single area designation, in which case the state board carries out the duties of the local board.
53 In Boston, the WIB has MOUs with funding agencies and contracts with career centers.
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where an individual visited different state agencies to apply for different services. Under the
One-Stop system, individuals access all their employment and training needs at one location.
Currently, while access is coordinated, funding itself is not integrated. "One-stop partners" make
available their “categorical” programs through the One-Stop Career Centers. These programs and
services may include adult, dislocated worker and youth programs funded under the WIA, the
Employment Service, adult education, vocational education, vocational rehabilitation, welfare-
to-work, TAA and NAFTA-TAA, veterans programs, HUD employment and training programs
as well as information on filing for Unemployment Insurance.
One-Stop Career Center Services
One-stop centers provide access to three levels of services: core, intensive, and training services.
Any worker (employed or unemployed) can receive core services which include assessment,
counseling, job search and placement assistance as well as information on the labor market and
training providers. Workers who do not find jobs, or who are in need of further assistance to
maintain self-sufficiency, can receive intensive services and then training services. Each WIB
determines the percentage of their overall budget to allocate to each level of service.
Level I core services provided at all One-Stops cover a range of services such as:
• intake and orientation to One-Stop
• eligibility determination
• initial assessment of skill and abilities
• access to job vacancy listings
• job search and placement assistance
• access to information on job skills requirements
• information on providers of vocational rehabilitation activities
• access to list of eligible training providers
• UI filing information
• information on availability of supportive services
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Level II intensive services are available to adults and dislocated workers who have completed
one Core Service and are still unable to gain employment or who are employed and have been
determined in need of services to get a better job in order to gain self-sufficiency. Intensive
Services include individual career planning, resume preparation, job clubs, career counseling,
internships, and comprehensive assessments. Basic education, ESL, and basic computer literacy
are also sometimes considered Intensive Services.
Level III training services are available to under-employed and unemployed adults and
dislocated workers who have completed one Intensive Service and still can not obtain
employment leading to self-sufficiency. To access training, someone must demonstrate he or she
possesses the necessary skills to complete a training program, select a training program that is
linked to job vacancies in the area, demonstrate an inability to get Federal Pell Grants or any
other financial assistance, and meet the state and local priority system requirements. Most adult
and dislocated worker training, with some exceptions, must be provided through "individual
training accounts" (ITAs). The exceptions include on-the-job training, customized training,
training provided to special populations by community-based organizations and areas having
insufficient eligible providers. Vouchers can only be used for training with certified training
providers. Employers and unions can receive contracts to provide OJT or customized training to
new workers or existing workers who need to upgrade their skills in order to retain self-
sufficiency.
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Massachusetts’ Leading Wedge of Policy Reform: One-Stop Career Centers
Fixing a Broken System
Boston's One Stop Career Center system developed partly in response to criticisms that many
government workforce development programs were uncoordinated and ineffective. For example,
at the time the Career Centers were established there were about 150 federally funded programs
to help people get jobs.  Massachusetts had 45 of these programs administered in 5 different
sectors and 12 state agencies.  Each of the programs had its own rules, eligibility, and data
collection requirements. Another criticism was that the programs seem to orient services to job
seekers but not job-providers.  For example, in some programs, employers were expected to fill
out several-page forms indicating their interests and criteria for hiring workers.  That is,
employers were perceived by some job developers as an extension of the services provided to
job-seekers, rather than as customers themselves. In addition, government-supported job referrals
declined from 20 percent in 1985 to 3 percent in 1995, reflecting a system apparently out-of-
touch with the needs of job-seekers and employers.
Another issue that prompted reconsideration of workforce development programs was the
welfare reform debate that pervaded the early 1990s. Massachusetts was one of the first states to
emphasize job-first strategies as central to its notion of welfare reform.54 Partly as a result of the
dissatisfaction with existing workforce preparedness practices, Massachusetts established the
                                                
54 In 1995, the state adopted a program stressing work as a means to self-sufficiency and proclaimed that it  “is
among the boldest and most far-reaching welfare reform plans in the nation (DTA 1996a, 1-2).”  Massachusetts’
66
Massachusetts Jobs Council (MJC) also known as the MassJobs Council—comprised of private
sector representatives— in 1988 to link workforce development with economic development by
mobilizing the private sector and integrating the employment service delivery system. In the
early 1990s, the MassJobs Council was a high profile group because training was a high priority
during the Commonwealth’s high unemployment. The MassJobs Council also exerted political
influence through its co-chair Lieutenant Governor Paul Celluci who was also a friend and ally
of its executive director. As a result, public agencies were more likely to collaborate with the
MassJobs Council in its efforts to integrate elements of JTPA-related training programs with
other public organizations such as the welfare department and the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Commission. Such initiatives brought the MassJobs Council national attention because they
differed from recent experiences and patterns of Massachusetts and most other states. Buoyed by
its successes in coordinating training programs, the MassJobs Council launched an effort to
establish a network of One-Stop Career Centers.
“One- Stop Shopping”
Acknowledging the frustration and high transaction costs of both job-seekers and employers in
accessing the bewildering array of employment and training services, the MassJobs Council
proposed “one-stop shopping” for services that would eventually lead to formal consolidation of
programs and funding.  In 1993, the MassJobs Council convened representatives of training
organizations discuss the proposal. Donahue et. al. (2000, page 40) noted that
there were at least two different conceptions of what ‘one-stop’ centers would entail. One
group saw it broadly, as the kickoff for a campaign of deep consolidation leading to an
integrated workforce development system. The other group viewed the notion more
                                                                                                                                                            
welfare agency, the Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA), began implementing its plan in fiscal year 1996
by funding direct job placements services through the Career Centers.
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narrowly—not systematic integration, but engineering more convenient access to what
would remain separate programs.
These different ideas of the one-stop career centers would continue to persist throughout their
development and periodically surface as implicit tensions and overt conflicts over their
implementation. In the meantime, the MassJobs Council did not reconcile the different
conceptions as it acted quickly to respond to a sudden opportunity for funds to test the idea from
the Department of Labor. Massachusetts’ proposal to the DOL was influenced by David
Osborne, who sat on the MassJob Council’s executive committee and was a well-known public
reform expert and author of Reinventing Government.  Osborne had also collaborated with
Douglas Ross, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of the Employment and Training
Administration to develop the training reform idea—customer focus, competition, and
consolidation—that underlay the one-stop initiative.
The one-stop career center idea was propelled by a general agreement to improve employment
services. In addition to the employer-based MassJobs Council, the Massachusetts AFL-CIO did
not oppose the one-stop initiative based on the governor’s commitment that no state employee
would be laid off as a result of the competitive process.  If necessary, Employment Service
employees were to be given opportunities for transferring to unemployment services.55
In October 1994, the MassJobs Council and the state were awarded a $11.6 million federal
Department of Labor (DOL) grant for implementation of a statewide One-Stop Career Center
                                                
55 Among the states awarded DOL early One-Stop Career Center grants, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Colorado
permitted the delivery of Wagner Peyser Employment Services through counties or a privatized entity in addition to
unionized ES employees. Final WIA regulations specified that Wagner Peyser Employment Services could only be
delivered by unionized state“merit-staff employees.”  However, as a result of political and legal challenges, final
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system. The MassJobs Council was a policy board rather than an implementation agency and
therefore experienced delays in implementing the One-Stop Career Center approach. Part of the
delay was influenced by the employment and training community that felt threatened by the
competitive process of the new one-stop approach. Prior to the one-stop career center initiative,
the Commonwealth’s Department of Employment and Training held a virtual monopoly on
employment services. The Employment Service was now expected to compete for funds to run
career centers with services that it had administered for decades.
“Competitive” versus “Collaborative” Career Center Models
As part of Massachusetts’ competitive Career Center system model, the state’s Regional
Employment Boards (REBs)—policy entities created by JTPA and principally advised by private
sector representatives—were invited to submit proposals to be implementation sites or planning
sites.  The requests for proposals specified that the REBs must be organizationally and fiscally
separate from the Service Delivery Areas (SDAs)—the local entities that had managed training,
sometimes directly, under the JTPA. Four of 12 REBs in the state applying for the grants met
this criteria and were immediately approved and permitted to solicit competitive bids for
operating one-stop career centers: Boston, Hampden County, Metro North (Cambridge and areas
to is north and west), and Berkshire County. At this stage, the REBs conducted the next level of
competition in selecting career center operators. Notably, in both Hampden County and
Berkshire County, the private for-profit firm of Employment and Training Institute, Inc. (ETI)—
based in New Jersey—was selected as sole operator of a career center.56 These decisions sent
                                                                                                                                                            
WIA regulations granted specific exclusions to Massachusetts, Michigan, and Colorado to operate as “pilot
programs” and allow non-union (i.e., “merit-based”) employees to deliver Wagner Peyser Employment Services.
56 In Hampden County, ETI, Inc. operated the FutureWorks career center in the city of Springfield. In Berkshire
County, ETI, Inc. operated the Berkshire Works career center in the city of Pittsfield.
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clear signals to the training providers across the state that a competitive process was being taken
seriously. Fearing their programs and funding in peril, local training providers and statewide
agencies encouraged the state legislature to file a measure blocking the one-stops on the basis of
insufficient funding and merit. Although the governor vetoed the measure, stakeholders holding
different ideas about the one-stop career center concept regrouped and eventually came to a
compromise in 1997.  Competition in choosing one-stop operators would no longer be required.
Existing one-stops already selected through competitive bidding could continue, but new one-
stops could choose between a “competitive model” or a “collaborative model.” In the
collaborative approach, one-stop operators would not have to bid competitively. Operators such
as SDAs or the Department of Employment and Training’ local Employment Service offices
could be designated to administer one-stops either individually or collaboratively. Collaboration
could range from co-location to integrated cooperation. As it turned out, subsequent one-stop
operators were chosen using the collaborative model.
The political battle over one-stop career center “competitive models” versus “collaborative
models” reflected divergent views among policymakers and practitioners in the employment and
training community. According to Donahue (2000), one view was that the Commonwealth’s job
training efforts did not need major restructuring because they already operated well and by some
accounts were among the best performing in the country.  Another view—held by ambitious
reformers, was that “politics beats policy,” and that the “resistance to competition displayed by
bureaucratic actors threatened by the early one-stops serves as a depressing reminder of how
difficult it is to change the behavior of large organizations and how hard they will fight to defend
their turf” (Donahue, Lynch and Whitehead 2000, page 44). Although the competitive model had
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been contained and bounded within four regions, the battle of institutional restructuring persisted
with a deeper competitive experiment in Boston.
Boston’s Competitive One-Stop Career Center System
Boston PIC as Career Center Intermediary
While the competitive model was used by the initial four REBs to select one-stop operators, the
Boston REB took the competitive approach one step further. Because Boston was geographically
larger than other regions and required multiple career centers, the Boston REB used competitive
bidding to select operators to run three different career centers that would also compete against
one another. In Boston, competition would be used in the selection of career center operators, as
well as in the operation of career centers. Other REBs used competitive bidding to select who
would operate the region’s only one-stop career center.
The REB overseeing this process in Boston was the Boston Private Industry Council (PIC), a
quasi-governmental nonprofit agency that was involved in influencing and administering
workforce development initiatives.57 PIC’s major program areas included welfare to work,
school to career, incumbent worker skills improvement—especially entry-level health care, and
the Boston Compact.58   The Boston WIB includes 35 leaders of the city’s private, public, and
nonprofit communities.  This board delegates certain decision-making authority to an 11 member
                                                
57 The Boston PIC is a private, non-profit organization that functions as a quasi-governmental agency because it
administers several federally funded workforce development programs.  The Boston PIC has a general hierarchical
structure but with many semi-independent projects and project staff, and is overseen by a board of directors
comprised mostly of private sector representatives. The Boston PIC served as the inspiration and model for the
federal JTPA legislation that authorized regional employment boards throughout the country.
58 The Boston Compact is a 1982 agreement among the Boston Public Schools, labor, business, and other parties to
improve the success of students in the city's public school system.
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Executive Committee that is comprised of a majority of employer representatives.59 The
Executive Committee determines day-to-day policy and program directions for the Boston PIC
and Boston’s WIB.60
The relationship of the PIC to the Career Centers is best understood as that of an intermediary
among the three Centers, as well as an intermediary between the Centers and the state offices
concerned with employment and training. The PIC is a chartering agent that charges each Career
Center an annual chartering fee of more than $ 75,000 for its services. According to the PIC
Career Center Program Manager, “we charter the centers, but we are not the lead agency.”  As a
result, it fills a complex multi-functional role as contracts overseer, information broker,
facilitator, ombudsman, and monitor for each of the Centers. Included among the services
provided by the PIC are:
• policy and information coordination among centers;
• technical assistance with management information systems (provided initial case
management software with rights to Centers to alter code);
• program monitoring (i.e., follow-up customer surveys, focus groups);
• organizational development training (arranged joint training in Continuous Quality
Improvement);
• staffing monthly meetings for three Centers directors;
• fiscal pass through (not fiscal agent) between state funders and Centers;
• development and coordination of some contracts and memorandums of understanding
(MOUs) between state departments and Centers;
• brokering and negotiating between state agencies and Centers.
                                                
59 The PIC Executive Committee consists of six CEOs from the private sector, the President of the Massachusetts
AFL-CIO, the Superintendent of Boston Public Schools, the head of University of Massachusetts (Boston), a
community representative, and the Mayor’s Chief of Staff.
60 The PIC Executive Committee is supported though a structure of committees and subcommittees.  For example,
the Workforce Development Committee consists of three subcommittees, the Employment and Training Systems
Subcommittee, and the Welfare to Work Subcommittee.  The original Career Center Committee that oversaw policy
and direction of the PIC Career Center initiative was later subsumed into the Employment and Training Systems
Subcommittee that now oversees the Career Center initiative.
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As suggested by its services and functions, the PIC occupies different positions in at least two
different networks.  It is the center of a hub and spoke network among the Centers.  It is also the
intermediary institution between the Centers and several state and local agencies.
Career Centers as Customer Service Driven
To develop its career center initiative, the PIC created a Career Center Committee in 1995 and
held a series of focus groups and public meetings around the question of why many employers
and job seekers were not using the existing Employment Services system. According to
observers (Heldrich Center for Workforce Development 2002), the PIC learned that improved
customer service was the primary issue, and that employers wanted Career Center staff to be
professional, have knowledge of their industry, designate a single point of contact, and remove a
job posting once the job was filled. Job-seekers wanted to be given respect by staff (e.g., have
staff keep appointments) and be given some direction in their job search.
Based on what it heard, the PIC determined that a commitment to service excellence would be
the driving theme of the one-stops and that the whole initiative would have the following
expectations: i) treat employers as a priority customer in the design and operation of both the
labor exchange and workforce development systems; ii) become competitive by adopting
standards of excellence (e.g., striving to reach performance standards of 100 percent) and
develop the best possible technology and facility resources; iii) remove bureaucratic constraints
to provide the best possible service to employer and job seeker customers; and iv) develop One-
Stop Career Centers that develop labor exchange services, serve as hubs within the workforce
development system, are customer-driven, develop and integrate funding sources, and are
quality-focused.
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Goals for Career Centers
Career centers were expected to subscribe to a basic philosophy of providing employment,
education, or job training services to businesses and individuals in an efficient, innovative, and
integrated manner.  The career centers were also required to address four specific goals:
• Universal Access: all individuals have access to free “core” services such as “on-line” job
listings, education and training program listings, and resource library. More intensive
“fee-based” services such as career counseling and workshops are also available.
• Customer Choice: recipients have a choice of centers within particular regions.
• Integrated services: “one-stop” model is designed to provide a seamless approach to
workforce development system.
• Remain Accountable: satisfaction with career center services to be monitored through
customer satisfaction surveys; and center funding is to be driven by performance.
There was a menu of services that each career center was expected to provide. For job-seekers,
each of the centers were to maintain a resource room with access to computers.  Customers could
use, free-of-charge, word processing software (for producing resumes and cover letters), job
matching software, and internet services.  Resource rooms were also to include fax and printing
privileges. Each of the centers also was expected to offer free workshops on topics such as
“creating a resume,” “creating a skills portfolio,” and “how to find a job.”  Basic computer use
skills workshops could be offered.  For job seekers with more specialized needs, employment
counselors would meet and develop longer-term job search strategies.
For employers, Center staff would help determine hiring needs and criteria.  Staff would then
posts job offerings in the job-matching database and help recruit candidates from client lists.
Career Centers were to function as single points of contact for employers connecting to the
workforce development system. Career centers were designated to provide employment services
to employers by screening, assessing and referring qualified candidates for job openings.
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In support of these objectives, the PIC adopted a Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI)
framework for the request for proposal, chartering, and annual review processes of the career
centers.61 Each career center was expected to demonstrate a focus on service excellence by
emphasizing outcomes and components of a plan that satisfied the needs of its job seeker and
employer customers. Within the framework, the PIC gave the career centers wide latitude to
establish strategies, markets, and services. In effect, it permitted a diversity of operational
approaches among the Career Centers.
Annual and Charter Review Process
In order to encourage, document, and assess differences in service approaches, the Boston PIC
adopted several mechanisms to monitor career centers’ plans, process, and procedures.   The
main instrument for this involved the Boston PIC “chartering” the career centers as joint venture
partnerships for a three-year period. A charter conferred a semi-autonomous status to a career
center that was renewable every three years based on the center’s ability to meet general
performance goals—partially based on benchmarks evolving from the competitive environment.
To structure this process, the PIC conducted annual reviews of career centers and a “charter
review” every three years to determine if the center would be “re-chartered.”62 Since 1997, the
re-chartering and annual review process has essentially remained the same. Though sharing a
                                                
61 Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) is an approach to improving operations that is mostly applied in the
commercial sector but that has been also adopted by many nonprofit and public organizations. CQI is results-
oriented with an emphasizes on experimenting and adjusting organizational processes to achieve “quality
outcomes.”  To this end, CQI gathers extensive information related to peer and customer feedback in order to
identify and solve systemic problems.  CQI approaches are often characterized by team-based leadership and a
variety of process flow diagrams.
62 Since the original charters in 1996, the PIC has re-chartered the Career Centers twice (in 1999 and 2002) and
conducted seven annual reviews. Rather than a competitive process, the re-chartering has effectively served as a
recertification since the PIC determined that the operators were meeting service expectations.
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similar set of guiding principles and basic research activities, the tri-annual charter reviews
involve more detail than the annual review. As part of the annual review and chartering process,
the PIC emphasizes a variety of inquiry-based activities that describe career centers’
development, strategies, governance structure, decision making process, and service delivery
process. Most of these activities are structured around the terms and framework of Continuous
Quality Improvement (CQI).63
During an annual review the PIC conducts a site visit during which career center staff make
presentations responding to questions sent earlier. The PIC also reviews written documents
prepared by the career centers that document service levels, and that also consist of yearly
progress reports and business plan updates. The PIC also collects customer feedback by
convening focus groups of job-seekers and employers. The annual review process is also used a
way to focus on specialized areas of Career Center operation each year. For example, one year
the PIC asked Career Centers to assess their employer relationships and to build plans around
achieving better customer satisfaction among employer customers. To re-emphasize the focus,
the PIC uses subsequent annual reviews to revisit each Career Center’s implementation plan and
performance related to the specialized area.
In general, the PIC relies upon qualitative information to focus on customer satisfaction.
Qualitative information complemented the quantitative information required by funding sources.
                                                
63 As the annual and charter reviews have evolved, the PIC has increasingly used the explicit language of Baldridge.
The PIC organizes its charter reviews by focusing on three core areas: Organization Development and Center
Management; Service Delivery Processes and Product Lines; and Performance Results. Each of these core areas
corresponds to Baldridge criteria. For example, the core area of Organization Development and Center Management
includes the Baldridge Criteria 1—Leadership and Criteria 2—Strategic Planning.
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In particular, the PIC examines how the career centers use CQI processes to identify and act
upon service and organizational problems. Qualitative measures used to document career center
performance include:
• strategic planning processes,
• customer flows,
• employee education and training,
• methods of staff empowerment,
• balancing-funding stream fragmentation with service integration, matching customers and
services,
• partnering processes,
• methods of gathering data for product improvement,
• processes by which data is analyzed,
The PIC uses quantitative data to track service utilization by different types of job-seekers and
employers as indicators of service delivery. To some extent, the PIC also uses four quantitative
indicators to measure career center performance. The four goals include two for job seekers and
two for employers:
• Ninety (90) percent of all job seeker customers will be enrolled in an education and
training program or service;
• Ninety (90) percent of all job seekers placed in a job will stay at least six months;
• Ninety (90) percent of all employer customers that accept a job seeker for hire will keep
the employee for at least six months; and
• Ninety (90) percent of all employer customers who use the Career Center will return
within two years for additional services.
These measurable objectives were intended to help meet the Career Center System’s fourth goal
of being accountable in the pursuit of high-quality customer service. The qualitative and
quantitative assessments of progress in providing customer service combined with the other
goals (i.e., universal access, customer choice, and integrated services), a menu of required tiered
services, and a CQI-based monitoring process, to comprise the basic framework for the Career
Center system.
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Career Center Operators: Background and Orientation
With its framework in hand, the PIC issued a “request for proposals” (RFP) as part of a
competitive bidding process. Seven groups responded with proposals. After an iterative review
of the competing proposals, the PIC accepted the “business plans” of three separate groups to
operate Boston’s three career centers. Three sets of career center operators where selected
because they addressed the RFP’s criteria and because they expressed an interest in participating
in an initiative that promised them wide latitude in delivering and innovating labor matching
services. The three sets of operating partners were also selected because they represented diverse
organizational backgrounds and strengths.
One-Stop Career Centers and Operators
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Operators: Jewish Vocational
Services; Mayor’s Office
of Jobs and Community
Services (Economic
Development & Industrial
Corporation/Boston
Redevelopment
Authority)
Massachusetts Division of
Employment and
Training; Drake, Beam,
and Morin64
Dimock Community
Health Center; Morgan
Memorial Goodwill
Industries, Inc.;
Women’s Educational
and Industrial Union
Even with diverse operators among the partnerships, each Career Center exemplified a
distinctive orientation due to the combined history and background of the sponsoring
organizations. The sponsoring organizations had, in most cases, a long history in their approach
                                                
64 Drake, Beam, and Morin exited as a co-operator in early 1998 and was replaced in early 1999 by Action for
Boston Community Development (ABCD).
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to employment and training. Over time and based on their institutional setting, the sponsors had
established relative stability in their organizational purpose, form, and functions. These
characteristics were also generally consistent with each sponsor organization’s mission values
and roles. As a consequence, the sponsor organizations infused the One-Stops with their own
dominant value orientation. The diverse sponsoring partnerships shaped and gave rise to three
emergent, distinct value orientations among the Career Centers: “community” at Boston Career
Link, “bureaucratic” at JobNet, and  “entrepreneurial” at The Work Place. The following section
provides background on the sponsoring organizations for each Career Center and illustrates the
basis for each Career Center’s orientations. Subsequent chapters reveal how different
orientations among the Career Centers relate to their diverse strategies and practices.
Boston Career Link: Operators and their Community Orientation
Since its opening, Boston Career Link (BCL) has distinguished itself among the Career Centers
for its “community focus” and personalistic “warm and fuzzy” approach. Much of this is due to
the community histories and orientation of its operators. Boston Career Link (BCL) opened in
June 1996 and continues to be operated by three sponsoring non-profits: Dimock Community
Health Center (DCHC), Morgan Memorial Goodwill Industries (MMGI), and the Women’s
Educational Industrial Union (WEIU). These three community-based nonprofits all share basic
values in serving disadvantaged populations, though their specific target populations differ
somewhat. Sponsoring BCL was seen as a way expand the service reach of each of their
individual organizations beyond their traditional clientele, while maintaining consistency with
their broad organizational missions. These interests were based on organizational histories
characterized by adapting and innovating services and programs in response to changing social
conditions and problems.
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All three sponsors had some shared objectives in partnering, as well as individual motivations
that were particular to their organizational interests. Overall, the nonprofits had in common a
general interest in repositioning themselves in the new evolving workforce development
environment. To varying degrees, the nonprofits saw the partnership as means to have a hand in
restructuring Boston’s workforce development system. For one partner organization, BCL was
also seen as an opportunity to address the financial strain of providing employment services that
were getting harder to support due to diminishing governmental funds with increasing
restrictions. All partners shared the expectations of the OSCC policy designers that pursuing the
competitive model might even yield profits as a revenue stream. The nonprofits also framed their
partnership as a complementary effort that leveraged each organization’s specialized expertise
serving particular populations and communities. They suggested that combining the particular
experience of the three nonprofits would provide a collective expertise that could be applied to
serving the multiple job-seeker populations comprising the universal population expected to be
served by Career Centers. BCL is distinguished among the Career Centers for its community-
based orientation. It is the only Career Center without a government partner. It is also
distinguished by each organization’s long history of serving disadvantaged communities. As an
executive director of BCL stated, the three non-profit organizations collectively represent more
than 300 years of service to low-income people in Boston.
Employment Services for 125 Years: Women’s Educational and Industrial Union
The history of the Women’s Educational and Industrial Union (WEIU) provides an illustrative
example of an organization that developed collective strategies to address the social problems of
specific populations. It is also an example of how such an organization has not only adapted its
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own services over time, but also helped spawn and support the development of new public
institutions. Located in Boston’s downtown, WEIU is not a union in the sense of organized labor
but rather a union in the sense of an organization focused on providing collective services and
advocacy for women. It was founded in 1877—in  response to Boston’s rapid immigration and
industrial growth in the 19th century—as a retail store to help women support themselves and
their families by selling crafts and foodstuffs. After providing free legal aid to workers for
several years and then starting an employment training program for the blind, the WEIU
launched a retail training program for women in 1905.65 In 1910 the WEIU established the
Appointment Bureau, a vocational advising and placement service for educated women in fields
other than teaching.66 The WEIU founded the Bureau of the Handicapped in 1930 to provide
training and employment for the physically handicapped, services now overseen by the
Massachusetts Rehabilitation Commission—a government agency. The WEIU began providing
training for home care staff in 1966 and training for licensed home day care providers in 1970. In
1992 the WEIU started a training program for employment advisors to improve their skills and
counseling when assisting career changers, new workers, and the unemployed.
The WEIU was just completing a strategic planning process in the summer of 1995 when the
request for proposals (RFP) to create One-Stop Career Centers was released. For the WEIU, the
timing was fortuitous since it was reconsidering its approach to employment services. Since its
earliest incarnation as the Appointment Bureau in 1910, WEIU’s career center had been one of
the organization’s core services. For many years, the WEIU operated a career center that
                                                
65 Four year after beginning its employment training program for the blind, WEIU help create the Massachusetts
Commission for the Blind.  WEIU’s retail training program was adopted by Simmons College in 1917 and continues
it today as the Prince Program in Retail Management.
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provided a resource library free to the public, career counseling on a sliding scale fee, and job
finding workshops with no or minimal fees. By the early 1990s, the career center’s eight full-
time equivalent staff provided services to about 3,000 to 4,000 people per year. About 80 percent
of the people using the services were women and they tended to be white, college-educated, had
access to other resources, and “knew how to get there.” As part of the strategic planning process,
the WEIU “had a glimmer” that the internet would change job search, especially for people with
resources, which were the kinds of people using their services. At the same time, the WEIU’s
technological capacity was limited and would have required investing to update and upgrade its
computer and human resources. In its planning process, the WEIU also determined that its career
services were running the largest deficit of all programs running deficits.  Forecasting that its
traditional clientele would use its services less and that its career center deficit could increase,
the WEIU looked for other community organizations interested in re-shaping their employment
services. In the BCL proposal, the WEIU saw an opportunity to partner with other CBOs having
similar values and having complementary career services focused on the disadvantaged, even
though other WEIU programs served the disadvantaged. And by offering to spin-off its career
resources library, WEIU saw an opportunity to contribute a sizable asset to the collaborative
effort while at the same time reducing its own career center deficit.
100+ Years of Employment and Training: Morgan Memorial Goodwill Industries
Like WEIU, Morgan Memorial Goodwill Industries (MMGI) was motivated to form BCL as a
consequence of its long history and interest in providing employment services to Boston’s
disadvantaged people. MMGI is currently located in the Roxbury, a community of low-income
                                                                                                                                                            
66 The WEIU opened the country’s first credit union in 1913.
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and working class residents that also has a sizable minority population. Started in 1895 by
Reverend Edgar J. Helms, the Boston Goodwill was the founding organization of what has
become a worldwide network of 227 independent Goodwill Industries affiliates. Reverend
Helms’ idea was to provide employment and training to immigrants in Boston’s South End by
having them collect unwanted household goods and refurbish the items for resale. The resold
goods not only paid the workers' wages but also provided low-cost items for poor and working
individuals. The success of this approach was soon expanded beyond new immigrants to include
other disadvantaged workers. It was also replicated in other cities where community
organizations adopted the Goodwill Industries name and strategy. By  1920, the Goodwill
“network” extended to major cities including Baltimore, Brooklyn, Milwaukee, San Francisco
and Pittsburgh. In the 1930s and 1940s, Boston’s Goodwill Industries responded to the
employment crisis of the Great Depression and World War II by further developing its workforce
development services. In addition to offering programs to assist the poor, Goodwill gave greater
attention to people who were physically or otherwise disabled. In Boston and nationally,
Goodwill played a role in providing adequate numbers of workers to produce many basic
necessities during World War II.  During the past thirty years, Boston’s Goodwill further
expanded its clientele to accommodate workers as the work environment changed and new social
issues emerged. The organization's programs were redefined to also address the needs of the
homeless, people with substance abuse problems, people with criminal histories and welfare
recipients. At the same time, MMGI’s main population has continued to be those with physical
and mental disabilities. And while retail operations remain its core vehicle for employment
services and resource development, MMGI now also offers limited computer skills training in an
attempt to match the emerging technological requirements that were being required by
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employers. As MMGI added different types of disadvantaged people to its core service
population, Goodwill also over time expanded its funding sources beyond its retail services to
include a variety of philanthropic grants and governmental employment training funds. By the
mid-1990s, MMGI recognized that the governmental funding structure for employment and
training services was changing. For MMGI, partnering to sponsor BCL was a way to position
itself within the emerging workforce development environment. Collaborating to form BCL was
also seen as a continuation of its long history of providing employment services to an expanding
range of disadvantaged workers.
A Hundred Years of Metamorphosis: Dimock Community Health Center
Like WEIU and MMGI, Dimock Community Health Center (DCHC) was also motivated in
partnering to form BCL as a result of its historical and contemporary interests in employment-
related services in Boston. It also provides an example of an organization that has reshaped its
institutional mission and practices as a result of changing societal and community conditions.
Located in Roxbury—a low-income community of predominantly minority residents—Dimock
was originally incorporated in 1862 as the New England Hospital for Women and Children.
Soon after its inception, the hospital became a pioneering training center for women physicians
and nurses.67 Throughout its history, the hospital continued to operate at the leading edge of
changing social conditions and trends. For example, in 1969, the hospital’s board of directors
shifted the organization’s orientation from hospital to that of a community based organization
and re-inaugurated it as Dimock Community Health Center. The board believed that as a
community based organization, Dimock would be better able to meet the health needs of its
                                                
67 For example, the hospital graduated the nation’s first nurse in 1873, and the first African American nurse in 1879.
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service area as well as address the social and economic issues that influence individual and
family health. As part of this organizational change in 1969, Dimock received a Rockefeller
Foundation grant to start its workforce development services with a focus on providing training
for entry-level health positions. Since that time, Dimock has provided health-related employment
training services to disadvantaged people, especially residents of Boston’s low-income Roxbury
community. Many of these employment services have depended on governmental training funds
that, in Dimock’s experience, have become increasingly restricted. Like the WEIU and MMGI,
Dimock saw in the BCL proposal an opportunity to reposition their employment services within
a changing workforce reimbursement structure. According to Dimock President Jackie Jenkins-
Scott, the BCL was a way to “test if they would survive in the new era.” More importantly than
this, however, Dimock saw BCL as an opportunity to leverage each organization’s strengths, to
build upon the informal and formal relationships among the three sponsors, and to
“revolutionize” the emergent workforce development system.
For all three nonprofits, forming BCL was consistent with each organization’s espoused values
of serving disadvantaged populations. As partners in BCL, the nonprofits could continue to serve
their traditional constituencies as well as combine their organizational capacities to serve larger
numbers and more diverse types of people. Each partner had specialized skills, experience, and
organizational connections related to providing services to particular groups. Dimock brought to
the table a long history in workforce development, experience with working with the urban
minority poor, and contacts in the health industry. MMGI similarly had a long workforce
development history, as well as particular experience working with disabled people, and
expertise in retail services through its stores.  The WIEU offered a long history serving middle-
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class, middle to older-age women in a downtown location, with varied corporate contacts.
Though focusing on different populations, the organizations suggested that there were general
skills related to employment and training that could be applied universally to most job-seekers.
In joining together, the organizations felt that they presented a compelling partnership because of
the complementary nature of their employment services.
Another consideration by the organizations’ leaders in pursuing the partnership were the
organizational, personal and gender ties among the partners. Over the years the organizations had
formally and informally worked together on various projects. Not only had the organizations
directly had positive working experiences, they were also well known to each other through
indirect associations working in the workforce development field. WEIU’s president had
previously worked on several projects with Dimock’s president. Dimock had previously
collaborated on projects with Goodwill. Each organization also offered distinct sets of strong
connections as well as overlapping weaker ties to community organizations in the different
neighborhoods where they were located: Roxbury, Dudley, and downtown.
Gender also tied the partners together. Both WEIU and Dimock had female executive directors.
During the proposal process in 1995, Goodwill selected a new chief executive officer.  All three
leaders noted in interviews that the fact that they were all female contributed to a shared sense of
equitable partnership in overseeing BCL. “We created a true collaborative, with all the pros and
cons,” reflected Jenkins-Scott.  The three leaders comprised the board of directors of BCL, and
held responsibility for joint planning and hiring/firing of BCL’s executive director. The partner
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organizations agreed to split any profits. They also planned to spin-off BCL as an independent
nonprofit when it had matured and grown.
All three partners also saw in the One-Stop Career Center request-for-proposal (RFP) a chance to
“revolutionize” the workforce system by combining resources and serving a broader section of
jobseekers rather than only the poor. The RFP’s emphasis on partnership, innovation, and
seamless service delivery was appealing because each nonprofit felt that it was consistent with
each of their organization’s values and goals. The RFP also suggested that not only would there
be sufficient funds—a little more than $2 million—to support the One-Stop, but that the
competitive model encouraged entrepreneurial fee-based services that could generate positive
revenue streams: “profit.”
The brief histories of BCL’s sponsors illustrate several characteristics that they shared. Each
organization has maintained a long-standing commitment to serve particular population. To hold
such focus for more than one hundred years demonstrates strong dedication to the values of
community service and to the persisting needs of particular groups of disadvantaged people. It
also demonstrates a long-term organizational identification with particular populations that has
transcended any single visionary or charismatic leader. Over time, the organizations have
expanded their services beyond their core populations to other disadvantaged groups. According
to all three sponsors, expanding their service reach remains historically consistent with their
organization’s fundamental mission values of tending to the social welfare of disadvantaged
people.
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Another important attribute of the sponsoring community organizations has been their capacity
to adapt to large- and small-scale social, economic, and public policy changes. They have more
than merely survived the major transformative processes of the past 100 years: industrialization,
urbanization, and the expansion (and retrenchment) of this country’s social welfare state. They
have managed to maintain their solvency while remaining relevant to particular disadvantaged
communities. Each sponsor has demonstrated an enduring capacity for organizational
sustainability. As their histories suggest, their organizational lives are mostly characterized by
organic change and environmental sensitivity. At the same time, they have, in some
circumstances, innovated social programs that have been adopted by governmental agencies
(e.g., WEIU) as well as community organizations outside of Boston (e.g., MMGI). Such
longevity and institutional influence may be partly explained by the strong relationships that the
sponsors have developed over time with their clientele, other organizations, and within their
communities.  According to the sponsors, such trust relationships developed from long-term and
repeated interactions based on the organizations’ clear articulation and practice of values related
to dedicated service to particular populations. As social and economic environmental conditions
changed, the sponsors have learned to share information and resources across crisscrossing webs
of individuals and organizations embedded with shared values in networked communities of
practice. As an example, the sponsors described how the BCL collaboration emerged from such a
network. As the RFP was being developed, communication signals filtered through the network
of community organizations involved in employment services about setting up a Career Center.
Several community organizations expressed such an interest. The three sponsors were familiar
with one another’s reputation in the community for dedicated service to disadvantaged
populations. Over the years, they had also been in a variety of formal and informal relationships
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together.  However, what distinguished these three organizations to one another was a shared
interest in leveraging their collective capacities to affecting larger scale institutional reform. In
other words, what drew them together in this initiative was that they saw in the career center not
another service delivery program, but rather an advocacy mechanism for changing Boston’s
workforce development system.
JobNet: Operators and their Bureaucratic Orientation
Unlike BCL’s operator-driven community orientation, JobNet has an underlying bureaucratic
orientation that is largely attributable to its sponsorship by a large state agency historically
associated with administering Massachusetts’ public Employment Service. JobNet opened in
January 1997 under the sponsorship of the state Division of Employment Training and the
private placement firm of Drake, Beam, and Morin (DBM). In 1998 DBM ceased its relationship
with JobNet. In 1999, JobNet’s new sponsoring operator was Action for Boston Community
Development (ABCD), a nonprofit human services agency with headquarters in downtown
Boston.
Classic Government Bureaucracy: Massachusetts’ Division of Employment Training
As explained previously, DET has operated Massachusetts’ “Opportunity Job Centers” which
housed the Employment Services and unemployment insurance offices for many years.
Historically, the DET has been considered an archetypal government bureaucracy partly due to
its association with the administration of unemployment benefits. The “unemployment office”
was the place to go to stand in line, fill out unemployment claim forms, listen to a government
worker repeat eligibility criteria, and perhaps conduct job search by browsing card catalogues
listing openings that employers had called in. As one former DET employee described it, the
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basic protocol was “shut up, sit down, fill out form, and wait ‘til you’re called.” DET’s
coordinating orientation was rule-bound, procedural, and hierarchical due to the kinds of
programs it managed as well as for the state and federal institutional infrastructure within which
it existed. In addition to administering the unemployment insurance cash benefit program to
eligible unemployed workers, DET also administered federal training and placement programs
and allocated dedicated federal funds.68
In addition to its own internal bureaucratic functions, DET also exists within a larger
bureaucratic complex of state agencies. DET operates within the Department of Labor and
Workforce Development (DLWD), which itself operated under the Office of Labor, Education
and Economic Development.
For these reasons, DET has operated as a classic governmental hierarchical bureaucracy. One
aspect of such an orientation is an emphasis on following norms and routines and inflexibility
towards innovation and change. An example of this is seen in the original siting plans for JobNet.
Many DET long-term Employment Service employees were reluctant to change their working
practices and were resistant to the One-Stop Career Center concept. When it first proposed
operating JobNet, DET planned to locate it in the first floor of the state offices Hurley Building,
where the Employment Service (aka Opportunity Job Center) had been located for many years.
The OSCC Committee determined that the new One-Stops should be in locations away from
their sponsoring operators so that they would be considered new enterprises. As one OSCC
                                                
68 In the 1990s, DET became less reliant on unemployment offices after developing its telephone claims center.
Callers can now initiate new claims, reopen existing claims, track the status of a claim or ask questions of DET
90
Committee member stated, “we didn’t want business as usual except with new paint on the
walls.” DET revised its proposal and JobNet was approved for its new location in commercial
office space near the financial district.
The Corporation: Drake, Beam, and Morin
Originally, JobNet was operated through a collaborative initiative of DET and the private
placement firm of Drake, Beam, and Morin (DBM). Founded in 1967, DBM is a human
resources consulting firm specializing in outplacement assistance for corporate layoffs, as well as
career assessment, training, organizational development, and job design. Founded in 1967, DBM
began offering outplacement services several years after its founding in 1967, and career
transition services in the 1970s.  In 1974, Drake, Beam and Morin was acquired by Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, a multi-million dollar publishing company. In 1979, DBM received its first
large group outplacement assignment and responded by developing its “career center” concept as
an innovative approach to delivering career transition services that went on to become an
industry standard for large-scale outplacement services. With its experience in offering career
center services, DBM saw JobNet as a means to build upon its experience and enter what was
represented to be an emerging market with profit potential. However, DBM exited the venture
after one year for several reasons. Even with the emphasis by the OSCC system designers in
setting up the One-Stops as “flat organizations,” setting up JobNet surfaced a series of tensions
between DBM’s private sector market-place orientation and  DET’s traditional bureaucratic
practices. As the fiscal agency for JobNet, DET’s influence soon dominated decision-making
over DBM. Soon after their JobNet proposal was selected, both partners saw that the One-Stops
                                                                                                                                                            
employees. Still bureaucratic, DET has made unemployment insurance more convenient, while arguably—since it
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were going to receive less operating funds with more restrictions than originally represented by
the RFP. Familiar with governmental budgetary and regulatory politics, DET adjusted. With
weakened influence and diminished opportunities for profit, DBM exited.69 With DBM gone,
DET proposed to operate JobNet by itself by drawing upon its Employment Service experience,
staff, and resources. At the same time, DET set out to find a replacement partner.
A Neighborhood-Distributed Bureaucracy: Action for Boston Community Development
In 1999, DBM was replaced with the non-profit agency Action for Boston Community
Development (ABCD). After Drake Beam and Morin’s departure from JobNet in 1998, DET and
JobNet essentially put out a bidding process among selected government and large nonprofit
organizations to become JobNet’s new collaborator. Although Bunker Hill Community College
was seriously considered, ABCD’s successful track record in applying for government contracts
and its strong connections to disadvantaged communities helped ABCD to submit the winning
bid.  Like Boston Career Link’s operators MMGI, WEIU, and DCHC, ABCD is a nonprofit
organization with strong community ties. Yet, in many ways, ABCD has more in common with
DET regarding a bureaucratic orientation. ABCD’s bureaucratic characteristics are partly
explained by its history, size, and structure.  Unlike MMGI, WEIU, and to some extent DCHC,
that all evolved slowly from grassroots civic innovation, ABCD quickly emerged as a major
actor in local politics and service delivery after its creation by civil elites, federal agencies, and a
national philanthropic foundation. In 1961, a handful of civic leaders formed the Boston
Community Development Program (BCDP) to develop “human renewal” as a complement to
urban renewal. Initially supported by the mayor and the Permanent Charity Fund (now the
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Boston Foundation), the initiative was formally incorporated as Action for Boston Community
Development in 1962 with funding from the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Program, followed
by grants from President John F. Kennedy’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and the U. S.
Department of Labor. With passage of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964—creating the
“War on Poverty”—ABCD was designated as the city’s official antipoverty agency. Since that
time, and in the spirit of “maximum feasible participation,” the Board of Directors has been
comprised of elected representatives from Boston’s neighborhoods who formally share decision-
making responsibility with representatives of municipal government and the private sector.70
Over time, ABCD has grown organizationally and bureaucratically to be the largest independent
non-profit human services agency in New England. As one Career Center director put it, “ABCD
has a lock on Boston’s poor indigent population.” ABCD’s strong relationship with poor
communities has enabled it to become a major contractor, administrator, and social services
provider with federal and state funds. In 2001, such funds comprised 90 percent of its $108
million total annual budget. Of this, 48 percent were federal funds administered through state and
city agencies, 28 percent were direct federal funds, 14 percent were state funds, and the
remaining 10 percent of revenue were from city and local grants, or contributions. Although 70
percent of its budget goes to early education and services to young families, ABCD administers a
broad array of social service programs including:
• Head Start
• Child Care Services
• Foster Grandparents
                                                                                                                                                            
69 In 2001, DBM was acquired by The Thomson Corporation, a multi-billion company serving the worldwide
business and professional services marketplace.
70 ABCD developed Area Planning Action Councils (APAC) in Boston’s neighborhoods in 1964-65. Each
neighborhood APAC selects a board member who then sits on the ABCD Board of Directors.
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• Youth Programs including an Alternative High School (University High) in cooperation
with the Boston Public Schools
• SUMMERWORKS, providing career-oriented work experience for low-income teenagers
each summer
• a now-independent and fully accredited Urban College of Boston; a two-year college
• Career Development
• LearningWorks which includes two cutting-edge welfare-to-work programs funded by
the federal Department of Labor
• Management of the Massachusetts Bay Area Combined Federal Campaign (CFC),
Commonwealth of Boston Employee Charitable Campaign (COMECC); City of Boston
Employee Campaign (COBEC), and private sector campaigns which together reach out to
more than 150,000 federal, state, city and private sector employees and benefit more than
3,000 charities
• Health Services/Family Planning
• Housing and Homeless Services
• Community Services
• Elder Services
• Intergenerational Programs
• Housing Services
• Fuel Assistance
• Weatherization
• consumer services and advocacy
To manage such diverse programs, ABDC has developed into a complex, bureaucratically
organized organization. Throughout its history, ABCD has provided employment and training
services via contracts with state and federal agencies. In 1971, it created its Center for Jobs,
Education and Career Training, which reorganized employment and training programs into
assessment, basic education, career programs, career counseling and job placement services. In
1999, ABCD received a $2.8 million DOL welfare-to-work grant in partnership with Morgan
Memorial Goodwill Industries. About two percent of ABCD’s budget is currently used for
employment and career development services.
ABCD’s bureaucratic orientation initially posed a challenge when it partnered with DET to
operate JobNet. During the first year of collaboration, ABCD treated JobNet as a new program to
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add to its long roster of service contracts. For ABCD, this entailed incorporating JobNet into its
varied reporting and accounting systems with their requisite forms and processes. DET, too, had
its own procedures and requirements. JobNet’s executive director Rosemary Alexander had been
a long-term DET employee and was familiar with many of its rules and regulations. However,
she was also very familiar with the people and processes she could use to abbreviate, short-cut,
or circumvent procedures that she felt interfered with her ability to effectively manage JobNet.
With no similar insider or tacit knowledge to navigate through its bureaucratic processes, ABCD
presented itself as an inflexible and cumbersome partner. Later sections will further develop the
theme of how the bureaucratic orientations of DET and, to some extent, ABCD, have influenced
the operations of JobNet.
The Work Place: Operators and their Entrepreneurial Orientation
Whereas its operators provided Boston Career Link a community orientation, and JobNet’s
operators gave it a bureaucratic imprint, The Work Place (TWP) developed an entrepreneurial
style from its sponsors: the Mayor’s Office of Jobs and Community Services(JCS)/Economic
Development & Industrial Corporation and the non-profit Jewish Vocational Services.
According to Work Place director Thomas Ford,
we operate more like business than a government agency…we don’t have a program, we
have products and services…and the decision maker is the user, even if that person is not
the payer, kind of like Blue Cross.
Enterprising  Agencies: Office of Jobs and Community Services and the Economic
Development and Industrial Corporation (Boston Redevelopment Agency)
The Work Place’s entrepreneurial orientation is partly explained by the predominant private
sector orientation of its city agency operator. In fact, the city agency operator is a joint effort by
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two allied city agencies: the Office of Jobs and Community Services and the city’s Economic
Development and Industrial Corporation (EDIC). Both agencies are divisions within the Boston
Redevelopment Agency—the city department that is responsible for Boston’s economic
development. To this end, EDIC is primarily involved in promoting and managing a variety of
land and industrial development efforts. For example, EDIC manages the agency's three
industrial parks: the Marine Industrial Park in South Boston, the Crosstown Industrial Park in
Roxbury, and the Alsen-Mapes Industrial Park in Dorchester. Also part of EDIC is the Boston
Local Development Corporation (BLDC), a private, non-profit corporation which offers financial
services and lending programs to companies locating or expanding in Boston. EDIC is also
comprised of the Boston Industrial Financing Authority (BIDFA), which issues both tax-exempt
and taxable industrial development bonds to finance hard assets for Boston's businesses and
institutions. In all these activities EDIC  acts entrepreneurial itself, as well as supports
entrepreneurial behavior in the private sector.
Jobs and Community Services (JCS) shares EDIC’s entrepreneurial emphasis, but with a focus
on education, training, career development, and human services.71 JCS describes itself as an
“innovative public agency” that promotes economic self-sufficiency among all Boston residents
by serving as an advocate, clearinghouse, and laboratory for best practices in literacy, lifelong
learning, job training/placement, and human services to Boston residents.
                                                
71 Jobs and Community Services (JCS) allocates federal and state grants through program areas including: Adult
Services, which supports adult literacy, job training, and welfare-to-work programs; Central Artery / Tunnel
Training Program, which promotes union apprenticeships; and Human Services, which manages Community
Development Block Grant funds.
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Entrepreneurial Nonprofit: Jewish Vocational Services
The Work Place’s entrepreneurial style was also shaped by its other operator: Jewish Vocational
Services (JVS). Known for its own leadership and innovation in employment and training, JVS
also influenced The Work Place to develop an entrepreneurial orientation focused on innovative
practices. With origins in the tradition of Jewish Communal Services, JVS had its foundations
during the Great Depression when Jewish organizations provided employment assistance to
Jewish people facing mass unemployment and discrimination (Berger 1981). In response to the
influx of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, a national conference on Jewish unemployment
was convened in 1938 by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.72 That year,
Jewish Vocational Services was formed in Boston.  Over time, JVS has adapted itself to
changing social, economic, and political conditions and is now a nonsectarian agency that has
provides workforce development services to Jewish and general communities.
In the mid-1990s, JVS underwent a strategic planning process that culminated in shifting the
organization’s employment services focus to  emphasize continuous lifelong learning by
providing the connections, resources and support needed to achieve next-step career-
advancement goals, family sustaining wages, and “durable self-sufficiency” for the at-risk
populations. It was during the strategic planning process that JVS decided to collaborate to form
The Work Place.
                                                
72 The 1938 conference eventually led to the formation of the International Association of Jewish Vocational
Services (IAJVS), a not-for-profit association linking 29 social service agencies in the United States, Canada, and
Israel. Boston’s JVS is one of those 29 agencies.
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JVS is organized into the four areas: the CALL, Neighborhood Business Builders, Career Moves,
and The Work Place. Academic and training courses at the Center for Careers and Lifelong
Learning (CALL) are intended to help diverse clients prepare for a career, keep skills current,
and upgrade skills in order to advance. A small business loan program, Neighborhood Business
Builders (NBB) provides various forms of capital, training and business development support to
entrepreneurs and small businesses. Target populations are minorities and people in
economically distressed communities who are under-served by the capital market and other
support services. Career Moves offers mostly fee-based career development services, lectures
and workshops for professionals seeking job leads, networking contacts or employer recruitment
assistance. Career Moves also coordinates with the Young Leadership Division of Combined
Jewish Philanthropies, offering professional networking and career management events
specifically designed for young Jewish professionals. Finally, JVS presents The Work Place as a
offering a wide range of customer-focused, high quality employment services, many of which
are available at no cost, with customized services offered for a fee.
Chapter Summary
This chapter reviewed the history and highlighted key issues associated with federal workforce
development policy. In addition, Massachusetts and Boston’s recent workforce development
policies were detailed and discussed in order to set the stage for the development of Boston’s
One Stop Career Centers. Assembled together in this chapter, the brief histories of federal, state,
and local workforce development policies provide institutional context for understanding the
expectations and challenges confronting the career centers. Moreover, regarding the career
centers, this chapter highlighted the distinct histories and purposes of the career centers’
sponsoring operators. The operators’ organizational backgrounds shaped the strategic
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orientations of each career center. As evidenced in subsequent chapters, the distinctive strategic
orientation of each career center significantly influenced its planning, practice, and performance.
For Boston Career Link, the three operators all shared long histories of providing community-
based services. With roots in the 19th Century, each of these organizations has developed during
more than 100 years an approach that maintains a focus on particular populations that carries
over into disadvantaged populations more broadly defined. In conducting its work, each
organization was also connected through webs of personal and organizational ties to a wide
network of community groups and initiatives. Based on such relationships, the three operators
joined forces to sponsor BCL as a way to leverage the experience and particular expertise of each
organization, to serve a broader group of disadvantaged people, and to attempt to influence the
emerging restructuring workforce development system.
For JobNet, the partners represented longstanding major actors in Boston’s employment
environment. Over time, they each developed into large behemoth agencies that were
bureaucratically and hierarchically organized in order to manage the high volume and
regularized provision of services. Such structure was also the result of attempting to rationalize
the multiple demands and high expectations of diverse public needs. As major stakeholders in
the employment and training sector, both DET and ABCD had interests in maintaining their
organization’s role in Boston’s evolving employment services system. For them, sponsoring
JobNet was a means to protect their organizational interests, preserve their complex operations,
and to influence the emerging system.
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For The Work Place, the sponsoring operators functioned in a competitive environment that
valued entrepreneurial behavior. With its focus on economic development, EDIC worked
primarily with land and industrial developers and financiers to promote private sector initiatives.
In this setting, JCS had the opportunity to hear from business employers about their human
resource needs. EDIC/JCS were frustrated that Boston’s employment and training providers were
not adequately meeting employer demands for a range of workers. Sponsoring TWP was seen as
an experiment to focus on the demand side of employment services. JVS saw TWP as a way to
broaden its services to a wider group people as well as to expand its reach into the employer
community.
In the competitive environment of the OSCC selection process, the sponsors highlighted their
competitive advantages that derived from their distinct organizational experiences and expertise.
The OSCC Committee welcomed such differences as a way to experiment with varied and
innovative approaches to employment services.
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CHAPTER THREE
Start-Up Era: Early Years (1996-1998)
Overview
This chapter examines the initial set-up and operations of the three career centers and provides
the foundational structure for subsequent analyses in the following two chapters. Through
detailed examples and narrative analysis, this chapter introduces and describes the indications of
process and performance that are used to answer this study’s three research questions. In
addressing the question of functional diversity and of adaptation among the career centers, this
chapter examines process indicators regarding planning (i.e., operator governance; management
structure; information analysis) and practice (i.e., service delivery approaches and priorities;
information and resource transactions with other organizations; network relationships and
activities). In addressing the question of performance, this chapter introduces and discusses
indicators related to two dimensions of performance: service outcomes (i.e., placement rates, job
postings) and demographic measures. Subsequent data analysis chapters continue to examine
process indicators to answer questions about organizational diversity and adaptation, as well as
to analyze outcomes indicators to address the question of performance. This chapter sets the
stage and begins documenting how the career centers shared similar constraints and opportunities
in preparing and operating the centers. At the same time, due to their sponsorship, they also each
faced a variety of unique advantages and challenges. Career center responses to their situations
partly derived from the particular strategies, initial learning, and relationships of the operators.
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Boston Career Link
Planning and Practice
First Six Months: Budget Constraints, Resistance, Strings
Within its first six months, Boston Career Link (BCL), experienced a series of issues that would
re-surface in various forms during the rest of its existence. Despite the high expectations and
rhetoric surrounding the OSCC as a competitive model that would be well-resourced, seamless,
innovative, and flexible, the partners soon learned that those initial conditions were not as
originally forecast. Immediately after being selected to start up BCL, the operators encountered
fewer resources, more strings, heavier institutional resistance, and deeper management
challenges than they originally planned.
In setting up Boston Career Link (BCL), Dimock Community Health Center was chosen among
the partners to serve as the lead operator because it had more fiscal capacity to manage BCL’s
cash flow. However, BCL immediately encountered fiscal problems when it learned that its first-
year funding in 1996 was about $1.9 million, several hundred thousand less than originally
budgeted. Resolving initial budget issues took months. Complicating this were requirements that
added unplanned costs.73 In addition to a lower budget and higher costs than projected in original
proposal, BCL also faced cash flow problems due to slow payment and reimbursement by the
state.
                                                
73 For example, the PIC required that OSCC offices be physically independent and not located within partner
organization offices, and that each OSCC have a minimum of 10,000 square feet. In the operators’ original
conception, BCL was to be located in very low-rent space within MMGI’s large office/retail complex in the low-
income Dorchester neighborhood. Obliged to alter their proposal, the operators experienced a month-long delay
before eventually settling on commercial space on Huntington Avenue that was accessible on subway and bus lines
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BCL also found that while seamless funding may have been the goal, it did not describe the
continuing infrastructure “silos” of federal, state, and local funding streams and budgets. BCL
had to develop and manage contracts not only with the PIC but also with different funding
sources such as the Massachusetts Commission for the Blind, the Massachusetts Rehabilitation
Commission, and the Department of Transitional Assistance.  These contractual relations often
conflicted with BCL’s original approach of providing the same universal services to all clients.
For BCL, building relationships and developing contracts with state agencies was complicated
by institutional resilience and animosity. According to the CEO of one of BCL’s operators,
“state bureaucrats hated this program because it took away their power and union people were
afraid they would lose jobs, so they all did everything they could to sabotage negotiations.”
Even though the PIC provided some intermediary support in facilitating, it did not pool money
itself and make it available to the One-Stops. In this environment, BCL—and Dimock as fiscal
agent—spent a lot of time negotiating. BCL’s position in reaching financial agreements was
complicated because of the competitive framework within which OSCC were expected to
operate. Each OSCC often had to negotiate their own agreements rather than collectively. From
the perspective of one BCL operator, this situation gave the other One-Stops an unfair
competitive advantage because both The Work Place and JobNet had government partners and
so had better access to both funding and clients. However, all three career centers faced similar
challenges in establishing contract relationships with several public agencies.
                                                                                                                                                            
and located in central Boston, but on the edge of South Boston and near the low-income residents that the partners
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Budgetary constraints also compelled BCL to prioritize its allocation of staffing resources. In this
regard, BCL emphasized job-seeker services at the expense of employer services. The result was
that its employer services staff was not fully funded. With no employer services team leader, this
component suffered under-management and relied instead on Dimock’s and WEIU’s existing
connections with 30 health care employers primarily from teaching hospitals, home health care,
and HMO community.
An over-riding challenge for BCL was having appropriate leadership and staffing to manage its
dual customer orientation and its varied network relationships. BCL’s first executive director left
within the first six months. Although having community-based workforce development
experience, she was unable to develop and implement the leadership and interpersonal skills
needed to manage the career center’s complex organizational relationships. Dimock
subsequently loaned its Vice President for Career Services to serve as acting executive director.
In addition to insufficient resources dedicated to employer services, BCL also faced
technological constraints. Limited computer skills and problematic computer software prevented
staff from entering job-posting data. With no working talent bank that could electronically match
resumes with hundreds of job postings, staff manually sifted through paper resumes and job
posts to find employment. This, too, soon became a problem, because BCL’s office, located in a
“basement” walk-down from the street, experienced three floods during the winter season. Some,
but not all, resumes were ruined and lost.
                                                                                                                                                            
historically served. As a result, the partners had to re-budget to pay $115,000 per year for a five-year lease.
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Retooling Strategy after Six Months
After six months of operating and experiencing both mixed performance and mishaps, BCL
retooled its strategy for the remaining six months of its first year. BCL’s interactions with job-
seekers and employers provided the staff with familiarity of other industries. BCL learned that
there were sizable numbers of openings in the health care and the hospitality industries, and
made these priority areas. In addition, BCL expanded its employer outreach to include financial
services, retail, and food service. At the same time, BCL decided to focus on lower-skilled job
openings to address the employment needs of those job-seekers with little education and
experience. BCL was particularly interested in providing services to customers associated with
the Department of Transitional Assistance (DTA)—the state welfare agency—that offered
resources in the form of welfare to work contracts. As part of this strategy, BCL planned to
develop employer ties with community-based small businesses, especially those located in
lower- and mixed-income neighborhoods. BCL felt that such businesses were more likely to be
within walking distance or easily accessible by public transportation for people with low-
incomes or receiving public assistance. BCL also thought that such businesses were likely to
have flexible work hours enabling low-income and welfare mothers to retrieve their children
from school and day-care.
Universal Access versus Categorical funding
One of the most complex challenges in its first year involved BCL’s capacity to integrate
categorical funding streams with universal access. BCL’s original vision of employing
generalists that offered universal services was based on block grant funds that provided
flexibility. Instead, the emerging fiscal environment was increasingly characterized by
categorical funding streams and performance-based revenue. BCL determined that it needed to
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re-align its staffing services in order to earn budget revenue from these sources with some degree
of predictability. BCL’s approach to this situation was to develop “integrated teams for special
populations” in order to meet its placement goals and earn its performance based revenue. For
BCL, integrated teams also served another purpose. These teams were seen as an attempt to
foster dialogue and coordination between service delivery and placement outcomes. That is,
integrated teams were a vehicle for case management.
On the other hand, BCL greatly focused the activities of its integrated teams based on categorical
funding. Instead of separating job-seeker and employer services as distinct activities that only
connect during the labor matching process, BCL created teams focused on particular population
groups. For example, BCL created a DTA team of employer services and job-seeker services and
a Title III (i.e., federally funded program for dislocated workers) team of employer services and
job-seeker services. BCL’s strategy of emphasizing categorically funded populations also
included the cultivation and organizational connections to support this goal. In addition to the
informal organizational networks available through its operating sponsors, BCL decided to
formalize its own relationships by inviting organizations to sit on its Customer Advisory Council
(CAC). BCL’s plan for the CAC consisted of:
seeking a balance among members to create partnerships for political advocacy and
marketing, outreach to community based organizations to identify candidates who will meet
categorical placement goals (particularly sources for DTA customers already involved in
supportive services to help reduce barriers to employment) and employer advice and
counsel.74
In its efforts to reconcile the competing operational demands of categorical funding streams and
universal access, BCL often sacrificed its services to employers. As early as the end of its first
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year, BCL determined that it had understaffed its employer services relative to job-seeker
services. To rectify this, an Employer Account Executive (EAE) was reassigned from providing
services for DTA customers to join another EAE in focusing on employer services. Within
months of making this change, BCL had hosted 19 on-site employer events, including industry
briefings and job fairs. According to BCL’s annual report, these employer-based activities were
largely responsible for increased job placements, job postings, and new accounts. Nevertheless,
BCL subsequently refocused its services towards categorical customers and reassigned its
Employer Account Executives (EAE) to DTA recruitment in order to meet DTA customer
placement goals. These actions severely limited employer services. This tactic significantly
reduced BCL’s focused ability to outreach, market, and develop employer business. It also
hampered BCL’s ability to define and develop employer service offerings beyond placement.
In its first year, BCL responded to budgetary and policy challenges by shifting its tactics with a
focus on the immediate responses to meeting categorical funding objectives. According to
several staff and outside observers, BCL seemed to be operating in perpetual crisis.
Crisis Management during the Second Year
BCL’s second year was characterized by attempts to stabilize itself through restructuring its
internal governance and strengthening its external relations with community organizations. A
major theme of these efforts was that they were consultative in nature. That is, BCL relied on
advice and familiar relationships to guide its planning. The first action was formally hiring Guy
Bresnahan, Dimock’s Vice President of Career Services, as BCL’s executive director, after
serving as the interim director for more than six months. Another action was the decision by
                                                                                                                                                            
74 Charter Review Fiscal Year 1998 Report (page x).
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BCL’s executive board to seek the counsel of an organizational consultant to assess BCL’s
organizational structure and to recommend changes. After soliciting recommendations from their
professional and friendship networks, BCL’s operators found and hired a consultant.
The organizational consultant found that BCL had mixed and overlapping internal reporting
relationships. While noting that they were possibly appropriate in a crisis atmosphere, the
consultant determined that such commingled relationships were confusing and inconsistent with
BCL’s organization chart. Moreover, they contributed to miscommunication, inefficiency,
counter-productive interpersonal issues, and functional breakdown. He reported that
reporting lines—regardless of where personnel fall within the formal operating units appear to be
based on such factors as actual informal daily practice, personality differences, prior personal
professional relationships or organizational affiliations, or previous organizational structures that
are no longer operative.75
 The consultant recommended that “there should be more formal linkages between career
counselors and account executives—through clusters, working groups, or cross-team pairings—
to encourage greater coordination of client services…[because] these two principal program
areas of BCL operations appear to lack the level of coordination and cross-communication that
could ensure greater efficiency in moving clients through the counseling-to-placement process
and greater success in making quality placements.”76  According to the consultant, BCL’s
coordination had been essentially “left to chance.” BCL’s operators and director agreed to adopt
the suggestions.
                                                
75 Boston Career Link, Business Plan Update, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 2.
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In addition to seeking counsel on its organizational structure, BCL also relied upon consultants
to help provide and implement CQI training. Outside assistance was required because of
problematic attempts to implement CQI from within BCL. Initially, CQI was strongly associated
with BCL’s first executive director during the first six months of operation. After she left, both
BCL’s operating sponsors and staff were leery of a CQI approach as it had become identified
with the first director’s style and managerial ineffectiveness. The personal identification of CQI
to the former director became an obstacle that slowed down its internalization within BCL.
Additionally, CQI’s long-term systemic approach was increasingly out-of-sync with what
became BCL’s standard operating mode of urgency and improvised tactics. Acknowledging its
ambivalence towards CQI, and at the behest of the Boston PIC, BCL sought outside CQI
assistance.
Selected through professional and friendship networks, Quality Improvement Collaborative
(QIC) was hired to conduct training and facilitation for BCL’s Quality Improvement Teams.77
QIC was also selected because its specialty was assisting nonprofit and government agencies to
focus CQI techniques on developing evaluative processes aimed at meeting funding
requirements. Under the director’s direction, some investments were also made to upgrade
BCL’s technological capacity by improving management information systems (MIS) used for
internal purposes and for upgrading reporting systems used for external relationships with other
                                                                                                                                                            
76 Boston Career Link, Business Plan Update, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 3.
77 The Quality Improvement Collaborative is a consulting group teaching Total Quality Management (TQM) to
nonprofit and government agencies primarily in the public health sector. QIC is a service of Health and Addictions
Research, Inc., a private, non-profit research organization that provides program and policy consulting services on
issues related to substance abuse, behavioral health and criminal justice.
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agencies. For BCL, CQI was implemented primarily as a complement to the upgraded
technology systems as a way to enhance BCL’s reporting systems. In its annual report, BCL
reported that “this training has clearly paid dividends, as BCL’s documented performance gains
far exceeded those established in FY98.”78 While BCL used CQI successfully in improving the
targeting and reporting of performance outcomes, it did not adopt CQI in ways that significantly
influenced its organizational planning and processes.
At BCL, CQI was adopted and grafted onto its ad hoc approach and existing management
structure. As BCL experienced crisis and lagging performance, it determined that it would not
support activities that did not expressly help improve performance. Conventionally, CQI is not
introduced by applying it to the most pressing problems facing an organization. However, BCL
“re-designed” CQI as a “just-in-time” training module using the achievement of actual
performance goals as training objectives.
CQI was not implemented by BCL in ways that significantly changed its planning processes nor
structure. BCL continued to function through layered levels of mixed and overlapping
relationships. In some cases, it was difficult to distinguish the functional versus rhetorical
adoption of CQI terms. At the same time, BCL’s personalistic and relationship-based working
environment persisted. And BCL continued its emphasis on categorical services. Of the two QI
teams that were established, one dealt with DTA customer process analysis and recruitment, and
the other dealt with employer services but with an emphasis on “job-readiness.”
                                                
78 Boston Career Link, Business Plan Update, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 9.
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BCL also did not fundamentally forego its dominant reliance on mixed formal and informal
information gathering approaches in favor of CQI’s more structured use of systematic, process
flow analysis to diagnose and solve problems.  Rather, BCL continued to use “open awareness”
of many kinds of interactions as a “listening” tool to intuitively guide planning and
programming. However, BCL’s “open awareness” approach sometimes led to failed initiatives
due to insufficient market research. For example, based on “staff perception” of what customers
needed, and assuming that BCL’s employed customers would pay for them, BCL designed and
offered a 8-week intensive self assessment series of four new fee-based workshops with titles
such as “New Year, New Career” and “GiveYourself a Career Check-Up.” Due to insufficient
registration, ten of the twelve scheduled workshops were cancelled, and the other two workshops
were each offered only one time. The BCL Quality Council analyzed the failure of these
workshops and determined that they were not adequately marketed; the organization relied too
heavily on staff perception of customer needs without testing these perceptions with customers;
and that further customer research needs to be conducted before offering any new  fee-based job-
seeker products and services.79
Collaborating with CBOs
In addition to its efforts to make internal changes to stabilize the organization in its second year,
BCL also sought to strengthen its external relations as a means to buttress and extend support
from other community-based organizations. Boston Career Link had several levels of
relationships with community organizations. First, BCL had close connections with its operators.
Senior managers from each of the partners, together with the BCL management team, formed a
                                                
79 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 3.
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Management Committee that lent professional partner expertise and helped coordinate
complementary resources from each operator (and the larger community) to support the work of
Boston Career Link.80 For example, BCL assumed annual responsibility for the Career Counselor
training series that had been offered for many years by WEIU.81
Consistent with its operators’ roots in providing grant-funded community services, BCL initiated
several projects such as delivering training for adult literacy and ESL instructors on career
counseling and assessment techniques at the Higher Education Information Center; collaborating
with Children’s Hospital’s Institute for Community Inclusion to provide outreach and
employment services to disabled TANF recipients residing in Boston’s Enhanced Enterprise
Community neighborhood; collaborating with Dimock’s HIV Services Department to provide
employment related services to City of Boston funded HIV case managers and several Boston
AIDS service organizations.82
In reaching out to its network of community nonprofits, BCL also expanded its Customer
Advisory Council (CAC) with the result that it was predominately comprised of representatives
of community based organizations.83  In its first meeting, the Customer Advisory Council
suggested that BCL conduct outreach and collaborate with Boston’s community-based
organizations (CBO) to address “misconceptions” about career centers. In response, BCL
convened an informational breakfast meeting that was attended by 12 nonprofits active in
                                                
80 Boston Career Link, Business Plan Update, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 5.
81 BCL hired a conference coordinator and professional trainers to conduct the professional development seminar for
career counseling professionals throughout New England.
82 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 4.
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workforce development. Eight of the twelve attendees accepted BCL’s further invitation to
attend regular Thursday afternoon meetings to make presentations to staff about specific
programs for which they were recruiting. As a result, BCL both immediately strengthened
working relationships with several CBOs, as well as developed a monthly open-invitation
process for other CBOs to attend meetings and share information. According to Charter Review
Fiscal Year 2000 Site Visit Report, BCL planned to “continue to emphasize collaboration with
community based service providers and initiate efforts to develop working relationships with
these service providers.”84
Employer Services
However, BCL was not as successful in developing relationships with employers. At its second
meeting, the CAC suggested that BCL hold a similar informational breakfast for employers to
increase awareness of the “new configuration of customer friendly labor exchange services
offered by career centers.”85 BCL made initial plans but did not hold such an event.
Because of BCL’s continuing focus on servicing job-seekers and on increasing categorical
funding, BCL gave less attention to employer services. Given choices between devoting
resources to categorically-funded job-seekers or employers, BCL often chose the former. As
noted in a site visit report, “BCL’s effort to balance these usually competing demands and the
shifts in organizational vision, mission and focus they entail may have taken the strongest toll on
                                                                                                                                                            
83 In addition to seven nonprofit representatives, CAC’s five employer representatives included Blue Cross Blue
Shield, a small restaurant owner, a lawyer, hospital administrator, and a business association, the Associated
Industries of Massachusetts.
84 Boston Career Link, Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 9.
85 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 2.
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the employer services group in terms of role conflicts and loss of focus over the last year.”86  For
example, when BCL reassigned Employer Account Representatives to DTA recruitment and had
them rotate to local DTA offices to recruit welfare recipients, BCL “significantly reduced the
units’ ability to outreach, market, develop employer business and define/develop service
offerings beyond placement.”87
When the imbalance between job-seeker and employer services became pronounced, BCL
refocused its employer services and rededicated Employer Account Representatives to working
exclusively with employers rather than splitting time between employer services and DTA
outreach and follow-up.  The result was that BCL increased on-site employer events, including
industry briefings and on-site recruitment. BCL also held several on-site “mini” job fairs with
employers that were “familiar” and that regularly posted jobs at BCL. At these events, job-
seekers were pre-screened and indicated which employers they wanted to meet. In finding
modest success with these mini job fairs, BCL considered charging employers a fee for the free
and popular job fairs, but there was staff discomfort about requesting fees. BCL also did not
emphasize expanding its job fair approach to “non-familiar” employers. Instead, BCL planned to
do versions of this approach as neighborhood job fairs by collaborating with community-based
organizations.88
Since its first year, BCL’s one main continuing employer interaction was through hosting
“industry briefings.” At these bi-monthly briefings, multiple employers in a similar sector made
                                                
86 Boston Career Link Charter Report Summary, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 6.
87 Boston Career Link Charter Report Summary, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 6.
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presentations on labor market trends and on what skills and qualifications the employers found
desirable. Often, the employers had no specific jobs to offer. According to a BCL career
counselor, the briefings were still useful even when no jobs were available because they allowed
employers to “network” amongst themselves and with job-seekers. The industry briefings were
also BCL’s main source of information about employers, except for the information provided by
the Boston PIC as part of its annual “voice of the customer” employer focus groups and related
labor market data. In fact, BCL did not conduct any employer focus groups, although it
conducted several focus groups for different populations of job-seekers. However, one employer
suggested that BCL have clerical skills testing software to assist employers with an increased
screening service by documenting the keyboard speed and accuracy levels of BCL job referrals.
BCL’s emphasis on job-seekers also influenced how it filtered and responded to employer
information. After initially targeting employer services in four industries—health care, financial
services, retail and food services—BCL became familiar with the employment features of each
industry. In its second year, BCL refocused its industry targeting strategy based mostly on the
employment needs of job seekers. As a result it focused on health services and hospitality as
sources of jobs for its categorically funding low-skill workers. In some ways, BCL’s employer
services staff basically functioned as job developers.  As it learned about the employment
opportunities in different industries, BCL provided job-seekers with information about
occupational skills recognized as having cross-industry appeal such as programming and
technical support, marketing communications, administrative and clerical, and customer service.
                                                                                                                                                            
88 BCL had discussions with the Dorchester Bay Community Development Corporation, the Dudley Street
Neighborhood Initiative, and Jobs for Youth.
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Job-Seeker Services
Even during the time when BCL rededicated staff to focus on employer services, BCL
informally developed and implemented an integrated team approach based on categorically-
funded job-seekers. For example, a DTA team was comprised of employer services and job
seeker services. According to the Boston PIC’s Charter Review Committee:
This has led the organization to conclude that it needs to rely upon ‘integrated teams for
special populations’ in order to meet its placement goals and earn its performance based
revenue in order to have any degree of predictability regarding categorical funding
streams.89
Related to its focus on categorically-funded job-seekers, BCL increased referrals to education
and training programs, especially for DTA customers, Title III dislocated workers, and Trade
Adjustment Assistance Act customers. In the first quarter of FY99, BCL made 43 education and
training referrals with 100 percent enrollment rates, compared to 4 in the first quarter of FY98.
Part of the increase was due to the development of process that included inviting local training
providers to make presentations at staff meetings.
Populations and Placements
During its first years of operation, BCL tended to have higher proportions of job-seeker
customers that were college educated, female, and white as compared to the other career centers.
This pattern continued even as BCL began to emphasize services to categorically-defined
disadvantaged workers.
By the end of its first fiscal year (1997), BCL had registered a total of 5,800 individuals. About
one-third of registrants were primarily DTA referrals, or others with low skills. Another third
116
were recent college graduates or the short-term unemployed. The remaining third were
experienced workers in a variety of career transition stages, including those involved in a job or
career change as well as dislocated workers. Many of the people in the “experienced” group were
referrals from WEIU, either new direct referrals or previous users of WEIU’s career center that
had transferred over to BCL. Partly as a result of WEIU’s referral-base and BCL’s proximity to
Northeastern University and Longwood Medical Area, a majority of BCL’s job-seekers were
women, relatively well-educated—most having at least a college degree, white, and young. BCL
served a higher proportion of young job-seekers—23 percent were under 22 years old—
compared to six percent at TWP and four percent at JobNet’s that were under 22 years of age.
Many of BCL’s job-seekers previously or currently attended college or had completed a degree
(See Appendix Table 8). In its first year, the majority—72 percent—of BCL’s customers had
some college attendance or degree. In comparison, 33 percent of JobNet’s job-seekers had some
college attendance or completed a degree, and 63 percent of The Work Place’s job-seekers had
some college attendance or completed a degree.90 Correspondingly, BCL tended to have lower
percentages of job-seekers with less educational attainment compared to the other career centers.
In 1997, about one-quarter (24 percent) of BCL’s customers had only a high school degree or no
high school degree. In contrast, about two-thirds (67 percent) of JobNet’s customers had only a
high school degree or no high school degree, and more than one-third (37 percent) of The Work
                                                                                                                                                            
89 Boston Career Link Charter Report Summary, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 6.
90 Among BCL job-seekers in 1997, 31 percent had college degrees and 21 percent had advanced degrees. In
contrast at JobNet, 16 percent had college degrees and 8 percent had advanced degrees. At The Work Place, 24
percent had college degrees and 13 percent had advanced degrees.
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Place’s customers had only a high school degree or no high school degree.91 BCL’s distribution
patterns of educational attainment remained basically unchanged during its first two years.
By the end of its second year, despite BCL’s shifting towards categorically-funded job-seekers,
the majority of BCL’s job-seekers had a similar composition as the year before: female, and
relatively well-educated. Part of this was due to the continuing referrals from WEIU.  Women
comprised 64 percent of BCL’s job-seekers. About 54 percent of all customers had a college or
graduate degree, 21 percent had some college, and 25 percent never finished high school.
However, BCL’s focus on disadvantaged workers contributed to increases in job-seekers from
communities of color. Almost 50 percent of job-seekers were African-American, 30 percent were
white, 9 percent were Hispanic, and the remainder were Asian or other. About 20 percent of
BCL’s job-seekers were under-employed, or temporary or part-time workers. And 16 percent
were full-time permanent employees seeking career advancement or change. Compared to its
first year, a larger share—about 62 percent—of BCL’s job-seekers were unemployed. In general,
though they remained predominantly female and educated, BCL’s job-seekers included more
unemployed people than the prior year.
BCL’s job placement rate for the unemployed jumped from 16 percent in the first year to 49
percent in the second year (See Appendix Table 4).92 In fact, the number and placement rate for
this group was the highest among the three career centers in its second year. There are several
                                                
91 At BCL in 1997, 16 percent of job-seekers had only a high school degree/equivalent and 6 percent did not have a
high school degree/equivalent. In contrast, 47 percent of JobNet’s job-seekers had only a high school
degree/equivalent and 20 percent did not have a high school degree/equivalent.  At The Work Place, 25 percent of
job-seekers had only a high school degree/equivalent and 12 percent did not have a high school degree/equivalent
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explanations for this. Compared to the other two career centers, BCL had higher percentages of
higher educated job-seekers—making them easier to employ.93 BCL also had fewer total
numbers of job-seekers—making it easier to provide services. One reason BCL had fewer job-
seekers than the other two career centers was that BCL “historically exercised the strongest
control over its ‘front door’ by requiring anyone using services at Boston Career Link to register
as a member and attend a QuickStart orientation session.”94 This process tended to filter through
more motivated job-seekers as well as quickly engage job-seekers into a counseling and case
management track. In contrast, customers at the other career centers could sign-in and
immediately and independently use resource room computers and materials. Despite having a
lower volume and higher percentage of educated job-seekers that made placements easier, BCL
had the lowest placement rates in its first year partly due to its haphazard data collection and
reporting systems.
BCL’s increased placement rates in its second year partially resulted from changes overseen by
its new executive director to address what he stated were “serious data collection and reporting
deficiencies and MIS staff supervision lapses.” These changes included following-up with
employers on job referrals, periodically mailing to job-seekers a follow-up mail-back postcard
with a financial incentive for returned cards, and better staff attention to daily data entry and
employer outcome feedback. As part of this effort in the second year, BCL also purchased the
                                                                                                                                                            
92 A career center’s placement rate refers to the percentage of unemployed job-seekers—who used at least three
services from that career center—that found employment in that year.
93 In 1998, 43 percent of BCL’s job-seekers had a college degree or higher, compared to 34 percent at The Work
Place and 20 percent at JobNet, and 38 percent of BCL’s job-seekers had a high school degree or less compared to
43 percent at The Work Place and 71 percent at JobNet.
94 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 9.
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CareerMaker job-matching software developed by The Work Place, as well as instituted the
barcode data collection technology process pioneered by  The Work Place.
In addition to these improvements, BCL also bolstered its counseling approach. BCL offered a
Monday morning “Job Seeker Success Group” that was a staff-facilitated peer support group for
job-seekers who needed additional support around the job search where “job-seekers interact and
offer encouragement and support to one another with guidance and support from the BCL career
counselor.”95 BCL conducted a job-seeker focus group and noted that the quality of its placement
services was often related to BCL’s “caring and compassionate approach with customers.”96
While BCL did especially well placing unemployed and dislocated workers, it had difficulty
placing job-seekers with low-skills and receiving welfare. Even as its placement performance
improved dramatically, BCL noted that “the placement of DTA customers in sufficient numbers
to fully draw down BCL’s annual performance-based allocation continues to be a problem.”97
BCL recognized that while the welfare-to-work mandate would likely change the demographic
composition of BCL’s membership, DTA members as a group were not a significant segment of
its approximate 3,000 new job-seekers. However, BCL was concerned that “a grossly
disproportionate commitment of already scarce staff resources is required to deliver increasingly
prescriptive and administratively burdensome services to what will amount to a small percentage
of the customers served by BCL during the fiscal year.”98
                                                
95 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 7.
96 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 8.
97 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 5.
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Summary
In its first years of operation, BCL provided indications of a strategic orientation characterized
by community processes. Regarding its planning, BCL’s management was marked by shifts in
organizational leadership and focus that contributed to a sense of immediacy in operating and
delivering services. In this “crisis environment” BCL emphasized short-term practices rather
than long-term planning. BCL reacted to situations, drawing upon the social service experience
of staff to address needs as they arose. Personalized instead of planned responses distinguished
BCL activities.  This consultative mode extended beyond service delivery to management and
the use of information to inform planning and practice. BCL tended to use “sensing” modes
gather and interpret information rather than systematic data collection and analysis. This
approach tended to favor and reinforce BCL’s strengths in providing categorical services.  At the
same time, BCL extensively used its organizational relationships to varied networks of
community and social service agencies for both planning as well as service delivery. That is,
BCL tended to collaborate most closely with organizations that shared BCL’s orientation toward
relational processes and specialized populations. Relatedly, BCL had poor ties to DTA.
Managing with a short-term horizon and a focus on targeted job-seekers resulted in
compromising the delivery of services to employer. By placing a lower priority on employers,
BCL’s employer services group experienced role conflicts and loss of focus. This situation was
exacerbated by BCL’s attempts to maximize performance-based earnings by further deploying
categorical job seeker services. BCL moved resources to welfare clients rather than employer
services, contributing to further imbalance between the two types of services. In contrast to its
pursuit of governmental contract-based resources, BCL developed few fee-based services.
                                                                                                                                                            
98 Boston Career Link Charter Review Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000, page 9.
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Indeed, BCL staff were generally inexperienced and uncomfortable with offering fee-based
services. Overall, the patterns of BCL’s management, services, and inter-organizational ties
reflected an orientation towards community processes characterized by ad hoc tactics, relational
coordination, personalized focus, and consultative and perceptual information.
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The Work Place
Planning and Practice
Open for Business
The Work Place (TWP) was the first Career Center to begin operations because it was able to
quickly implement its proposal, unlike BCL or JobNet that engaged in extended negotiations
over appropriate sites. Opened in March 1996, TWP located its offices in class “A” offices in a
corporate tower in Boston’s financial district at 101 Street. Its location was both strategic and
symbolic. TWP selected its office building as a signal distinguishing its operations as more
business-like rather than governmental. It wanted to be downtown so that it was close to large
corporate employers and to be able to offer unemployed and employed job-seekers access to a
wide range of employment positions. Its location was also easily accessible via the subway.
From its inception, TWP situated itself within proximity of a dense network of commercial
establishments, and tried to look, act, and talk like a business.
According to The Work Place Director Thomas Ford, “we operate more like business than a
government agency…we don’t have a program, we have products and services…and the
decision-maker is the user, even if that person is not the payer, kind of like Blue Cross.”99  Ford
explained that the Work Place functions as
                                                
99 Personal interview with Tom Ford, Director of The Work Place, April 23, 1998.
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a labor market intermediary whose core business is facilitating labor exchange.  Our raw
material is the labor force...that is, both job seekers and employers are inventories for
each other and we are the brokers…with our product being the labor match.
Ford stated that TWP was driven by the needs of its job-seeker and employer customers. He
noted that “we serve our customers, not clients.” An example of TWP’s customer focus is in how
the agency developed its approach to services.  Ford stated that when they started offering
traditional employment development services for job seekers, “no one was buying, so we broke it
down into ten customer interests: like preparing resumes, cover letters, or going  through the job
bank...these are now part of our services repertoire.”  He added that the approach “does not mean
one size fits all, but that you need to tailor to different populations…that there are different
services but the same quality.”
To offer multiple lines of service that customers would use and purchase, TWP focused early in
its operations on developing processes that gathered and analyzed information. To function as a
customer-driven organization, TWP determined that it required extensive information about
customer behavior, service utilization, and satisfaction. The organizing framework for these
processes was customer service. According to Ford, “everything gets articulated as a customer-
service problem or it is not a big problem.”
TWP’s particular emphasis on customer-service and information gathering distinguished it from
traditional government programs. As an example, it was noted that there were no intake forms.
Instead, customers were requested to register with their name and address.  Because the same
services were offered to all people under the principle of universal access, additional information
was voluntary.  As an incentive to provide this extra information, fully-completed forms were
entered in monthly drawing for a free lunch. According to Ford, this “market” incentive
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approach resulted in the refusal rate decreasing from 25 percent to 4 percent. Ford further noted
that, unlike government programs, TWP’s customers received a membership card. Instead of
filling out forms when using different services, members’ cards had a magnetic strip that was
swiped whenever members used the resource room, attended workshops, or met with counselors.
To orient its operations to satisfy customer demand, TWP emphasized the collection and use of
customer information and the development of organizational learning processes. These processes
were primarily based on Continuous Quality Improvement (CQI) that focused decision-making
on solving problems at the direct service level.
CQI, Strategic Planning, and Governance
TWP used CQI both strategically and symbolically to orient TWP as an agile, fast-paced,
entrepreneurial enterprise. CQI training began before TWP first started operating. Within several
months of opening, four teams were formed to focus on customer satisfaction, customer
outreach, inter-organizational communication, and customer flow. TWP quickly determined that
the scope of each team’s work was too broad, and restructured the teams into smaller groups
with narrower areas: marketing of “Work Keys,” talent bank process and procedure, customer
follow-up, front desk flow, library flow, and data integrity. For TWP, the adoption and
implementation of CQI was part of an attempt to:
institutionalize CQI as an organizational philosophy and practice rather than confine it to
a training program…We as an organization acknowledge that a true learning organization
must apply the methodology and tools of CQI to all processes—not just convenient, easy-
to-tackle processes and issues.100
                                                
100 The Work Place Charter Report Summary, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 9.
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Ford compared the use of CQI at The Work Place to the use of CQI in the Saturn car-
manufacturing plant, but said “we don’t have a stop button…instead, any one can mention issues
to our process-improvement team.”101  He said that all staff are expected to spend at least half a
day a week on relearning and applying CQI methods, and that it has been useful in distinguishing
between system (organizational) problems and staff problems.
TWP used CQI as an organizing process to identify and solve problems at two levels: policy
decisions and program decisions. Policy decisions occurred in three weekly meetings involving
leaders of TWP and its operators that reviewed performance, planned improvements, and
developed general strategies.102 Program decisions were made by customer-specific teams, as
well as process improvement teams assembled to deal with operational issues. Individual staff
initiated process teams in response to their observations or customer feedback. Program level
decisions were encouraged to happen as close to the direct service level as possible within the
context of policy decisions made at the executive level.  “You can’t have the customer as
decision-maker unless front-line workers are also decision-makers,” stated Ford.103
TWP’s initial team-centered and CQI orientation was challenged later in its first year when it
became clear that original funding levels would not materialize. As a result, TWP’s original
                                                
101 Personal interview with Tom Ford, Director of The Work Place, April 23, 1998.
102 One weekly meeting between the directors of JVS and TWP provided an opportunity to supervise and review
management of the career center. In another weekly meeting involving the director and senior managers of TWP and
the director and assistant director of JVS, the group discussed the performance of major customer activities as well
as the organization’s relationship with each of its stakeholders. A third weekly meeting involved JVS’ director and
assistant director, TWP’s director, and the director of the Office of Jobs and Community Services to discuss overall
career center performance and progress in resolving issues. Additionally, every other month there was a meeting of
TWP’s director and JVS’ director with TWP’s oversight board to review program and fiscal management, and
receive input and technical assistance in developing, marketing and fine tuning products.
103 Personal interview with Tom Ford, Director of The Work Place, April 23, 1998.
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organizational structure went through changes in order to maintain customer service levels and
address the needs of categorical funding streams. Categorically-funded programs entailed tighter
accountability, more record keeping and reporting, and specific programs designed to provide
intensive one-on-one services to customers from DTA, Title III, Mass Rehab, and Mass
Commission for the Blind.  To address these increased demands on staff time, TWP restructured
itself by converting several management positions to direct service and creating categorically-
focused teams. The staff reorganization resulted in having a Core Team (Manager of Career
Resources Library and Career Counselors), and categorical DTA and Title III teams. Each
categorical team had career counselors, job developers, and a lead counselor who served as team
leader. Although TWP was concerned
that creating teams focused on planning for targeted populations would create staff
divisions, undermine the philosophy of cross-operational functions and would
compromise the concept of an ‘authentic’ one-stop career center (leading to a model
resembling co-location) and the principles of universal access and customer choice.
These concerns have not materialized.104
When pressed by the new fiscal environment, TWP reacted by altering its organizational
structure and delaying the development of new services, but also continued relying on its CQI
approach and teams. In fact, TWP used the restructuring as an opportunity to support individual
and organizational learning. It did this by utilizing skills learned through its main staff
development processes: off-site training, CQI training, and TWP’s performance evaluation
process known as Performance Enhancement Process (PEP).105
                                                
104 The Work Place Charter Report Summary, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 9.
105 PEP is a multi-rater, peer assessment system in which the entire staff has the opportunity to rate other staff
members in categories such as continuous learning, team work, leadership, and communication. To foster
interpersonal working relationships and cooperation amongst staff, performance improvements were suggested
through a peer review process and annual pay increases were based not on individual performance but on
organizational performance.
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A majority of staff participated in off-site training seminars on topics such as presentation skills,
supervision skills, sales, and time management. CQI training included flowcharting, affinity
diagramming, systems thinking, and team based decision making. Ford said that all staff were
expected to spend at least half a day a week on relearning and applying CQI methods, and that it
has been useful in distinguishing between system (organizational) problems and staff problems.
All staff members were involved to varying degrees in some combination of TWP staff
development processes. According to Ford, engaging the entire staff in its re-evaluation and re-
design was instrumental to building a team-based organization because “if you want to be
competitive in the world, eliminate competitiveness within the organization.”106
Software Developer and Vendor
At the outset of career center operations, DET was supposed to provide talent bank and job-
matching software. Within its first few months, TWP determined that the state was unlikely to
develop the software in a reliable and timely way. For TWP, this presented a problem for
employer services. Using CQI processes, TWP found that it was taking too much time to respond
to employers’ requests for job candidates because TWP was screening applicants manually.
TWP determined that it took two to three days to sift through several thousand job postings
before finally getting a resume on an employer’s desk.
TWP also contacted other career centers—both in Boston and throughout Massachusetts—that
also needed labor matching software and that expressed an interested in purchasing one for
$5,000. So, with the entrepreneurial enthusiasm, TWP formed a team and created its own
                                                
106 Personal interview, Tom Ford, Director, The Work Place, April 23, 1998.
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software translation system. After several months of bootstrapped resources, TWP unveiled its
package, CareerMaker, that matched employers’ job specifications to potential applicants’
qualifications. Instead of three to four days, the software’s job-matching processes took only one
hour. Not only did JobNet and Boston Career Link purchase licensed copies of TWP’s software,
but the state’s Department of Labor and Workforce Development began reviewing CareerMaker
and negotiating with TWP about distributing it to all career centers in Massachusetts.
TWP also modified the software provided by the state, Account Manager, which was designed to
record and track employer information only. To integrate it with the talent bank in CareerMaker,
TWP developed reports to track the number and type of referrals made to individual job listings,
and to track how a placement was made.107 That is, a report function was created to track
whether a placement was made via CareerMaker, internal staff referral, or through self-directed
referral via the internet JobBank.
TWP also developed other methods to track its labor exchange activities.108 TWP was the first
Boston career center to implement a bar code data collection system. After registering and
                                                
107 TWP also developed a connection between CareerMaker and FastTrack, a Lotus Notes based program that
customers used in a self-directed manner in the Career Resource Library. FastTrack was used by customers to
develop a Career Action Plan (CAP) by moving through a map of services designed to help them determine their
strategy for job search, education and training, or career information. The CAP provided a series of questions about
customer objectives and prompts a menu of options from which the customer can choose. FastTrack then tallied the
services chosen, generated a hard copy, and had the capacity to measure a customer’s plan against actual services
utilized by comparing the plan to the service record in TWP’s information management system. FastTrack also
generated an email to TWP’s “Quality Coach” anytime a user completed CAP’s customer satisfaction section. This
feedback was designed to support the software’s continuous improvement and as a mechanism for assessing
customer satisfaction.
108 The Client IMS is a case information management system used to capture categorical customer placement data.
In early 1997, TWP conducted telephone follow-up to check whether categorical placement data was being tracked
correctly. Follow-up phone calls and mailings were subsequently and periodically used to track placements for
categorical funding sources. Placement data for non-categorical customers was captured by contacting employers,
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becoming a “member” of TWP, customers were given a membership card with a bar code
imprinted upon it. Customers were then requested to swipe the card when first entering the center
and when using services such as the Career Resource Room. In this way, TWP was able to track
usage patterns and determine what services were being used and when. All this information was
integrated into its management information system.
TWP was especially interested in employer feedback and ways to improve employer services as
well as to recover dissatisfied business customers. Starting in April 1997, TWP sent or faxed a
“transactional survey” automatically to every employer whose job posting expired. The survey
measured satisfaction and solicited information about improvements. Participants in TWP’s job
fairs were also surveyed regarding satisfaction with the event.
Since its inception, TWP intensely used data to inform strategies and practices for both
employers and job-seekers. TWP used evaluations, transactional surveys, telephone interviews,
semi-annual focus groups of job-seekers and employers, exit surveys, and its internal information
management systems as feedback mechanisms in its CQI processes that have led to changes in
programs and services. For example, regarding under-utilization of periodicals, TWP responded
to customer preferences by reducing general business magazines in favor of more professional
and trade association newsletters with job listings. Although emphasizing data-collection
processes and technology, TWP used a variety of information sources to support its decision-
making and practice.
                                                                                                                                                            
through mass mailings, via “The Finish Line”—TWP’s job placement hotline, and anecdotal information received
through a variety of means, including the receptionist who was often the main contact for non-categorical customers.
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Relationships with Employers
Since it began operating, TWP emphasized its services to employers. As previously mentioned,
TWP used a variety of methods to gather information about the needs and preferences of
employers. TWP also engaged in activities to strengthen relationships with employers, develop
new products, and market its services to employers. TWP staff actively networked with
employer associations such as the Chamber of Commerce. TWP also created an active Advisory
Board that consisted mostly of employers in finance, marketing, law, education, accounting,
administration, real estate, and human resources. In addition to improving its general services
and contacts with employers, TWP focused on developing fee-based revenue-producing
employer products. In its first year, TWP developed four such products: job fairs, on-site
recruitment, customized recruitment, and job-profiling software-based consultation.
In May 1997, TWP contracted to coordinate a job fair at Logan Airport for the Massachusetts
Port Authority (Massport), an independent public authority which develops and manages Logan
International Airport and the Port of Boston.109 TWP worked closely with MassPort to design the
job fair to meet MassPort’s specific needs. For example, TWP used its CareerMaker software to
target job-seekers for the MassPort fair and to send a specialized mailing to the job-seekers
living in the neighborhoods surrounding Logan Airport (based on zip code analysis of TWP’s
database). MassPort had identified this customized service as important because it wanted to
recruit workers living in areas that were affected by Logan’s operations, accessible and available
for all its work shifts, and disadvantaged economically. Twenty vendors participated in the fair,
                                                
109 Massachusetts Port Authority as an independent public authority whose facilities employ more than 20,000
people. MassPort is not part of the state government, although Massachusetts’ governor appoints its board. MassPort
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522 job-seekers attended, 362 interviews were conducted, and 68 hires were made.110 Ninety-six
percent of vendors indicated they would participate in a similar fair again. Several Logan Airport
vendors subsequently became direct employer customers of TWP.
TWP also conducted fee-based customized recruitment for employers. According to TWP,
“employer business depends on the development of a relationship over time, not only upon
immediate placement outcomes.”111 One example of this emphasis on building relationships is
TWP’s experience with  Filene’s Basement, a retail department store in downtown Boston.
Initially, TWP did not have candidates to refer to Filene’s for some its job openings. Over time,
TWP remained in contact with Filene’s and eventually held two onsite job fairs and provided
consultation services for Filene’s Somerville Distribution Center’s plant closing. According to
TWP, its initial interactions with Filene’s produced no “traditionally reportable outcome,” but its
“investment in establishing a relationship later yielded positive customer services” for both the
employer and job-seekers.112
TWP and JVS Entrepreneurial Ventures
Its relationships with employers also spurred TWP to pursue new products. Several employers
complained to TWP about a mismatch between candidates’ skills and the requirements of a job,
leading to high turnover and the need for companies to recruit for the same positions repeatedly.
Through its connection to JVS, TWP learned of a job profiling software package used by JVS
organizations in other parts of the country. This software—Work Keys—provided detailed skills
                                                                                                                                                            
receives no state taxpayer funds for its operations. Its revenue is generated by user fees charged at the facilities it
operates and through bonds it issues as a bonds authority.
110 Vendors included eight airlines and a mix of hotel, food service, and airline support enterprises.
111 The Work Place Charter Report Summary, Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 7.
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analysis for any position as well as skills analysis for incumbent employees who may have
possessed transferable skills or who could move into new positions with additional training.
TWP and JVS decided to collaborate in marketing and sharing revenue from using Work Keys
together. Targeting incumbent workers, TWP staff conducted assessments with the software and
JVS offered skills training. The decision by TWP and JVS to collaborate in using the Work Keys
software as a profit generator was part of a larger strategy by the two organizations to diversify
TWP’s revenue with more fee-based services. This effort was driven by a motivation to replace
“lost” public revenue: the difference between TWP’s original proposal budget and the actual
funding. TWP intended to diversify its revenue by developing fee-based activities and
“aggressively pursuing grants” with JVS.113
Prioritizing Categorical Customers and Employers
By 1998, a changing fiscal environment for the career centers increasingly emphasized
categorical funding over “core” support. In its first year, 16 percent of TWP’s operating budget
was targeted specifically on welfare recipients. In its second year—FY99—funding targeted to
welfare recipients from multiple sources increased to nearly half of TWP’s operating budget.
While resources for categorical customers had increased, funding for core services decreased by
40 percent in its second year. In response, TWP adjusted its operations. It re-allocated resources
to welfare and self-directed job-seekers while attempting to maintain its priority commitments to
employers and CQI. These responses to changing external conditions were complicated by
internal changes in staffing and structure. TWP experienced significant staffing changes because
of resignations/turnovers, addition of new staff for new contracts, and reassignment of existing
                                                                                                                                                            
112 The Work Place Charter Report Summary, Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 7.
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staff to accommodate funding and priority changes. During 1998, eight of its total 27 staff
resigned and nine were hired.114 Unlike JobNet with its relatively stable operations and low staff
turnover, TWP’s dynamic operations contributed to higher levels of staffing volatility.
Identifying and Marketing to Self-Directed Customers
During this time of adaptation, TWP also re-focused its attention on its “self-directed”
customers. After a year of operations, TWP recognized that about 75 percent of its customers
were self-directed. The remaining 25 percent of customers had more barriers to employment,
used a majority of TWP’s career services resources, and tended to receive categorically-funded
services. As a result, TWP had many opportunities to collect information about members of this
latter group through their various interactions with TWP’s data gathering processes such as
service evaluations and information systems. On the other hand, the self-directed customers did
not interact very much with staff and so TWP had less customer information about their service
use, job-search trajectory, and placement outcomes. After experimenting with several
information gathering methods, TWP subsequently found that the most effective—and
expensive—approach involved contracting with a call center to conduct telephone follow-up
surveys. Although costing $16 per completed call, this approach yielded utilization and
satisfaction data as well as information that more than 200 “self-directed” customers had
successfully found employment using TWP services.115
                                                                                                                                                            
113 The Work Place Charter Report Summary, Progress Report, Charter Review Fiscal Year 1999, page 5.
114 Three of the eight resignations were from the leadership team including the assistant director, the Quality Coach,
and the Career Resource Librarian. Other resignations were by two Employer Account Managers, Career Counselor,
Network Administrator, Program Assistant, and a Receptionist.
115 TWP has continued to use this approach because of the valuable information and placement data it yields.
134
TWP was especially interested in self-directed customers because it saw this group as potential
users and buyers of enhanced fee-based services. After investigating customer usage and interest
in fee-based services, TWP determined that it did not have a sufficient mix of suitable fee-based
services and associated marketing efforts. The Career Services team then experimented with
different approaches. One action was making changes in the physical layout of the library and
the way resources were organized. Staff especially looked at how to increase interactions with
customers. The new objective was not simply to help customers find resources they asked for,
but to improve the use of the resources, and to connect customers to other TWP fee-based
services when self-directed services were not the most effective way to meet customers’ goals.
One example involved the development of new resume service offerings. Originally, only one
type of fee-based resume service was offered. Feedback and customer surveys revealed that
different people had varied resume preparation needs. So, TWP invested in resume development
training for staff and certification by the Professional Association of Resume Writers. TWP then
offered distinct resume packages for entry-level, professional positions, and executive or
specialized positions. Instead of a single resume service at a single price, TWP offered a menu of
ten choices with varying prices to accommodate different needs and budgets.
Prioritizing Employers
To help maintain its focus on employers despite categorical-funding pressures, TWP continued
using a variety of information gathering approaches to assess employer needs and TWP services.
In addition to its continued use of transactional surveys sent to employers, TWP convened
specialized focus groups. TWP used the focus groups not only for information gathering but also
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for marketing. After the focus groups, most participants purchased fee-based services, and
several of these employers purchased individual recruitment activities at TWP. One focus group
focused on employers who hired large numbers of entry level workers. TWP invited employers
who hired entry level workers as a way to understand and address the mismatch between
employers’ postings and jobseekers’ qualifications.  According to TWP:
fully 75 percent of our job-seeking customers are not appropriate referrals to jobs listed
on the job bank…Employers who post jobs in our job bank are looking for workers
skilled in engineering, graphic design, CAD/CAM, research, interactive media design or
public relations. Jobseekers in our talent bank are seeking administrative and clerical
positions (25 percent), trade positions (20 percent), or low skilled positions (20 percent)
such as warehouse worker, retail sales, shippers/receivers or stock clerks.
TWP used the focus groups to learn more about the needs and preferences of employers who
hired entry-level workers. TWP also sought to cultivate stronger relationships with such
employers as a means to improve employment opportunities for its many low-skilled job-seeker
customers.  For TWP, this was more than a complementary approach to the traditional method of
relying on individual job developers to find employment positions. It was consistent with TWP’s
general strategy of emphasizing employer demand as a primary guide for its operations.
In an effort to more directly align its operations with the needs of employers, TWP increased the
influence of its Employer Advisory Council (EAC) to provide strategic guidance and
governance. TWP had planned to also set up a job seeker advisory council but decided to delay
that council for two reasons. First, TWP believed that the growth of the employer-based business
was a “higher and more critical priority” at that stage of its development.”116 And, TWP already
had a mix of processes for gathering feedback from job-seeking customers (e.g., surveys, focus
groups, and service evaluations). TWP prioritized the employer council over the job-seeker
136
council in order to ensure that they could “invest the necessary energy and resources” to address
what TWP considered “the most critical and difficult challenge facing The Work Place,”
growing the employer side of its business.117 Although TWP also had feedback mechanisms for
its employer services, it created the Employer Advisory Council to strengthen its connections to
the business community, to tap into the employers’ expertise for the development of fee-based
services, and to better align TWP’s strategies and practices with employer needs. After being
formed in October 1998, the employer council met monthly to guide TWP’s organizational and
business growth and to develop a business plan for new enterprises. According to TWP, the
Employer Advisory Council:
provides advice to The Work Place on the relevance, effectiveness, and responsiveness of
The Work Place’s services to employer customers, and recommends improvements as
needed. It also assists The Work Place in identifying new trends in the labor market that
constitute opportunities for The Work Place to develop new services or improve/expand
existing ones.118
By its second year, the Employer Council provided more than guidance. It replaced the monthly
formal oversight previously provided by the Executive Committee of the JVS Board of
Directors. The formal nature of the employer council’s relationship to TWP had two particular
strategic advantages. It addressed the concern raised in the previous year’s charter review
process that TWP had been planning—perhaps too many—collaborative ventures with JVS in an
effort to diversify its revenue. And it addressed TWP’s efforts to operate more like a business by
closing identifying with employers. In fact, the employer council was comprised of seven
                                                                                                                                                            
116 The Work Place, Progress Report, Charter Review FY2000, page 2.
117 The Work Place, Progress Report, Charter Review FY2000, page 2.
118 The Work Place, Business Plan Update, Charter Review FY2000, page 12.
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members who were all employers.119 The employer council provided TWP with closer employer
relationships, while, at the same time, maintaining a governance tie to JVS.
Fee-based Services
TWP had several interests in building stronger employer relationships and in developing more
profitable fee-based services: revenue diversity, service enhancements, and performance
measures. TWP focused on developing fee-based services in an attempt to create additional
revenue streams in order to offset the increasing share of its budget represented by categorical
funding. For TWP, fee-based services also provided ways to broaden the scope of services made
available to customers beyond free core services. Successfully selling its services in the
marketplace was also an indication to TWP that its activities were valued enough by employer
and job-seeker customers to pay for them:
If career centers in general and The Work Place in particular are going to become viable
players in the regional labor market, we must offer high quality services that are in
demand by employers. It is dangerous to assume that only those things that government
wants to fund (through welfare reform, for example) meet the true needs of employers.
The ultimate measure of the quality and value of our services and our viability in the
marketplace is the employers’ willingness to pay for these services. If we are not able to
establish ourselves in the market place, we will not succeed.120
TWP attempted to increase its fee-based services by enhancing existing products and develop
new services. TWP’s fee-based services to employers were essentially those offered beyond the
free core service of posting job openings. According to TWP, simply posting jobs does not work
for many employers who use a multi-pronged approach to filling their human resource needs.
For these employers, TWP offered several options: job fairs, information tables, and in-house
                                                
119 Five members were TWP employer customers and two members were also members of the JVS Board of
Directors. One of the two council co-chairs was also a member of the JVS Board, where she sat on that board’s JVS
Program Committee that monitored TWP’s progress toward meeting its goals and objectives.
120 The Work Place, Business Plan Update, Charter Review FY2000, page 19.
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recruitment. Job fairs ranged from large events with up to fifty employers to “mini job fairs” at
TWP for a single employer. These often involved specialized recruitment of job-seekers such as
recruitment from specific neighborhoods (e.g., East Boston and airport area) or special skills or
language capacity. Some employers paid for the opportunity to display and talk about their
positions at a booth in TWP’s lobby or to merely display the information on a table in the
resource library. Other employers opted for more active services such as on-site recruitment
where employers made presentations to groups of job-seekers in a classroom style setting.
Interested job-seekers then filled out application forms in one room while the employer
conducted interviews in an adjoining room. This approach allowed employers to reach larger
numbers of job-seekers and often resulted in same-day hires. According to TWP, its fee-based
employer services reflected “our ability to listen, to understand what the customer really needed,
and to be creative and responsive in developing solutions, [and] led to greater customer
satisfaction as well as increased revenues for The Work Place.”121  In its drive to develop new
fee-based services, TWP started in late 1998 to work with its Employer Advisory Council and a
team of graduate students from the Harvard Business School to develop a business plan for new
enterprise ventures aimed at generating significant employer based fee income.122
At the same time that it emphasized fee-based employer services, TWP also developed and
offered a variety of fee-based services for job-seekers that ranged from $10 for scanning an
internet job site to $250 for an executive resume package. TWP’s efforts to increase fee-based
revenues from job-seekers had some success. However, TWP’s emphasis on fee-based employer
                                                
121 The Work Place, Business Plan Update, Charter Review FY2000, page 19.
122 TWP approached two and four year colleges that did not have placement offices and offered fee-based job market
research, assessment, counseling, resume and interview coaching services to students and their parents.
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services meant that this revenue stream increased more than from job-seekers. Fee-based income
increased from just over one percent—$18,000—in Fiscal Year 1998 to five percent—$81,509—
in Fiscal Year 1999. During this time, employer-based revenue increased from $6,759—or 37
percent of total fee income—in Fiscal Year 1998, to $64,467—or 84 percent of total fee
income—in Fiscal Year 1999. In contrast, during this same time, job-seeker fee income only
slightly increased from $11,319—or 63 percent of total fee income—in Fiscal Year 1998, to
$13,043—or 16 percent of total fee income—in Fiscal Year 1999. So, while employer income
increased 850 percent between Fiscal Year 1998 and Fiscal Year 1999, job-seeker income
increased only 15 percent.
There were two main reasons for the difference in increased income from employers versus job-
seekers. First, TWP’s career services catalog had “over-sold” its free core services and “under-
sold” its fee services. Second, many career services staff had backgrounds in the public and
nonprofit sectors and were uncomfortable and under-trained in selling and marketing. In
response, TWP planned to modify its marketing materials and to train staff.123 Another
explanation for the difference in income is that TWP invested more resources into its fee-based
employer services. By focusing resources on employers, TWP managed to significantly increase
its income from employer services.  Compared to fee-based job-seeker services, TWP saw more
flexibility and profit potential in developing fee-based employer services. And, as will be
discussed more in the next chapter, a tightening labor market was compelling employers to
increasingly work with TWP to meet their human resource needs.
                                                
123 The Work Place, Business Plan Update, Charter Review FY2000, page 19.
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Populations and Placements
During its initial years of operation, the ethnic and racial mix of TWP’s job-seekers was similar
to that of Boston. In its first year (fiscal year 1997), approximately 45 percent were white, 27
percent were African American, 11 percent were Latino, 6 percent were Asian, and 11 percent
were “other.” About half of TWP’s job-seekers were female, and about three-quarters were
between the ages of 22 and 45 years of age. In its first year, more than one-third (37 percent) of
TWP job-seekers had only a high school degree or less, about one-quarter (26 percent) had
attended some college but not received a degree, and more than one-third (37 percent) had a
college or advanced degree (See Appendix Table 8).124 Among TWP job-seekers in fiscal year
1997, a majority—63 percent—had at least some college education, as compared to 33 percent at
JobNet and 72 percent at BCL. About one-quarter (24 percent) of TWP customers had a college
degree, and 13 percent had advanced degrees. Among TWP customers, a little less than one-
quarter (22 percent) had only a high school degree or equivalent, and eight percent never
graduated from high school. About seven percent were welfare recipients. In its second year,
partly due to its pursuit of fee-paying customers, TWP’s percentage of customers with college or
advanced degrees increased from 37 percent in 1997 to 45 percent in 1998.
TWP was the first career center to reach the 20 percent placement goal that was the benchmark
established by the REB (See Appendix Table 4).125 During its first year of operation, TWP not
                                                
124 In comparison, a majority  (67 percent) of JobNet job-seekers had only a high school degree or less, only 9
percent had attended some college but not received a degree, and about one-quarter  (24 percent) had a college or
advanced degree. At Boston Career Link, about one-quarter  (24 percent) of JobNet job-seekers had only a high
school degree or less, 20 percent had attended some college but not received a degree, and a majority (52 percent)
had a college or advanced degree.
125 The State WIB and Boston WIB determined that the Employment Service had found jobs for an average of 20
percent of clients. This figure became a general benchmark to ascertain how the  new career centers performed
relative to the previous system.
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only had the highest placement rate of 33 percent (compared to 15 percent at JobNet and 16
percent at Boston Career Link), but TWP also had the highest number of placements (See
Appendix Table 5). TWP had 1259 placements compared to JobNet’s 207 and BCL’s 557.126 In
its second year, TWP’s placement rate was 28 percent (compared to 21 percent at JobNet and 49
percent at BCL).
Due to its emphasis on employer services, TWP had much higher rates of filling the job positions
posted by employers. For example, TWP reported that it filled 32 percent of employer-posted
employment opportunities in its first year, compared to 18 percent at JobNet and 9 percent at
BCL.
Summary
More so than the other career centers, TWP indicated that it quickly embraced the competitive
and entrepreneurial spirit of the Boston career center initiative. To support its organizational
planning, TWP adopted a CQI approach even before it opened its doors, whereas BCL and
JobNet adopted CQI later, and then only partially. An indication of its entrepreneurial orientation
was TWP’s emphasis on data-driven management and program planning as a method to conduct
“market-based” analysis and product development. For example, TWP invested early in
developing technological capacity to support labor matching services, such as creating and
licensing CareerMaker software. Similarly, TWP innovated the use of bar code technology as a
means to track customer usage of services. TWP’s entrepreneurial orientation was especially
indicated by its strong planning and practice focus on employer services, particularly those
                                                
126 TWP’s high numbers in its first year is partly due to its being first career center to open, thereby giving it a longer
reporting period, as well as larger market share due to the late entry of its “competitors.”
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services and products that generated fees and “profits.” To this end, TWP prioritized the
investment of organizational resources into developing relationships with employers. TWP also
cultivated organizational ties to governmental and nonprofit agencies. However, unlike BCL and
JobNet, TWP followed through on its interest in developing ties with employers and employer
networks by establishing and sustaining an Employer Advisory Council. Reflecting its
entrepreneurial orientation, it was only when TWP realized in its second year that categorical
funding could be a significant source of revenue that TWP accelerated the development of
categorical-funded job-seeker services. Overall, in its planning and practices, TWP demonstrated
an entrepreneurial orientation characterized by strategic rather than tactical coordination,
systemic (i.e., “market”) assessments, data-rich analysis, technological innovation, fee-based
services, and an employer focus.
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JobNet
Planning and Practice
Services for All while Targeting the Poor
The operators of JobNet originally proposed that JobNet be located in the old main Employment
Service downtown office. On the one hand, this request was similar to the proposals for the other
career centers in that operators wanted to locate services within one of their existing buildings.
However, whereas the other career centers quickly adjusted their proposals in response to REB
questioning and located other office space for the career centers, DET was less flexible and more
resistant to moving away from the old Employment Service headquarters. In fact, the JobNet
proposal was rejected twice by the Boston PIC because it did not signal that JobNet was
sufficiently distancing itself from DET and its Employment Service past.  Because of its revised
location proposals, JobNet was the last Career Center to open. JobNet was eventually located in
commercial office space that afforded accessibility to a wide range of Boston residents and
workers because it was several blocks from Boston’s main train/bus/subway South Station
terminus. Within a year, JobNet also set up a satellite office at 1010 Massachusetts Avenue,
which was shared space in the Newmarket Square local DTA (welfare) office. This location
provided access to TAFDC recipients and residents of the low-income Roxbury and Dorchester
neighborhoods. The decision to set up operations at these locations reflected JobNet’s dual
strategy of providing accessible services to all job-seekers, while at the same time focusing on
the most disadvantaged.
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Integrating the satellite office into JobNet’s operations proved to be problematic, however. With
no information systems to connect it to the main location, the Newmarket office functioned as a
quasi-independent program. According to the Boston PIC, JobNet had:
no formal mechanism for the satellite staff to participate in training, staff meetings and
other staff development activities at the main office. A significant opportunity for
information sharing, and skill development among the staff is lost through this lack of
integration. Further, organizational identity, both on the part of the satellite staff and in
the public perception by those customers who receive services through the satellite office,
may also be compromised by the lack of integration.127
In several ways, these themes would continue to describe the main challenges experienced by
JobNet in its early years: integration, information, and identity.
Uneven Partnership
JobNet (JN) opened in January 1997 under the sponsorship of the state Division of Employment
Training and the private placement firm of Drake, Beam, and Morin (DBM). From the
beginning, DET was the main operating influence. All of JN’s financial and payroll transactions
were directly managed by DET. DET also provided many of JN’s original staff, with at least one
staff person coming from DBM. Furthermore, JN’s first executive director was a long-term
veteran of DET. With such heavy reliance on DET personnel, JobNet’s general orientation was
based on DET’s bureaucratic tendencies. Though formally (e.g., financial and information
systems) and informally (e.g., personnel networks) connected to DET, JobNet did have some
limited managerial discretion. Part of this leeway was due to the arms-distance oversight
provided by JobNet’s Governing Board. Comprised of DET’s assistant deputy director and
DBM’s operations vice president, the Governing Board met every six weeks to two months to
receive the executive director’s operational updates and had little role in strategic planning. One
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reason for the hands-off approach was that neither DET nor DBM had prior experience with
giving or receiving policy or operational direction from a board of directors. Though JobNet
proposed to develop an external advisory board of job-seekers and employer as a vehicle to hear
the “voice of the customer,” no such board was convened in its first two years.
JobNet not only had limited influence from its Governing Board, but also from DBM. DBM did
not exercise strong policy or managerial direction through its role on the governing board. As a
result, even during its first year when it had few procedures in place, JobNet relied on its DET-
based staff to organize itself and deliver services. In this setting, JobNet adopted a CQI approach
mostly characterized by a team-centered management style. That is, task teams were empowered
to implement ideas in weekly staff meetings. This approach was more pragmatically-driven than
conceptually-grounded. That is, the first executive director—a long-term DET employee with a
professional background in administering unemployment insurance—was inexperienced and
uncomfortable with CQI processes. And, not having direct experience in employment services,
especially those related to employers, the director relied on staff to figure out what and how to
deliver core and enhanced services to both job-seekers and employers. At the same time, the
team approach showed DET’s bureaucratic influence. Teams were organized into functional
areas that were called “staff coalitions.” These groups were “empowered” to set standards and
benchmarks, solve problems, and report recommendations to the management team in areas such
as resume standards, resource room operations, marketing of JobNet services, and Title III
(dislocated worker) program administration. These “staff coalitions” established “benchmarks”
                                                                                                                                                            
127 Charter Review Report Summary Fiscal Year 1999, page 18.
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such as customer wait time of less than five minutes, on time start to all workshops and
orientations, and return of phone/voice messages within 24 hours.
JobNet associated its team-based organizational structure with its general strategy to distinguish
JobNet’s “empowerment approach” with DET’s traditional “dependency model” in which
services were provided to those eligible and that assumed that clients could or would not manage
their own job search needs. During its first year of operation, JobNet was influenced through its
partnership with Drake Beam and Morin to experiment with customer-focused approaches in
providing employment services. JobNet initially adopted a “self-help” customer service model
that encouraged customers to learn job-search skills on their own so that, “like bank ATMs and
gas stations, some of the responsibility falls on the customer. For example, when asked by
customers to create resumes for them, staff instead directed them to workshops and resource
room computers.  Despite experimenting in team- based processes, JobNet’s associate director
suggested in 1998 that JobNet’s emphasis on self-reliance and teamwork would likely change as
its internal operations matured and became formalized.128
Computing by Hand: Information Management as Priority
Even with DET’s considerable staff and technical resources at its disposal, JobNet, like Boston
Career Link with its more limited resources, was challenged by technological problems related to
its management information systems. Accustomed to DET’s well-established data collection and
reporting systems, JobNet staff members were especially frustrated with the lack of a state-wide
information system for collecting data from the One-Stop Career Centers. This lack of
                                                
128 Personal interview with JobNet associate director, April 17, 1998.
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standardization was for JobNet, “a nightmare of manual, crisis-driven, ever-changing reports.”129
Without state-mandated information systems to implement, JobNet was compelled to adopt new
software systems—Account Manager, CareerMaker, and Lotus Notes—some of which it
purchased from The Work Place.130  The software, requiring new training for staff, produced
mixed success because key procedures continued to be manually and routinely conducted for
almost one year. Most importantly, with no talent bank software, most labor exchange was
conducted by hand, as had been done historically by the Employment Service. JobNet’s default
use of such paper-based forms was yet another signal of the center’s latent bureaucratic
tendencies. This practice limited the specificity by which staff could target qualified candidates
for job postings. JobNet also had under-developed information systems to manage other career
center functions. For example, JobNet maintained an 8-column hand-written ledger for tracking
fee-based money received for services and space rental for eleven months, before transferring
this data management activity to Intuit’s Quicken software. Such technical limitations were
especially frustrating for JobNet because, more so than Boston Career Link and the Work Place,
JobNet’s former DET staff were accustomed to standardized documentation and reporting
routines. This difference among career centers was evident in their first annual review progress
reports, where JobNet—much more so than  BCL and TWP, considered one of its main
organizational priority and performance issues to be the identification and response to managing
information systems. In contrast to the many reports it generated for state agencies, JobNet
critiqued itself for not preparing internal management reports. To address its relative lack of
sophistication in its technical operations and to allow program managers to run more detailed
                                                
129 Personal interview with Rosemary Alexander, JobNet Executive Director, May 11, 2001.
130 JobNet paid The Work Place licensing and consulting fees for software and support.
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reports, JobNet determined that it would hire an additional information technology (IT) staff
person and to make IT a priority.
Responding to losing a Partner, Peers, and a Director
In its second year, JobNet continued to wrestle with its information technology issues, and
encountered new challenges including the departure of DBM and of JobNet’s executive director.
DBM decided to withdraw its participation as a career center operator because it calculated that
it was unlikely to make a profit and because it had less influence over JobNet’s operations that it
had anticipated. With fiscal management authority and with former employees in JobNet’s key
leadership positions, DET’s formal and informal influence constrained DBM’s ability to shape
JobNet’s activities. Moreover, the organizational interests and competencies of DBM and DET
sometimes clashed. For example, DBM was unaccustomed to developing or providing services
to disadvantaged job-seekers.  Conflicts with DBM contributed to another major change faced by
JobNet in its second year, the departure of the executive director.
According to a JobNet informant, the director left—and returned to DET—due to the stress and
frustration of attempting to reconcile the conflicting views and expectations of DET, DBM, and
Boston’s One-Stop Career Center system. In an attempt to rebuild JobNet, DET—at this point
JobNet’s sole operator—recruited Rosemary Alexander as the new director in the summer of
1998. Alexander was a DET veteran who had actual experience administering several local DET
offices, unlike the previous director with a long tenure in DET’s central administration. At this
point in its governance, JobNet had no other operator except DET. Neither did JobNet have a
Customer Advisory Committee. For nearly nine months, JobNet was governed by DET and by
the new director designated by DET. As a result JobNet reasserted the bureaucratic orientation
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inherited from DET. As the leader in this chain-of-command, Alexander focused on the three
activities: finding another operating partner, improving information systems, and enhancing
management and labor exchange processes.
To find a new partner, DET initiated a standard state competitive procurement process for
contracts in May 1998. After reviewing the three bid responses to the RFR, Alexander persuaded
DET not to award the contract and instead to modify and re-issue the RFR so that it contain
specific language encouraging more collaboration and in-kind contributions rather than a
“vendor” type relationship as suggested in the original RFR. These changes delayed the selection
process so that a new partner was not chosen until February 1999.
Fixing Information Technology
During this time, several changes were made to JobNet’s information systems. Compared to the
other career centers, JobNet had the least amount of information technology staff, yet the highest
amount of staffing resources devoted to meeting reporting requirements. To address this, JobNet
hired another IT person and began transitioning from its mixed assortment of career center
information management systems to the DET’s automated information management system to
record DTA placement program activity. This decision was made to improve the accuracy of
reporting and to reconcile data between the DET system and the DTA system.
JobNet also reviewed the problems with its data entry and reporting and found several issues.
One issue was that JobNet used a variety of reporting systems that not all staff used similarly or
consistently. In response, JobNet instructed staff to schedule appropriate amounts of time for
data entry, even if it reduced time for direct client services delivery.
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In an effort to simultaneously improve its information systems and its internal management,
JobNet organized two CQI teams to examine problems with its labor exchange. Both teams
identified inconsistent data collection procedures as the culprit. Overall, JobNet’s approach to
information and systems management was establishing procedures and instructions for
administering the tasks, documentation, and reportable outcomes associated with the labor
matching process. JobNet’s self-identified strategic priorities included “re-establishing consistent
procedures for capturing important information regarding use of Center resources and service
delivery; revising customer management procedures to promote improved case management; re-
establishing employer recruitment set-up/follow-up procedures; restructuring ongoing orientation
and follow-up procedures to ensure that JobNet customers provide job attainment information on
a timely basis; initiating direct referral activities on a more consistent basis; and streamlining the
cycle time for matching qualified customers with jobs.”131
Emergent Bureaucracy and the “Walking Wounded”
JobNet’s second year of operation was characterized by increased formalization using DET’s
familiar organizational processes: rules and documentation. However, JobNet did this through
staff teams and CQI processes. That is, JobNet’s team-based CQI processes focused on data
collection, forms, procedures, and reporting outcomes. In this way, JobNet attempted to develop
a hybrid emergent bureaucracy focused on quality service.  According to Alexander, she took the
job of directing JobNet because she wanted to learn “how to do customer service” and combine it
with the “tried and true structure of DET” in delivering services.132
                                                
131 Presentation to the Boston Private Industry Council Career Center Sub-Committee, November 5, 1998, page 7.
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Alexander said she had to retrain JobNet staff to de-emphasize DET-based case management
approaches and to strengthen the labor exchange aspects of employment services. At the same
time, Alexander said that she felt “the public charge is very serious… our reason for being is for
public dollars to be used for indigent and refugee populations. The majority of people who come
here have problems…the state is seen as the last resort for the walking wounded.” One
consequence of this is that many of JobNet’s customers are not job-ready and require referrals to
other support services. Staff time devoted to such people does not result in a “placement.”  In
fact, JobNet staff found that many people in the DTA-supported structured job search (SJS)
program were “difficult” customers, some wanting a place to stay during the day, some with
mental or emotional problems, and some who identified the career center as the “state”
employment service where they had a “right” to demand certain services and levels of attention.
Relationships with Job-Seekers
As the last career center to open, JobNet had the advantage of knowing that the initial block
grant budgeting would be compromised, and that categorical funding would be an important
source of revenue. Based on this information and on DET’s experience with such programs,
JobNet organized its operation with lead Career Associate (CA) specialists in specific program
areas such as welfare, Skills Plus, Title III (dislocated workers), and ADA (American Disabilities
Act). Having Career Associates with population specialties meant that there were several types
of relationships with job-seekers.
                                                                                                                                                            
132 Personal interview with  JobNet executive director, May 11, 2001.
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Customers eligible for categorical funding were more likely to access JobNet either through the
satellite office and other local area welfare offices, or referrals by other recipients. In addition to
being an active presence in welfare offices, JobNet built on its DET connections to make
presentations at unemployment insurance monthly meetings. With its location at the edge of
Chinatown, JobNet’s Asian staff established relationships and made presentations at local
Chinatown organizations such as the Asian American Civic Association. These outreach
activities contributed to JobNet seeing a higher percentage of unemployed than the other two
career centers. It also had a higher percentage of customers with only a high school degree.
Having a satellite office within a DTA office also contributed to JobNet reporting 74 DTA job
placements through October 1997, a number that exceeded the 50 placements reported by the
other two career centers combined.
Employer Services
Through its connection to DET, JobNet had access to a large base of employers. This is because,
over time, many employers had grown accustomed to listing jobs with DET to meet job posting
requirements associated with ensuring affirmative action outreach compliance. As a result,
JobNet did not have to conduct much outreach or marketing to employers. In fact, JobNet’s main
challenge was managing the volume of employer calls coming in. In this regard, JobNet mostly
applied the standardized DET-esque case management approach that it developed for categorical
job-seeker customers to how it managed employer relations. In general, the EAs were not able to
convert many employers from the free core posting to fee-based services. Moreover, the large
volume of employer referrals from DET soon became problematic because JobNet staff had to
enter the jobs data into both the Career Center software (Account Manager) and the DET (TED)
information system. Then, after posting the jobs twice, staff had to manually conduct matches
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because the candidate data was stored in different software that did not permit labor matching. In
addition to hand-sorting resumes and job postings as part of its labor exchange process,
Employer Associates and Career Associates also used staff meetings to discuss the “job of the
week” and the “client of the week.” Such non-automated systems resulted in “hit and miss” job
matching. So, even with a large, installed employer customer base, JobNet was challenged
technically and procedurally in turning this asset into job matches, enhanced (i.e., fee-based)
employer services, or into a revenue stream.
Populations and Placements
In comparison to the other Boston career centers, JobNet tended to have higher volumes of job-
seeker and employer customers, higher percentages of job-seekers with low educational
attainment, and lower placement rates.
In its first year, the ethnic/racial composition of JobNet’s job-seekers was, like TWP’s
demographics, relatively similar to that of Boston, with the exception that JobNet had a higher
Asian population due to its proximity to Chinatown. JobNet’s job-seekers were 35 percent white,
30 percent Asian, 21 percent African-America, 9 percent Hispanic, and 4 percent other.133
JobNet had a slightly more balanced gender distribution among the career centers: 51 percent
female compared to TWP’s 55 percent female and BCL’s 65 percent female population.
                                                
133 Fiscal Year 1997 data.
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JobNet consistently served higher proportions of less educated job-seekers than the other career
centers (See Appendix Table 8). In its first year, 67 percent of JobNet’s job-seeker customers
had only a high school degree/equivalent or less; and 20 percent did not have a high school
degree. These percentages were significantly higher than those of TWP (37 percent with only a
high school degree/equivalent or less, and 12 percent with no high school degree) and BCL (24
percent with only a high school degree/equivalent or less, and 6 percent with no high school
degree). Similarly, JobNet consistently served lower percentages of job-seekers with higher
educational attainment.  Only 9 percent of JobNet’s job-seekers had some college versus 26
percent at TWP and 20 percent at BCL. The percentage of JobNet’s job-seekers with a college
degree or higher—24 percent (8 percent with advanced degrees)—was also much lower than that
at TWP—37 percent (13 percent with advanced degrees), and BCL—52 percent (21 percent with
advanced degrees). While the percentage distributions of educational attainment among JobNet’s
job-seekers did not vary significantly during its first several years, JobNet’s percentage of less
educated customers slightly increased as its percentage of customers with college degrees
decreased.
By the end of its second year, JobNet’s total share of job-seekers was much higher than that the
other career centers, a pattern that has continued to 2003. In Fiscal Year 1998, JobNet registered
4592 new job-seekers or 42 percent of all such customers at Boston career centers (See
Appendix Table 7). In contrast, TWP registered 3486 new job-seekers (32 percent of system
volume) and BCL registered 2841 new job-seekers (26 percent of system volume).
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JobNet’s relationship to DET continued to provide it with many employer referrals. JobNet’s
identification with the State Employment Security System was the main source of job postings.
According to JobNet, “on a continuing basis many employers listing job orders with us realize
that they do not only receive quality referrals but also satisfy the federal requirement, for those
receiving federal funding, to post job orders with the public employment service.”134  JobNet’s
relationship with state contributed to JobNet consistently having higher numbers of employer
accounts and job postings than the other career centers. In Fiscal Year 1998, JobNet opened 769
employer accounts—representing nearly half of all such accounts opened by Boston career
centers. Relatedly, 1486 jobs were posted at JobNet (See Appendix Table 6). In comparison,
TWP opened 432 employer accounts and posted 904 jobs, and BCL opened 389 employer
accounts and posted 761 jobs.
Like BCL, JobNet’s information technology problems contributed to reporting low placement
rates in its first year. For that year, JobNet reported a 15 percent placement rate and BCL
reported a 16 percent placement, while TWP reported a 33 percent placement rate (See Appendix
Table 4). In Fiscal Year 1998, JobNet’s placement rate increased to 21 percent, while BCL’s rate
increased to 49 percent and TWP’s rate decreased to 28 percent.  One explanation for JobNet’s
low placement rate compared to the other career centers is that JobNet had the largest volume of
job-seeker customers, as well as a higher proportion of less educated individuals. In its emphasis
on serving the very disadvantaged, JobNet saw many customers with low literacy skills, varied
or limited work histories, and those needing social service supports (e.g., homelessness,
substance abuse). However, not all disadvantaged customers had poor placement rates. JobNet
                                                
134 JobNet Career Center Progress Report. Charter Review Fiscal Year 2000. January 28, 1999. Page 7.
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found that its satellite office within a DTA office had a higher placement rate than the main
office. After analyzing differences in labor exchange methods, JobNet determined that the
approach at the welfare office involved more comprehensive case management techniques that
yielded more complete information exchange between staff and customers and employers.
Summary
JobNet’s bureaucratic orientation was exhibited through several aspects of its planning and
practice. The most telling indication of bureaucratic processes was DET’s strong formal and
informal influence on JobNet’s management, particularly after the departure of DBM. Most of
JobNet’s leadership and staff were former workers of the DET/Employment Service. DET
provided much of the financial and data system administration for JobNet. DET provided
sufficient capitalization to manage payroll and other disbursements while awaiting contractual
reimbursements. In this regard, JobNet was more fiscally stable and therefore less
administratively stressed and dependent on categorical funding than either BCL or TWP.
Through DET, JobNet was able to draw upon well-developed financial systems to manage
complex contracting relationships with other governmental agencies. DET connections also
provided entry to establishing resource-sharing relationships with other state agencies such as the
co-location of JobNet’s satellite office at DTA’s Newmarket square office. However, because
JobNet was deeply embedded in public bureaucratic structures and networks and because JobNet
did not have a well-developed board or systematic CQI training, JobNet’s practices and services
tended to reflect governmental processes. Consequently, JobNet identified its biggest managerial
and administrative challenge as involving the upgrading and managing its management
information systems—central concerns of government bureaucracies. In contrast to its strong
relationships with government agencies, JobNet had weak relationships with employers even as
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it processed large numbers of employer job postings. JobNet’s primary interest regarding
improving its interactions with employers consisted of developing consistent procedures for data
entry and documentation of employer job postings. JobNet had no fee-based services to offer by
the end of its first year, and very limited fee-based services at the end of second year.
Chapter Review
In 1998, a casual visitor to all three of Boston’s career centers would likely have observed more
similarities than differences among them. The office layouts were so consistent that the centers
appeared to have shared the same office space designer: computer resource room, library,
training rooms, and offices.  Likewise, all three centers offered similar types of career planning
and job search services and workshops. However, before they opened for business in 1996 and
during the next few years of their operations, the career centers made different decisions that
influenced how they planned, practiced, and performed as labor market intermediaries. In the
case of Boston Career Link, the career center quickly entered into a period of crisis management
marked by managerial turnover, shifting and reactive tactics, and a reliance on mixed and
overlapping personal and organizational networks for support. BCL’s approach to information
was characterized more by situational, “sensing,” and interpretation modes rather than
systematic, technological, and analytical methods. BCL’s personalistic approach was exhibited
through a reliance on internal and external consultative processes that favored services to job-
seekers over those to employers. At The Work Place, an entrepreneurial zeal for team-based
information-rich CQI processes focused its services on employers. TWP emphasized the
consistent use of systemic and strategic analysis in its management and in its development and
delivery of services. TWP supported this approach with investments in technology and data
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analysis methods.  In response to diminished funding, TWP emphasized fee-based services for
both job-seekers and employers in an attempt to diversify its revenue. JobNet’s bureaucratic
orientation emerged quickly as a result of few counteracting forces to DET’s formal and informal
influence. In this setting, JobNet used a hybrid process of CQI-infused teams and categorical
specialization to standardize practices around information systems and labor matching. By
combining such procedures with its inherited relations with government agencies referring job-
seekers and employers, JobNet administered a high volume of employment services, especially
to the most disadvantaged job-seekers. Regarding performance, TWP was the first career center
to pass the benchmark indicator of a 20 percent placement rate, reaching a 33 percent placement
rate by the end of the first year, compared to JobNet’s 15 percent and BCL’s 16 percent. TWP
also had the highest number of placements at 1259 (compared to JobNet’s 207 and BCL’s
557).135 Reflecting its focus on employer services, TWP filled 32 percent of employer job
postings, compared to 18 percent at JobNet and 9 percent at BCL. However, by the end of the
second year, BCL had the highest placement rate, 49 percent, compared to 28 percent at TWP
and 21 percent at JobNet. BCL’s surging placement rate may be partly explained by having
significantly larger percentages of  higher educated job-seekers than the other career centers,
increased organizational investments in placement data record-keeping, and customized case
management practices. JobNet’s increased placement rate is partly explained by improved
recording keeping and labor matching procedures. While no clear explanation is evident, TWP’s
decreased placement rate may be partly explained by the organization’s slight shifting of
resources to categorically-focused—harder to place—job-seekers and to employer services.
                                                
135 TWP’s high numbers in its first year is mostly due to its being first career center to open, thereby giving it a
longer reporting period, as well as larger market share due to the late entry of its “competitors.”
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CHAPTER FOUR
Welfare Reform & Tight Labor Market Era: Middle Years (1999-2000)
Overview
After a start-up phase of several years, the career centers entered into a second era highlighted by
welfare reform implementation and a tightened labor market. During this era—comprising the
years 1999 and 2000—the career centers experienced changing institutional conditions in their
external environment that were associated with corresponding internal operational shifts. In this
chapter, the career centers are examined as they continued to evolve their operations and fashion
different approaches to the mix of challenges and opportunities presented by welfare reform and
low unemployment rates. As will be revealed, the career centers did not respond equally to these
changing situations. Related to their strategic orientation, the centers exhibited differences in
their planning, practice, and performance. Boston Career Link focused on altering and re-
building relationships as a response to its persistent managerial and planning problems and to its
challenges of delivering services associated with welfare reform. The Work Place focused on
adjusting its plans and practices to better promote development of fee-based and employer
services in order to exploit the opportunities presented by increased employer demand for
workers. At the same time, TWP reorganized its teams as a means to adapt to the demands of
welfare reform. JobNet focused on integrating a new operator into its increasingly formalized
planning and programs at the same time as adjusting its information and service delivery systems
to the new requirements of welfare reform.
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Boston Career Link
Planning and Practice
Consultative Strategic Planning
Despite some management restructuring, Boston Career Link kept experiencing shifting
reporting and authority relationships as it continued focusing on disadvantaged customers.
Overall during 1999 and 2000, BCL’s basic over-arching management structure did not change,
and episodic staff and management turnover contributed to a reliance on personal and peer
relationships for carrying out day-to-day operations. At the same time, BCL persisted in
emphasizing services to individuals with employment barriers while still having the largest
percentage of most educated job-seekers of all three career centers. According to BCL,
“it would be fair to say that low-income people have been the target population of BCL.
This target population is consistent with the missions of the collaborating agencies and is
also the population for which there is the most funding available for services, including
Welfare-to-Work and Department of Transitional Assistance funding.”136
As noted by BCL, disadvantaged people were targeted because they were the traditional
recipients of services by BCL’s operators and because they represented sources of revenue.
However, providing services to those for whom governmental funds were available tended to
reinforce BCL’s tendency to rely on immediate tactical responses to funding opportunities rather
than long-term planning. Initially, BCL’s hoped that its Customer Advisory Council could
provide operational oversight and supplement the advice and oversight of its operators on the
governing board. However, this expectation did not bear out as intended. For example, BCL was
not able to carry out the CAC’s proposals that BCL sponsor a second annual informational
meeting for Boston’s education and training providers or hold a similar meeting for
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employers.137 Acknowledging BCL’s penchant for reacting to the immediate needs of its
customers and its own administration, the CAC determined in its second meeting that it was
necessary to conduct longer range strategic planning to evaluate BCL’s viability and identify
opportunities for the center’s future growth and development. The CAC specifically
recommended that the operators hire an independent consultant to facilitate strategic planning
prior to initiating its operations in fiscal year 2001 and prior to implementing WIA.  In the fall of
2000, BCL’s governance board (i.e., MMGI, WEIU, DCHC) selected Workforce Learning
Strategies (WLS) as the strategic planning consultants. Like BCL’s organizational and CQI
consultants, WLS was partly selected due to overlapping professional and friendship networks
evolved over time.138
Recognizing BCL’s unstable history, WLS was charged with developing a strategic plan that
would help BCL respond to changing institutional conditions as well as would align BCL’s role
with that of its operators and other community partners.139 According to the strategic plan,
BCL’s main challenges and opportunities related to changes in the labor exchange environment
including welfare reform; implementation of WIA; limited state government support for a
                                                                                                                                                            
136 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 10.
137 After hosting its first informational breakfast in 1998, BCL determined that 1999 was a transition year for WIA
and that there were too many uncertainties regarding how Individual Training Accounts would be piloted. Instead of
its own event, BCL decided to participate in a Job Training Alliance meeting. However, this meeting did not occur.
138 BCL’s operators were familiar with Workforce Learning Strategies’ principals—Suzanne Teegarden and Barbara
Baran—through several institutional relationships. Previously, Suzanne Teegarden was the President of the
Massachusetts’ quasi-public Corporation for Business, Work, and Learning (CBWL), which promoted workforce
development and economic development policies, and provided state-level policy oversight to career centers. Also at
CBWL, Baran was Vice President for Workforce Development. And, Teegarden and Baran were Co-Directors for
the Workforce Strategies Collaborative (WSC) at Northeastern University’s Center for Urban and Regional Policy.
WSC worked with career centers and government and community agencies on workforce development issues.
139 To develop BCL’s strategic plan, WLS interviewed BCL’s stakeholders and evaluated the career center
environment and prospects for future development. As background, WLS defined target job-seeker populations and
analyzed who BCL was serving; determined who the other Boston career centers were serving; profiled Boston’s
working age population; and identified those groups facing serious barriers to employment.
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competitive career center model; and the influence of a strong economy and tight labor market
on labor exchange practices.140 Moreover,
people from low-income families, people from communities of color and linguistic
minorities are less likely to be part of an informal network to learn about job openings.
These groups may also face barriers to employment, such as prejudice, lack of English
skills, limited work histories and low educational attainment, and may be more in need of
the job search assistance, career counseling, interview training, access to job training
programs, and other support services that BCL provides.141
“After lengthy discussions,” BCL’s operators agreed on four areas of realignment: adapt to WIA;
focus on populations in greatest need of career center services; target particular employers that
match the employment needs of targeted job-seeker populations; and align more closely with the
three collaborating agencies. The operators met with PIC which accepted the proposed
realignments.
The strategic plan suggested that BCL focus on Empowerment Zone (EZ) residents because they
fit many categories of disadvantaged workers including low-income, communities of color, and
linguistic minorities. BCL noted that an advantage of focusing on EZ residents was that planned
economic development projects in the EZ would generate job opportunities. According to BCL,
“most of these projects will house industries with natural alliances to the collaborating agencies
and with many entry-level jobs.”142 Focusing on EZ residents also provided rationale for plans
among BCL’s operators to re-locate BCL to offices within MMGI’s large building, which
                                                
140 The consultants’ analysis attributed most of BCL’s operational challenges to lower than anticipated funding
levels, significant funds being categorical rather than discretionary, cash flow delays, and insufficient funds for
universal access services. The consultant report forecast that career center funding would remain flat or decrease,
that WIA could make additional demands without providing additional funding, and that funding levels would not
support a free-standing career center. BCL therefore determined that in order to remain financially viable, it had to
reposition itself and its services.
141 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 2-3.
142 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 5.
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happened to be situated in the Roxbury neighborhood section of Boston’s Empowerment
Zone.143 By moving its operations to MMGI’s low-rent office space, BCL’s operators hoped to
reduce BCL’s overhead costs as well as strengthen the operators’ oversight of BCL.
Strategic and Structural Re-alignment
One immediate outcome of the strategic planning process was an agreement by the three
operators to continue their involvement with BCL but Roxbury that MMGI would take over
financial, operational and managerial responsibility, and that Goodwill’s Board of Directors
would provide oversight to BCL. Moreover, BCL would move to office space within MMGI’s
building, which was located in the low-income neighborhood and within the Empowerment
Zone. BCL’s operators felt that the move would bring BCL closer to the disadvantaged job-
seekers it was most interested in serving. A consequence of the process was that during the
strategic planning in fall 2000 several key staff persons left the organization including the
executive director and the information technology manager. Due to these departures, BCL
personnel scrambled as duties were reassigned and staff were re-organized. By the end of 2000,
BCL had a new management structure, and new weekly staff meetings. These management shifts
resulted in delaying implementation of the strategic plan. As BCL reported, “formal deployment
of most of BCL’s strategic plan has been put on hold while the lead agency status was
transferred from Dimock to Goodwill and while the Steering Committee has been recruiting a
new director.”144  Even as it attempted to develop a long-term strategic plan, BCL continued to
operate in an environment of perpetual re-organization.
                                                
143 BCL’s operators originally proposed locating BCL in MMGI, but were prevented from doing so by the PIC.
144 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 4.
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DTA-Contracted Services and Programs
During 1999 and 2000, in the midst of its shifting planning and managerial efforts, BCL
remained challenged in responding to varied categorical performance-based mandates that
needed to be satisfied to in order to fully fund staffing and operations. Many of the categorical
requirements were related to the rolling out implementation of welfare reform. To meet these
outcome performance and revenue targets, BCL focused on DTA-contracts for welfare recipients
to such an extent that a “disproportionate level of staffing was committed to DTA services at the
expense of new product development and implementation.”145
In providing DTA-contracted services, BCL reported that its two main “marketing techniques”
consisted of strong relationships with DTA employees and targeted services to TANF recipients.
According to BCL, its “outreach workers have a good relationship with DTA employees, and
have worked to keep those relationships solid, through relationship-building events and other
positive interactions.”146 However, BCL acknowledged that such relationships did not
necessarily translate into more customers or effective services. In early 1999, BCL opened a
satellite office across from the Dorchester DTA office, but closed it a year later in March 2000
because it “did not significantly increase the number of BCL clients.”147
A more successful marketing technique was “product differentiation” regarding services to
TANF recipients. According to BCL, its  “job search program is more staff intensive and
structured than those of other career centers, and BCL believes it has been more successful. BCL
                                                
145 Charter Review FY ’01, Boston Career Link Progress Report, p. 2.
146 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 11.
147 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 11.
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is able to market its specialized program and superior success rate to clients and those assisting
clients.”148 In 1999, for example, BCL launched the Career Transitions Project (CTP), an
intensive post-placement case management and supportive services for DTA customers making
the transition from welfare to work. Under a contract that was operated with the Behavioral
Healthcare Network, the CTP assisted BCL to meet expanded job retention and earnings increase
standards by providing an integrated system of post-placement services for welfare recipients. A
key feature of the CTP was a service coordination design that provided an array of work-related
support services delivered by a community-based, mobile, multi-disciplinary team of
professionals and paraprofessionals. The services were designed to provide flexible and
sustained involvement by TANF customers with the goal of long-term job retention.
In 1999, BCL also began an experiment with a service it called the “Job Match Café,” an attempt
to improve the labor matching that occurred between candidate referral and employer contact.
Using funds made available by DTA through DET for employer-focused initiatives, BCL
allowed primarily DTA job-seeker interest to drive which four employers were invited to meet
job-seekers at four café events.149 The Job Match Café reflected BCL’s tendency to emphasize
job-seeker preferences and relational interactions in its approach to labor exchange. However,
Job Match Café did not produce many hires and was subsequently discontinued.
In its drive to increase the funding it derived from DTA contracts, BCL also experimented with
incentive plans for staff and welfare customers.  BCL’s staff incentive plan was built around
performance in finding employment for welfare customers. A portion of funds earned on DTA
                                                
148 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 11.
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contracts above BCL’s financial target was returned to BCL staff in form of bonus.150 One
indicator of the incentive program’s success is that BCL outperformed every career center in the
state on a similar DTA contract in fiscal year 2000.151 Although BCL had high placement
performance compared to other career centers, BCL was not able to determine the specific
impact of the customer incentive plan because it did not collect information or have a control
group.152 BCL’s high placement rates for DTA customer reflected BCL’s effectiveness in
providing labor exchange services to targeted customer groups, even without having formalized
strategies or information systems.
Special Services for Special Populations
In addition to its DTA-focused activities, BCL continued to provide services to other targeted
groups. In some cases, BCL staff routinely provided services onsite to community-based groups
who wanted their customers to have enhanced access to labor exchange services. In other cases,
BCL developed services and programs in collaboration with its operators as well as other
community-based organizations. For example, BCL engaged in several projects providing
                                                                                                                                                            
149 Employers who participated included the New England Aquarium, Pitney Bowes, Citizens Bank, and Marriott.
150 Twenty five percent of every dollar earned by BCL above the financial goal was dispersed to staff as a bonus.
Incentive amount distribution depended on the intensity of the staff person’s involvement with DTA customers.
151 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 16.
152 Similarly, BCL was unable to assess the affects of a bonus program in 2000, in which BCL offered to pay DTA
customers $200 for work-related expenses if they enrolled in job search, found a job, and retained it for 30 days.
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employment services to disabled people.153 BCL also offered specialized services to specific
groups involved HIV job-seekers.154
BCL’s focus on specialized groups of customers also influenced the development of BCL’s
services and products that, though not explicitly targeted to a single population, revealed an
emphasis on targeting specific groups or specific neighborhoods. In 1999, BCL’s first job fairs
occurred in venues mostly located in disadvantaged neighborhoods and targeted to job-seekers
with barriers to employment. BCL’s first off-site job fair was at the Bromley-Heath Public
Housing Development and, although small, was considered a success.155 In April 1999, BCL was
the lead sponsor for the “Spring into Employment Job Fair” that was organized by the
Dorchester Bay Community Development Center (DBCDC) and held at Dimock Community
Health Center.156 Encouraged by the reception from job-seekers and employers, BCL held a
larger job fair at its own offices five months later in September.157
Another way that BCL attempted to address the special needs of individuals was through the use
weekly clinical counseling services provided by the Corporation for Business Work and
                                                
153 With funding from the Federal Rehabilitation Services Administration, BCL collaborated with Goodwill, the
Institute for Community Inclusion, and Children’s Hospital to develop “Working Solutions,” a three-year
employment demonstration project to help people with disabilities who both receive public assistance and live in
Empowerment Zone/Enterprise Communities.153 Along with job search and job seeking skills, Working Solutions
provided case management to assist with issues such as child care, transportation, housing, or medical needs.
However, Working Solutions provided services to a relatively small number of disabled people. In its first year, the
program enrolled 29 people and secured employment for 14 of them.
154 To address the employment needs of HIV job-seekers, BCL collaborated with Dimock Community Health
Center’s HIV Services Unit to develop the “Phoenix Program” with funds from the Boston Public Health
Commission, and provided career counseling and job placement services to people with HIV/AIDS. Of the 60
participants in 1999, 20 participants were successfully placed in jobs.
155 The Bromley-Heath Public Housing Development is composed of approximately 1000 housing units located in
the Roxbury-Jamaica Plain borders of Boston.
156 The job fair attracted 12 DBCDC-affiliated fee-paying employers who met with 75 job seekers.
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Learning.158 BCL’s counseling approach to labor matching was noted by the Boston PIC in
reporting on a site visit presentation comprised of four different case studies describing four
individuals with different characteristics and employment goals:
The studies demonstrated the extremely customized, intensive, psychosocial approach
counselors take to employment counseling…It was clear from these presentations that
career counseling services at BCL are comprehensive, tailored to the needs of the
individual and flexible depending on the needs of the job/training seeking
customer…More generally, job-seekers at BCL start out receiving group services, then
proceed to more individualized services.159
In focusing on specialized populations, BCL relied upon over-lapping and cross-cutting
relationships among staff to share knowledge and experience. The REB noted that,
From the site visit and reports it was clear that the organization uses the expertise and
resources of its entire staff to contribute to the development of its programs for
specialized populations. This is one way that BCL manages the tension between
fragmentation and integration posed by categorical funding in a system that is mandated
to provide universal access to services.160
Employer Customers
In contrast to its consistent focus on specialized groups, BCL was un-focused in its services to
employer customers. BCL’s main interactions with employer consisted of posting job
announcements and of hosting Industry Briefings. According to BCL, “the Industry Briefing has
been BCL’s distinct method of allowing employers to interact with potential hires.”161  In
January 2000,  BCL’s management and staff determined that a new goal for the briefings would
be to repeatedly invite those few specific employers that already had a good track record of
                                                                                                                                                            
157 “Job Fair Expo ’99” attracted 18 fee-paying employers from different industry sectors and 335 job-seekers, most
of whom were existing BCL customers. According to BCL, 20 people were hired into jobs at the job fair.
158 BCL used the behavioral health clinician to help BCL staff with specialized counseling for customers as well as
several in-service training sessions for BCL staff such as setting boundaries and working with customers with
substance abuse issues. BCL also worked with the clinician to help design new core workshops including
Overcoming Age Barriers, Coping with Job Loss, and Assertive Communication.
159 Charter Review Report FY ’02, Boston Career Link, p. 4.
160 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Report Review, p. 9.
161 Charter Review FY ’02, Boston Career Link Business Plan and Progress Report, p. 12.
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hiring from BCL and providing the types of jobs appropriate to BCL’s targeted customers.162
However, just before this plan was implemented, BCL developed its new strategic plan in fall
2000 that changed the goal to targeting industries rather than specific employers.
Temp Agency Relations in a Tightened Labor Market
Related to the tightened labor market of 1999 and 2000, temporary staffing agencies sought out
more intensive ties to career centers. Since their opening, the career centers had each developed
mostly informal relationships with several temporary staffing agencies. These relationships
ranged from posting temp agency positions in a binder in the resource room to fee-based
recruitment.163 In other cases, career associates sometimes referred a job-seeker to temporary
agency as a means of gaining entry into a specific industry or as a way to get work experience.
As the labor market tightened, temporary agencies increasingly sought to use the career centers
as sources of workers. At the same time, career centers looked to temporary agencies as paths to
employment for job-seeker customers and as potential purchasers of fee-based services. In early
1999, the interactions between the temp agencies and the career centers developed into mutual
interests of formalizing the relationships and specifying the range of services the career centers
would offer and temp agencies would purchase. Career centers had independent discussions with
temp agencies while the temp agencies had similar conversations with all three career centers.
In the interest of developing coordinated services for temp agencies across the career centers, the
PIC’s Employer Services Work Group became involved as an intermediary and convened an
                                                
162 For BCL, examples of employers that hired TANF and low-income workers included Marriott Corporation,
Partners Health Care, and Northeastern University.
163 More so than the other two career centers, The Work Place offered fee-based services for temp agencies
including recruitment and, in some cases, placement.
170
initial meeting with all the career centers and several temp agencies and held subsequent
discussions throughout 1999.164 Career centers proposed offering a variety of fee-based
marketing services that could be purchased individually or bundled together as a “Visibility
Package” for $500. Staffing agencies indicated a willingness to also pay for listings in a temp
agency directory that would be distributed to job-seekers and employers, and for ads in the
directory, and a print binder of their listings. Temp agencies were also interested in paying career
centers to provide job readiness training to job seekers who were contracted with the agency but
who received negative feedback on assignments regarding “soft” work place skills and
behaviors.
As the discussions progressed between the career centers and the temp agencies, BCL developed
a particularly close relationship with one temp agency named Volt. BCL and Volt had separate
discussions about revenue sharing arrangements and negotiated a near-final agreement.165 BCL’s
intent was to replicate this arrangement with some of the 20 staffing agencies who already made
cooperative—though non-revenue sharing—working agreements with BCL. Despite BCL’s
strong interest in the deal with Volt, the negotiations were drawn out because they competed
against BCL’s other more immediate priorities as well as BCL’s persistent staff turnover and
organizational stresses. Before the agreement with Volt was signed, the senior executive at Volt
who had developed the agreement with BCL departed Volt. Without a personal relationship to
                                                
164 Temp agencies involved in the discussions included Volt (specializing in office and light industrial jobs), Arbor
Associates (specializing in social workers, case managers, child care jobs), Tac Staff (specializing in office,
technical, and engineering jobs), New Boston (specializing in office, hospitality, accounting, and light industry
jobs), OnSite (specializing in office, engineering/technical, and warehouse jobs), and Enet (specializing in
accounting, administration, legal, and medical).
165 The agreement involved a payment of a referral commission (5 percent of the workers pay rate) to BCL for
referrals hired by Volt; a 20 percent share of Volt’s conversion fee for BCL referrals who are retained as permanent
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Volt, BCL was left to find another person to broker the deal within Volt. As a result, BCL put the
Volt deal on a “back-burner” and made it less of a priority. By the time BCL renewed its interest
in the Volt deal in late 2000, the temp industry was experiencing the earliest signs of the
oncoming recession and this time Volt put the deal on the back-burner. In a later section, BCL’s
relational approach to the temp industry is contrasted with The Work Place’s approach.
Populations and Placements
During 1999 and 2000, BCL’s emphasis on categorically-defined disadvantaged job-seekers
influenced the composition of its customer population resulting in shifting percentages of people
with educational attainment. Nevertheless, special populations (e.g., welfare recipients,
economically disadvantaged, disabled) continued to comprise approximately one-third of BCL’s
job-seeker customers. Even as the percentage of higher educated job-seekers decreased at BCL,
BCL continued to serve larger percentages of people with high educational attainment as
compared to the other career centers (See Appendix Table 8). Between fiscal year 1998 and
fiscal year 1999, the percentage of BCL’s population with bachelors or advanced degrees
dropped from 54 percent to 39 percent.166 Correspondingly, BCL’s percentage of job seekers
with a high school diploma or less increased from 25 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 40 percent in
fiscal year 1999. In 2000, BCL’s percentage of job seekers with a high school diploma or less
remained the same at 40 percent, while this group increased from 43 percent in 1999 to 47
percent at TWP, and from 70 percent to 75 percent at JN. Also in 2000, BCL’s percentage of
job-seekers with some college education increased from 21 percent in 1999 to a 27 percent in
                                                                                                                                                            
employees; a 50 percent share of Volt’s direct placement fee charged to their direct hire employers when BCL
referred the client; and monthly career resource library table fees.
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2000. During fiscal year 2000, BCL had significantly higher percentages of educated customers
than the other career centers. At BCL in 2000, 60 percent of customers had attended college or
completed a college degree, compared to 53 percent at TWP and 25 percent at JN.167
In fiscal year 1999, BCL was the top performing career center in terms of placement numbers
and rates (See Appendix Tables 4 and 5). BCL placed a record high 823 job seekers into
employment and had a placement rate of 44 percent compared to TWP’s 24 percent and JobNet’s
21 percent placement rates. BCL also had the highest entered employment rate for Title III
(dislocated workers) with 87 percent and the highest wage at re-employment of $14.69, which
was a 102 percent wage retention rate compared to the planned standard of 91 percent.  BCL was
also the top performing career center statewide in terms of job placements (achieving 90-days
retention) and earnings associated with job-seekers with disabilities referred by MRC and the
Massachusetts Commission for the Blind.  BCL placed 253 DTA job-seeker customers, 179 or
78 percent of which retained the minimum 30 days required to qualify as reimbursable
placements. BCL also distinguished itself by a achieving the lowest enrollment to placement
ratio among the Boston career centers. BCL partly attributed its DTA placement increases to its
innovative staff incentive plan designed to financially reward incremental performance gains
versus established fiscal year 1999 performance benchmarks.
                                                                                                                                                            
166 In comparison, TWP’s percentage of job-seekers with bachelors or advanced degrees dropped from 45 percent in
1998 to 34 percent in 1999, and JN’s percentage of job-seekers with bachelors or advanced degrees barely changed
20 percent to 19 percent.
167 In 2000, job-seekers with bachelors or advanced degree comprised 33 percent of BCL’s customers as compared
to 2 percent at JN and 26 percent at TWP.
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In fiscal year 2000, BCL‘s placement rate decreased slightly to 41 percent from 44 percent in
fiscal year 1999. However, BCL’s 41 percent placement rate was still higher than JN’s 39
percent and TWP’s 33 percent placement rates (See Appendix Table 4). In 2000, BCL also led
the state in placing transitional assistance customers and in DTA payment receipts for meeting
contract goals.
Summary
During 1999 and 2000, BCL continued to experience shifts in organization and management,
though to a lesser degree than the chronic crisis of its initial years of operation. Selected through
BCL’s personal and organizational networks, strategic planning consultants counseled BCL’s
operators through a collaborative consensual process that yielded agreements including
developing closer relationships between BCL and operators, focusing on disadvantaged job-
seekers, and strengthening existing relationships with employers. By the fall of 2000, BCL had
yet again initiated organizational restructuring. Just as its organizational restructuring plan
emphasized rebuilding and strengthening relationships, BCL’s day-to-day operations and labor
exchange activities also continued to reflect a tendency towards personal interactions,
counseling, and networking. The advent of welfare reform and its emphasis on categorical-based
contracts heightened BCL’s own emphasis on specialized populations. BCL’s reaction to welfare
reform implementation involved prioritizing categorical customers over employer customers.
BCL maintained this emphasis even as the labor market tightened and employers and temp
agencies sought out and were interested in paying for services. In its service delivery and in its
collaborations with community nonprofits and public agencies, BCL drew upon its extensive ties
to diverse networks of social service organizations for specialized expertise, supports, and
174
resources.  Although BCL did not generally use information systematically to inform planning or
practices, BCL did target its information collection and reporting activities to document its
placements of categorical customers in order to meet contract compliance requirements. As a
result, BCL was able to report significantly increased placement rates.
To help job-seekers get jobs and to help fulfill its contract requirements, BCL relied internally on
psycho-social case management approaches. On the one hand, these methods allowed BCL
counselors to customize service delivery to the particular issues of its varied job-seekers. On the
other hand, such personalistic attention was both staff- and time-intensive. To reward staff in
sustaining their efforts and on focusing on placement outcomes, BCL instituted a financial
incentive program in 1999.
As part of its attempts to recruit and provide employment services to disadvantaged job-seekers,
BCL expanded the scope of its collaborative projects with its operators and other community-
based partners. BCL’s embedded ties to its operators and to the community-based networks of
other nonprofit social service organizations enabled BCL to target specific populations. BCL’s
relationships with the other organizations also yielded information about grant opportunities as
well as provided sufficient trust among the organizations to pursue funding opportunities. The
joint efforts allowed the organizations to share access to customers and to combine expertise in
social supports and employment services.
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The Work Place
During the years 1999 and 2000, The Work Place responded to the challenges associated with
increased reliance on categorical funding—particularly related to welfare reform—as well as the
opportunities presented by heightened employer demand for workers in a tightened labor market.
Organizationally, TWP continued innovating its information technology and relying on CQI
process. TWP also restructured staff from generalists to specialists and from cross-functional
teams to specialist teams. TWP continued its focus on employers by expanding products such as
job fairs and innovating new services such as its “Corporate Partners” membership program. In
its efforts to respond to employer demand for workers, TWP experimented with connecting
employers with untapped labor pools such as pre-release prison inmates and non-custodial
fathers.
Planning and Practice
Continuous Multi-level Strategic Management
During 1999 and 2000, TWP continued to operate under the same management structure and
processes that it had set-up previously involving daily, weekly, and monthly levels of oversight
and planning. According to TWP, “although there are two layers of management between the
director and the direct service staff, The Work Place behaves as a very flat organization. The
majority of the planning, problem solving and strategic decision making happens in the
leadership team (often including the JVS Executive Director). The layers of management serve
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to ease the burden of supervision and are not used as a chain of command.”168 On a monthly
basis, the Employer Advisory Committee (EAC) provided “direct oversight of Work Place
operations” and took an “active role in developing and improving products and services”
including providing guidance on job fair products and the organization of company info in the
resource library.169  The EAC provided budget oversight while fiscal authority was provided by
JVS’ Board of Directors’ Finance Committee.
While TWP maintained continuity in its management throughout 1999 and 2000, TWP did
experience other changes. In January 2000, TWP moved out of its financial district offices due to
escalating rents related to the booming economy; and relocated to new offices on Chauncy Street
near Downtown Crossing.  Also in early 2000, several staff resigned during a time when TWP
restructured its staffing assignments.
Adaptation to Welfare Reform and Categorical Funding
During TWP’s many planning meetings in 1999 and 2000, one of the main topics under
discussion involved assessing the extent of change associated with the evolving career center
system and the implementation of welfare reform, as well as formulating responsive and
appropriate strategies. According to TWP,
Over the past three years, the Career Center initiative in Massachusetts has made a clear
shift in priority, from a market-driven enterprise committed to finding new ways of
providing more relevant services to all customers, both job-seeker and employer, to a
funding source driven program providing services to job-seekers prescribed by the
funding source.170
                                                
168 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, p. 2.
169 The Work Place Career Center FY2001 Charter Review Process Progress Report, p. 1.
170 The Work Place Career Center FY2001 Charter Review Process Progress Report, p. 4.
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Since the budget indicated in the original career center RFP in 1996, funding for career centers
had decreased each year to the point where TWP’s FY2000 budget was down by more than 20
percent of initial forecasts. Overall, funding for career center operations had decreased while
funds restricted to particular customers had increased.171
Even though welfare reform contracts represented a growing share of its budget, TWP had the
least direct involvement with DTA among the career centers. Of all the centers in 1999, TWP
had the smallest presence in DTA offices, the lowest share of DTA referrals, and the poorest
performance in terms of DTA placements. One explanation for this is that TWP had a limited
functional relationship with DTA. According to Tom Ford, DTA was a “payer” rather than a
business partner or customer with whom TWP had a transactional or exchange relationship:
I think about the welfare department as a third-party payer not a partner, and we never sit
down to talk. Terms like $3,300 per placement are negotiated at the state level and given
to us as ‘take it or leave it. My partners are training providers, corporate partners,
Massport, and the state Department of Revenue.172
TWP’s “arms-length” relationship with DTA offices was compounded by TWP’s early
determination that TWP’s universal services, customer-driven career services approach was
incompatible with the DTA’s approach that “government is the decision-maker telling the client
what to do.” In fact, initial assessments by DTA customer focus groups, the REB, and the other
                                                
171 In fiscal year 1998, 70 percent of TWP’s career center funding was for core services; in fiscal year 1999, 50
percent was for core; and in fiscal year 2000, core funds represented about 40 percent of total budget. Core services
decreased both as a percentage of career center allocations, and in actual dollars. Between 1999 and 2000, funding
for core services was reduced by 46 percent.171 At the same time, categorical funding increased by 63 percent
between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999; and increased again in fiscal year 2000 by 16 percent. Overall,
funding for categorical job seekers increased by 89 percent between fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 2000. This
increase was most apparent in funds targeted to welfare recipients. Between fiscal years 1998 and 2000, funding
restricted to services for welfare recipients increased by 170 percent. In fiscal year 2000, funds for welfare recipients
accounted for almost half of TWP’s funding from all sources.
172 TWP’s governmental “partners” such as MassPort or the Department of Revenue purchased services from TWP.
Personal interview with Tom Ford, May 11, 2001.
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Boston career centers suggested that DTA offices were not appropriate venues for career center
services. While the other centers made “concessions” and increased their presence at DTA
offices, TWP “stuck to its guns” and did not change its approach of mostly delivering services at
TWP offices. However, as a result of its relatively poor performance on DTA contracts in 1999,
TWP decided in 2000 to add capacity at the largest DTA office (Dorchester) by installing a full-
time presence and to develop a satellite office. In this effort, TWP stated that it was committed to
offering a complete mix of career center services at those locations because “we are here to serve
welfare customers, but we are not going to just run another welfare program.”173 In addition to
adding services, TWP also adapted its practices.
TWP made several changes to adapt to welfare reform and to increased categorical funding.
Together with the rising share of career centers’ budgets on categorical funding, there was also
an increasing trend among these categorical funds towards performance-based contracting—
payments not for services but for job placements. As result, a growing portion of funding was
withheld until customers were placed in jobs that they retained for 30 days or more. This meant
that career centers had to wait at least 90 days after incurring cost before getting reimbursed. For
nonprofits like TWP’s fiscal agent JVS, this system contributed to potentially serious cash-flow
problems. In response to these trends, TWP instituted a variety of adjustments to how it
structured its management and employment brokering services. TWP re-organized its primary
work teams while maintaining a cross-functional team approach. During its annual site visit
presentation in December 2000, TWP noted that the shift to categorical funding had compelled
TWP to restructure its staffing configuration away from its previously flat and flexible cross-
                                                
173 Related to this effort, TWP established a fully functioning satellite center in South Boston that was funded
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functional team alignment to one of layered specialists. Nevertheless, TWP insisted on
addressing the needs of welfare customers while still practicing universal access and CQI team
processes.174 TWP redesigned services to include a twenty-hour per week structured job search
component and job search services at local welfare offices. TWP also added assessment and
referral services.  So as not to have the two services become competitive, both activities were
combined into a single team. The team met weekly, coordinated activities, and conferred on
individual cases to try and provide the most appropriate services for individual needs.
The changing funding structure of the career centers has also challenged TWP’s efforts to
concentrate resources on its employer customers as its priority customer. The increased focus on
services to categorical job seekers, and the performance standards that connect funding to
placement outcomes, resulted in an increased role for job developers at TWP. One consequence
was that two teams would be working with employers: job developers, working on behalf of job-
seekers, and account representatives, for whom the employer is customer. TWP was “concerned
that this would cause confusion and dilute our commitment to employers to provide a single
point of contact, and to treat them as a priority customer.”175 To protect its priority service
commitment to employers, TWP modified the process it had established for employer account
representatives, and identified elements of that process that could apply to or be adapted for the
                                                                                                                                                            
Boston’s Neighborhood Jobs Trust.
174 After examining customer flow, job placement, and post-placement services, TWP determined that three welfare
related categorical funding streams (i.e., Direct Placement, Welfare to Work, Post-Placement) had given rise to three
case management systems. That is, one welfare customer could have three TWP case managers. Consequently, TWP
convened a CQI team that studied the issue and drafted a “fishbone diagram” illustrating areas of overlap as well as
potential gaps in service. Based on the analysis, TWP revised its process so that there was one point of entry for
customers and a “cradle to grave” case management approach, reducing the number of “hand-offs” in the customer
flow and related opportunities for customers to “fall between the cracks.”
175 The Work Place, Business Plan Update, Charter Review FY2000, page 8.
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job development process.176 Even as it adapted its processes related to employer services in
response to increased categorical funding demands, TWP stated that it remained committed to its
employer-focused approach to labor exchange, and that
In spite of this fundamental structural shift, the organization retains a focus on quality,
customer service and choice, teams are still the primary functional unit, staff
development is a priority, CQI is integral to the organization’s way of doing business,
data is mined regularly to inform business strategy, product development and
improvement, and the organization maintains ‘an intense commitment to the employer as
customer.177
TWP used its strong relationships with employers in adapting the changing demands associated
with welfare reform and categorical funding. For example, near the peak of the economic boom,
Logan Airport faced acute labor shortages, especially during its peak business travel times of
early morning and early evening. In TWP’s first experience brokering a large number of
employment interviews between a major airline and welfare-to-work customers, many of the job-
seekers were offered employment. However, about half-a-dozen people rejected the job offers.
TWP contacted the welfare recipients and learned that they turned down the jobs because the
employer required that the workers be available at all times to work. Subsequently, TWP worked
with both its employer and its job-seeker customers to develop more compatible scheduling
options. Moreover, many welfare recipients with young children were limited in their
employment options because the mothers depended on childcare services usually offered during
standard working hours. TWP’s Transitional Services Group and Business Services Group joined
together to persuade MassPort to assist a daycare provider in setting up “non-standard hours”
daycare at Logan Airport. According to TWP,
                                                
176 For example, if the first contact with an employer was for job development, TWP collected the same information
about the employer that it would have collected if it had opened an employer account. The job developer then
informed the employer of the full range of services available at The Work Place, and stored the employer
information in the same database used for employer accounts.
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Access to daycare at the airport which provides services during the “peak travel/peak job
start” hours will go a long way to solving two problems. The employers at Massport will
be able to tap into a large pool of prospective employees who could not consider an
airport job without this service. Our TAFDC job seekers will have the services necessary
to take advantage of opportunities at the airport. A Win-Win situation!178
 As the Massport example illustrates, TWP’s established relationships with employers enabled
TWP to not only connect welfare recipients to job opportunities, but to also broker arrangements
that were mutually beneficial to employers and workers.
Data Analysis and CQI in the Strategic Planning Process
Alongside its commitment to employer services was TWP’s organizational priority on data-
informed strategic planning. According to TWP,
Strategic planning is critical to the success of any business, but it is especially important
to career centers, which operate in an environment where political and funding priorities,
labor market dynamics, and economic trends can fluctuate quickly and without notice.
We must be able to recognize these environmental factors, understand both the
opportunities they offer and the threats they impose, and respond to them in ways that
take the fullest advantage of the opportunities while minimizing the threats. To do this,
we must practice strategic planning and strategic thinking, not as annual or biannual
events, but as a way of conducting our business on an ongoing basis.179
One of the key mechanisms used by TWP for strategic planning continued to be information-
intensive and team-based CQI processes.180 To support its knowledge-based CQI processes and
strategic planning, TWP continued to develop its information technology capacities. In 1999,
job-seeker and employer databases were integrated to yield better information about the labor
                                                                                                                                                            
177 The Work Place Progress Report, Site Visit & Performance Summary, Charter Review FY’01, p 40.
178 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 15.
179 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, p. 6.
180 In its first two years (1996-1997), TWP leadership used input from the whole staff to create two sets of teams to
work on issues such as talent bank development, web site development, and data integrity. The dual strategy was to
address the issue and to provide CQI training in methods and techniques. Beginning in 1998 and increasingly in
1999 and 2000, CQI teams developed in response to a particular “opportunity for improvement” identified by any
individual on staff. The quality coach then guided selection of team members to assure the required skills and cross-
functional perspective was represented, and established a charter (i.e., outcomes desired, timeline, definition of
limits of authority and spending); and provided technical assistance.
182
matching process. TWP also developed a new, Microsoft Access-based case management system
as a substitute for the non-Y2K compliant system used by Boston’s career centers.181 Along with
its information systems, TWP continued to invest in data collection, particularly about placement
and retention.182 In addition to collecting data about job-seekers, TWP continued to gather
information from employers by emailing or faxing surveys of outcomes and satisfaction, and,
when not returned, making follow-up phone calls.
Employer Services in a Tight Labor Market
In 1999, TWP’s used CQI to respond to employer demand during the tight labor market.  TWP
polled employers and found that they wanted higher-skilled people, and were willing to pay for
recruitment. So, TWP reformulated this employer need into a strategic priority to increase
TWP’s market share of higher-skilled job seekers. TWP identified a “mis-match” between the
generally lower skill levels of its job-seeker populations and the desire among employers for
higher skilled workers. In its fiscal year 2001 Business Plan (page 8), TWP stated that
“employers are satisfied with our referrals for their entry level and lower skilled positions, and
are ready to increase their business with us if we could produce the referrals,” and “employers
are willing to pay for the recruitment of these employees, so an opportunity clearly exists as long
as the economy stays strong and labor shortages continue to exist.” However, like the other
                                                
181 With DET’s approval, TWP developed the new software application rather than adopt an alternative scaled-down
version of DET’s employment services system—Job Service Matching System (JSMS)—because TWP considered
the state’s system a “retreat from a knowledge-based case management system to a simple tracking and reporting
system that would have resulted in a 90 percent loss of the organization’s knowledge base.” Although TWP offered
its software for free to other career centers, none adopted it; leaving TWP as the only center in the Commonwealth
that did not use DET’s JSMS. Both JSMS and TWP’s software application were interim measures until DET’s new
career center  system MOSES was implemented in July 2000.
182 TWP contracted with a private company to make follow-up phone calls to those job centers -seekers who stopped
using services. For TWP, the telephone survey was effective in documenting successful job placements, but
expensive as each completed call cost $16. Despite the expense, TWP determined that the quarterly placement data
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career centers, TWP had mixed success in engaging with skilled job-seekers because there were
almost no public resources to do so. Moreover, many of these “high-end” customers tended to be
self-directed in that they preferred to use resource room resources independently. Although
categorical funding had directed TWP staff attention towards lower-skilled customers, TWP
made engaging job-seekers with professional, managerial, and technical backgrounds a strategic
priority in 1999 and 2000. According to TWP, “expanding our market share in this segment of
our business would satisfy an immediate customer need. In addition, it would position us to
continue to provide valuable services to employer customers when the economy softens.”183
Although primarily a response to employer demand, TWP’s increased services for higher skilled
job-seekers was also an opportunity to generate more fee-based revenue from the higher skilled
and often employed job-seekers themselves. According to  TWP, “we believe professional,
managerial and technical job seekers represent a significant source of untapped income.
Although our fee services to job seekers have grown steadily since we opened in 1996, they
continue to represent an insignificant portion of our total income (less than 1 percent). In fact
less than 2 percent of our job-seeking customers purchased fee services in FY 1999.”184 As a
result, a related strategic priority was to increase fee income from non-categorical customers. To
address these strategic priorities, TWP conducted labor market analyses to identify job positions
in high demand by employers and career services desired and valued by high skilled workers.
TWP also explored the potential labor pools represented by incumbent workers most likely to
                                                                                                                                                            
and customer service feedback information was so worthwhile that it increased its budget for the calls from $10,000
in fiscal year 1999, to $20,000 in fiscal year 2000.
183 The Work Place Career Center FY2001 Charter Review Process Progress Report, p. 3.
184 The Work Place Career Center FY2001 Charter Review Process Progress Report, p. 3.
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change jobs, graduating college and vocational school students, and “hidden” labor pools (e.g.,
older workers, people with disabilities).
As part of its strategy to attract more skilled job-seekers, TWP developed a variety of initiatives
including increasing the collaboration between its Career Services and Employer Services teams;
experimenting with providing services to new college graduates;185 revamping its website to
appeal to “higher-end” users;186 enhancing its services with new and evening offerings;
improving its resource room’s hardware, software, and staffing; and pursuing older workers as
an “untapped labor pool” with skills and employment experience.187
In addition to recruiting and servicing higher skill job-seekers in order to meet employer
demand, TWP also initiated several efforts to directly provide competitive services to employers.
Inspired by the exuberant entrepreneurialism of the robust economy, TWP decided to venture
deeper into the world of commerce. Although it already considered itself entrepreneurial, TWP
determined that it could act more business-like in the pursuit of fee-based opportunities. Strong
demand by employers for its fee and other services persuaded TWP that it could generate more
revenue if TWP acted even more entrepreneurial. According to TWP,
                                                
185 In its FY2001 Business Plan (page 10), TWP stated “with the economy being what it is, and the need for
employees with raw skills, talent and education, our efforts to work with these institutions is in line with the
demands of the current economy.”  TWP worked with a number of two- and four-year colleges (e.g., Bunker Hill
Community College, Roxbury Community College, Northeastern University, Simmons, and Wheelock) to offer
“one-stop” placement services to graduates. TWP found that it was able  to “increase the number of higher level job-
seekers in our customer base and provide more appropriate references to our employer customers” (FY2002 Charter
Review Progress Report, page 5). The result was that the number of job-seekers with some college increased from
1,335 in 1999 to 1,694 in 2000, and TWP’s overall placement rate increased by 10 percent from fiscal year 1999 to
fiscal year 2000.
186 TWP’s re-designed website was launched in August 2000, and was the most sophisticated career center website
in the Commonwealth according to the Boston REB at the time.
187 TWP developed several services for older workers, including a November 1999 fee-based panel discussion
attended by 40 older job-seekers customers and featuring employers of older workers.
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We acknowledged that we, as many other non-profits, tacitly felt as though we couldn’t
truly compete with private businesses. We recognized that it takes a certain amount of
entrepreneurial spirit, competition and risk to run like a business. The spirit and risk-
taking attitude had certainly existed at The Work Place, but for some reason we had not
been able to grasp the true meaning and market value of employer services.188
As the first step to strengthening its entrepreneurial orientation, TWP changed the name of
Employer Services to Business Development. This began a “trend toward better clarification”
that opened up the “opportunity to be creative.”189 Soon after initiating its Business Development
Department, TWP launched “Corporate Partnership,” a fee-based membership program that
entitled employer members to discounts and special TWP services.190 Corporate Partnership was
partially inspired by the popularity among businesses of developing strategic partnerships,
alliances, and networks; and by TWP’s market research showing that corporate partnership
represented a multi-billing dollar industry. As noted by TWP,
The idea of Corporate Partnership has recently been widely written about and seemed
like a reasonable way to parlay our knowledge of the labor market and our labor
exchange function into fee-based services…We could learn to act more like a business by
actually working more closely with them. In turn, the employer could take advantage of
our connections to the community and reach different labor pools to fulfill their hiring
needs.191
Corporate Partnership was an experiment in developing relationships and business services,
though not necessarily derived from the actual membership fees because the fee charged was “so
nominal in comparison to the amount of money [Corporate Partners] pour into advertising.”192
To launch and market Corporate Partners, TWP held a Masquerade Ball in November 2000
                                                
188 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 17.
189 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 17.
190 For an annual fee of $200, Corporate Partners received: discounts on all TWP fee services (e.g., job
fairs/recruitment sessions, workshops); a biannual newsletter; and advertising access on TWP website. TWP also
conducted a needs analysis of each Partner’s major staffing and workforce development issues so that customized
services could be offered.  In 2000, TWP had 22 Corporate Partners, mostly representing large employers as well as
several temporary staffing agencies.
191 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 17.
192 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 17.
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complete with food, dance lessons, palm readers, as well as newly produced TWP promotional
materials. Corporate Partnership members did indeed buy more fee-based services, as well as
provide TWP with valuable customer feedback and labor market monitoring information.
In addition to the fee and free services it provided employers as part of its ongoing employment
brokering, TWP’s most extensive interaction with employers occurred through its job fairs. The
largest job fairs were contracted by Massport. In March 1999, TWP held its fourth MassPort job
fair in two and a half years for businesses at Logan Airport. This job fair attracted 1004 job-
seekers—up from 552 job-seekers at the first MassPort job fair in 1997—of whom 19 percent
were hired.193 In addition to its MassPort job fairs, TWP contracted to organize customized job
fairs for specific industry sectors such as finance, hospitality, and transportation (e.g.,
Metropolitan Boston Transit Authority).194
In an example of TWP’s efforts to respond demand for workers and to explore hidden labor
pools, TWP arranged for a job fair at the Suffolk County House of Corrections in summer of
2000. According to TWP, “employers in this economy who are in desperate need of entry-level
workers are also opening their doors to this untapped labor pool.”195 Eight companies
participated in the job fair that occurred in the prison with inmates in preparation for release.196
Several inmates were hired upon release based on contacts made during the job fair, and another
15 ex-offenders followed up at TWP. TWP began talking with employers in 1999 about such an
                                                
193 Of those hired at the 1999 MassPort job fair, 28 percent were from Logan Airport’s “impacted” communities.
194 TWP also conducted fee-based “recruitment sessions” at employer sites. In 2000, TWP conducted 12 on-site
recruitment sessions.
195 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 11.
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event, and worked with prison officials to provide a tour and information about the prison and its
programs to assuage employer fears. According to TWP, “we have worked hard to educate and
inform the employer population about this group of customers…the added value of specific skills
gained through this program, the demystification of the general population’s stigma, and the
partnering promise of support and assistance through the process of hire are safeguards that
allow the employer to ‘take a chance’ on this population.”197
Temp Agency Connections in a Tight Labor Market
During the tight labor market, temp agencies increasingly called upon the career centers for
referrals and possible fee-sharing relationships. As previously noted, all three centers were
involved in PIC attempts to coordinate and standardize any fee arrangements. While both BCL
and JN went along with those plans, TWP decided to more aggressively pursue the temp agency
overtures. According to Ford, “we are all part of the labor exchange industry and they see us as
helping to improve their image…and helping to form strategic alliances amongst
themselves…for economies of scale.”198 Ford stated that temp and temp to perm were
increasingly legitimate forms of employment, and that, TWP itself hired several of their
employees first as temp to perm. TWP also wanted to explore temp to perm as a possible TWP
service. Seeing temp agencies as potential customers and partners, TWP arranged for competing
temporary agencies to sit down together – a first time event— and to help TWP design new fee-
based services. The agencies then paid for these services, such as a job fair at which many
temporary agencies participated. According to Ford, TWP’s efforts were partially undermined
                                                                                                                                                            
196 Participating employers included Clark Construction Corporation, Bovis Lend Lease, Hilton at Logan Airport,
New England Apparel, City of Boston, and the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority.
197 The Work Place FY 2001 Business Plan, page 10.
198 Personal interview with Tom Ford, May 11, 2001.
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because it had to wait on the PIC process to finalize standard fee arrangements. However,
according to PIC staff, the PIC proceeded carefully due to concerns about the temp industry’s
overall bad reputation and due to the PIC’s interest in developing high quality services for career
center customers.  Partly due to the PIC’s caution, the development process took a year to
complete. By then, in late 2000, the temp agencies had “gone elsewhere” as the labor market
started to loosen. Nevertheless, TWP maintained its own relationships with some temp agencies
and these became “good” TWP customers. According to TWP’s business services manager,
several temp agencies were supportive of TWP and participated in focus groups and job fairs, as
well as “spent lots of money” at TWP on recruitment and special mailings. TWP developed such
strong working ties to some temp agency staff that they frequently discussed labor market trends
on the phone or over lunch.
Focus on Fee-Base Revenue
During 1999 and 2000, a major focus of TWP was on the development of fee-based income,
which had been steadily increasing. Fee income was one percent of total revenue in fiscal year
1998, and increased more than four fold to five percent of total revenues in fiscal year 1999.199
TWP’s most successful product line was job fair services which brought in 80 percent of total
fee-based employer services. Based on its research, TWP determined that it needed to
continually refine and market its job fairs and other fee-based services. One result of this was the
launching of TWP’s Corporate Partners program, in which employers paid different fees
corresponding to different levels of membership that entitled the employers to “enhanced”
services and recruitment.
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Populations and Placements
The general trends of welfare reform and a tight labor market contributed to shifting TWP’s job-
seeker customer base resulting in more customers with low educational attainment and fewer
customers with high educational attainment.200 The movement toward categorical customers
resulted in an increase in the percentage of customers with a high school diploma or less, from
30 percent in fiscal year 1998 to 43 percent and 47 percent in fiscal years 1999 and 2000,
respectively (See Appendix Table 8). Correspondingly, TWP had fewer customers with high
education and skills due to the tight labor market—which made it easier for people to find jobs
using sources other than career centers—and due to TWP’s move away from the financial district
in early 2000—which had provided TWP with close access to many working professionals. The
percentage of TWP’s customers with a bachelor or advanced degree declined from 45 percent in
fiscal year 1998 to 34 percent in fiscal year 1999. This percentage further declined to 26 percent
in fiscal year 2000—after TWP moved away from the financial district halfway through fiscal
year 2000. Overall, TWP had fewer customers with any college education during 1999 and 2000.
TWP’s percentage of customers with any college education declined from 70 percent in fiscal
year 1998 to 53 percent in fiscal year 2000.
During 1999 and 2000, TWP had fewer customers with high educational attainment looking for
employment, but more employer customers looking for workers. More employers used TWP
services in 1999 and 2000 than in the previous years. For example, TWP opened 173 new
employer accounts in the second quarter of fiscal year 1999 as compared to 71 new accounts
                                                                                                                                                            
199 Fee-based revenue grew from $18,000 in FY ‘98 to $81,509 in FY ‘99.  Most of the increase was due to
employer fee income rising from $6,750 in FY ‘98 to $68,014 in FY ‘99.
200 At the same time, the linguistic minority population increased from about 21 percent in 1998 to 26 percent.
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opened in the second quarter of fiscal year 2000. TWP opened a total of 544 employer accounts
in fiscal years 1999 and 2000. Of these, 396 or 73 percent were repeat customers.
The shift in the composition of its job-seeker customer base towards less educated workers and
the increased employer demand for higher skilled workers partially contributed to lower
placement rates in 1999. TWP’s placement rate declined from 28 percent in fiscal year 1998 to
24 percent in fiscal year 1999 (See Appendix Table 4). TWP was the only career center to post
decreases in both its placement rate and its placement numbers in fiscal year 1999. TWP had 20
percent fewer placements in 1999 than 1998 (See Appendix Table 5). In fiscal year 1999, 1,045
job-seekers were referred to jobs and 495 of them were placed in jobs, while in fiscal year 1998,
1,024 job-seekers were referred to jobs and 621 were placed.
While the number of TWP’s placements decreased by 20 percent between 1998 and 1999, TWP
actually increased by 30 percent the number of referrals it made in response to employer job
postings. In fiscal year 1999, TWP responded to 638 job postings with referrals, while in fiscal
year 1998 it responded to 489 job postings.201 So, although TWP increased its referrals responses
to employer job postings, it actually had fewer placements. This is likely due to the “mis-match”
TWP identified between increased employer demand for higher skilled workers and the available
labor pool at TWP that was increasingly comprised by workers without high skills and
education. This tendency is similarly reflected in TWP’s determination that more of its job-
seekers required additional education and training. TWP’s referrals to education and training
programs increased 105 percent from 246 in 1998 to 505 in 1999.  And, while 67 percent (164)
                                                
201 These job posting numbers and referrals do not include job positions and applications at job fairs.
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of referrals entered education and training programs in 1998, some 89 percent (450) of referrals
entered programs in 1999.
By the end of fiscal year 2000, TWP’s placement rate increased to 33 percent from 24 percent in
fiscal year 1999 (See Appendix Table 4). There are several explanations for this. One
contributing factor is that TWP experienced a decline in job-seekers at the same time that it
increased its employer activities. In fact, TWP had the largest decline in job-seeker volume
among the centers, falling 37 percent as compared to 34 percent at JobNet and 17 percent at
BCL. At the same time, TWP continued to expand the number and types of employer services  in
2000. For example, TWP opened 475 employer accounts and posted 849 job positions in fiscal
year 2000, as compared to 371 accounts and 800 positions in fiscal year 1999 (See Appendix
Table 6). Another contributing factor is that TWP also reorganized its customer engagement
process, particularly regarding welfare to work customers. While TWP failed to meet its DTA
contract goals in fiscal year 1999, TWP performed at 125 percent of its contract goals in fiscal
year 2000. In addition, by doubling its budget for contracted telephone follow-up of customers
from $10,000 in fiscal year 1999 to $20,000 in fiscal year 2000, TWP collected more data about
successful placements.
Summary
During 1999 and 2000, TWP’s operations were affected by the external factors of increased
categorical funding (i.e., welfare reform) and a tight labor market, as well as by TWP’s internal
efforts involving restructured services, expanded employer activities, data collection, and a
continued reliance on CQI processes.
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The implementation of welfare reform and the concomitant rise of categorical funding
challenged TWP’s emphasis on customer choice and universal service. TWP initially resisted
reallocating its staffing resources to accommodate the requirements and expectations associated
with providing specialized services to welfare customers. For example, TWP did not join the
other career centers in their decision to provide dedicated staff at DTA offices. At the same time,
TWP did not have similar levels of personal and organizational relationships with DTA or with
the many community-based organizations that provided specialized services to DTA and other
categorical customers. One of the consequences of these factors is that, unlike the other career
centers, TWP failed to meet its DTA contract goals in the first full year of welfare reform.
Also, because employer customers were TWP’s strategic priority, TWP tended to over-
emphasize services to employers at the expense of services to job-seekers. While TWP
significantly increased its income from employer fee-based services between 1998 and 1999,
TWP’s placement rate declined from 28 percent to 24 percent. However, during the very low
unemployment period in 2000, TWP increased employer fee-based revenue as well as rebounded
its placements from 24 percent in 1999 to 33 percent in 2000.
After reviewing its mixed results for 1999, TWP used CQI processes to strategically restructure
its staffing resources in order to address its new funding environment. TWP also worked harder
to cultivate stronger relationships with DTA offices and other government and community
organizations. While TWP did not have BCL’s or JN’s embedded connections to partner
organizations based in disadvantaged neighborhoods with access to categorical customers and
expertise, TWP attempted to compensate by creating its own satellite “mini” career center” in a
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South Boston low-income neighborhood. In addition, TWP used its move to a new location in
January 2000 to re-design service delivery and to better integrate its business services and career
services. By the end of fiscal year 2000, these efforts helped TWP to increase its placement rates,
to exceed DTA contract goals, and to continue enhancing and deepening its relationships with
employer customers.
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JobNet
In comparison to BCL and TWP, JobNet’s bureaucratic predisposition and Employment Services
orientation made welfare reform implementation and the concomitant shift to categorical funding
less of a challenge. At the same time, JobNet was challenged in developing relationships with
community-based organizations that were important for accessing categorical customers and the
specialized support services they often required. Regarding the tight labor market, JobNet
continued to be challenged in providing services to employers beyond its established role as a
place for job postings that satisfied federal employment opportunity notification criteria.
Nevertheless, this institutionalized relationship with employers offered JN a large base of job
positions with which to try and place it large customer base of disadvantaged populations. As a
result, JobNet’s biggest challenges during 1999 and 2000 involved fashioning a partnership with
ABCD and restructuring its information systems.
Planning and Practice
Stability Amidst Change
Like BCL and TWP, JobNet experienced external pressures on its operations due to welfare
reform implementation and a tight labor market. However, JobNet was also challenged by
internal issues resulting from integrating a new operating partner and adopting new information
technology systems. According to JobNet, “the difficulties of a unified management structure are
apparent given the differences in staff compensation, approach to work and restrictions imposed
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by merit pay regulations.”202 Chief among the differences between ABCD and JobNet was that
while both had bureaucratized personnel procedures, many JobNet staff operated under union-
based state-level Employment Service rules. As a result, one of the JN’s main issues in 1999 was
developing the processes and procedures for ABCD to become a co-operator with DET.
According to the REB’s January 2000 charter review site visit report,
merging of organizational cultures has proven to be challenging. Having acquired a
partner, JobNet needed to establish a partnership. In order to deal effectively with
significant differences in operational processes, organizational structure, reporting
relationships, etc., all parties had to reexamine their perceptions and priorities and work
on compromises for common goals.203
One example of organizational differences between JobNet and ABCD was that salary levels and
related benefits for positions with similar job titles were significantly lower for ABCD than for
JobNet. Initially, these differences contributed to tension and confusion among staff, highlighted
distinctions in organizational approaches and loyalty, and generally undermined team-based
efforts. After nearly a year of negotiations between DET and ABCD, the organizations were able
to develop new job classifications appropriate to the functional roles of JobNet staff and to the
classification structure at ABCD.
To address the issues associated with including ABCD in JobNet’s operations, JobNet created a
“JobNet/ABCD Operations Group” that was comprised of JobNet’s director and its learning
organization specialist, and of ABCD’s education and training director and its LearningWorks
program director. However, rather than collaborative co-ownership, the relationship between
JobNet and ABCD was mostly characterized by coordination. The operations group met monthly
to coordinate service delivery, review initiatives, promote operational directions and ensure that
                                                
202 FY2000 Charter Review Process, Progress Report, page 5.
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strategies were “effectively communicated.” As a monthly meeting, the operations group did not
provide ABCD with ample opportunity to be involved in daily administration. Indeed, ABCD
was not involved in day-to-day management.204 Instead, ABCD’s participated in monthly
meetings as much to help JobNet with  program planning and review as well as to help ABCD
pursue its own interests. For example, consistent with its interests in applying for and managing
grants, ABCD successfully partnered with JobNet in receiving a grant to provide post placement
services to welfare recipients.205
Reaching out to Neighborhoods
For JobNet, one of the reasons that ABCD was selected as a partner was for its extensive
network of neighborhood organizations. Indeed, bringing in ABCD as a partner was associated
with one of JN’s strategic goals for fiscal year 2001 to “initiate expansion of JobNet’s scope of
service delivery to Boston neighborhoods and community based organizations.”206  However,
stabilizing its operating collaboration with ABCD took longer than anticipated—nearly a full
year—and delayed JobNet’s cultivation of ABCD’s relationships with community organizations.
According to the REB’s January 2001 site visit report regarding JobNet’s operations in 2000,
challenges facing its organizational growth and development has shifted from structural
and managerial instability to tasks of solidifying interagency partnerships and ensuring
quality performance. Put otherwise, its focus has needed to become more external,
building new alliances and partnerships with community based organizations and
                                                                                                                                                            
203 Charter Review FY ’01, Progress Report, Site Visit Summary, p. 1.
204 Day-to-day management of JobNet is provided by a four-member senior management team comprised of
JobNet’s director, learning organization specialist (Chief of Operations), Business Services Manager, and Branch
Office Manager.
205 Through the “Building Futures” project, the organizations collaborated offering a broad range of supports
including daycare, housing, utilities, transportation, as well as life and career planning counseling around issues of
personal money management, household budgeting, training and education, and career succession (including temp
to hire positions.
206 Charter Review FY ’00, JobNet Business Plan, p. 12.
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employers in order to identify opportunities for growth in the external environment that
did not exclusively depend on DET’s historical liaisons.207
As part of the effort to extend its relationships beyond DET and into neighborhoods, JobNet
planned in 2000 to develop an Advisory Group with representatives from state agencies,
community based organizations, organized labor, and selected industry sections and interest
groups.208 However, JN did not convene the Advisory Council due to “growing pains” in its
partnership with ABCD. Instead it developed an expanded “Governance Board” (i.e., JobNet and
ABCD) that included a few representatives of community based organizations and private sector
representatives.  The board met periodically to review broad policies and issues and to provide
feedback to the overall operation.209  JobNet’s lack of success with its Advisory Group
highlighted its inexperience and continuing ambivalence with having participatory board
oversight.210 Because it did not have an active board representing diverse and external
community-based interests, JobNet had relied on its DET-inherited, contract-based, relatively
weak relationships to neighborhood nonprofit organizations. Consequently, JobNet looked to
ABCD to strengthen its access to community organizations.
As a first step, JobNet conducted outreach to ABCD’s Neighborhood Service Centers, as well as
set up a satellite office at ABCD’s Learning Works in downtown Boston. Using that satellite as a
model, ABCD and JN planned to offer services at four ABCD offices in Dorchester, Parker Hill,
                                                
207 Charter Review Report FY’02, JobNet Progress Report, Site Visit & Strategic Plan Summary, p 1.
208 JobNet’s plan for the Advisory Council included representatives from the Boston Housing Authority. Department
of Education, financial services, health care, youth community, higher education, hospitality/tourism, health and
human services, telecommunications, and construction.
209 Charter Review Report FY’02, JobNet Progress Report, Site Visit & Strategic Plan Summary, p 1.
210 During the first year of operation, JN’s board was comprised of a single representative from each partner
organization and functioned at a minimal level during the start-up phase of the career center. During the second
year, the two organizational representatives attended formal board training but then the partnership dissolved, and
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Fenway, and Roxbury. In following years, JobNet and ABCD planned to roll out similar services
in other neighborhoods. JobNet intended for the joint operation to provide broader awareness and
access by city residents to JN services and to increase community-based employer utilization.
However, according to ABCD, it did not fully welcome JobNet into its LearningWorks
operation. After its unsuccessful proposal to run a One-Stop Career Center, ABCD had
developed LearningWorks as an example that it could also deliver career center services.
Consequently, ABCD administered LearningWorks as a separate operation that utilized limited
services from JobNet.
Experiencing fewer opportunities to access neighborhood resources than it expected from
ABCD, JobNet fell back on its own well-established connections with government agencies. As
noted by the REB, “by virtue of having the Division of Employment and Training as its lead
agency, it brought historically strong relationships with the many agencies and entities with
which one-stop career centers have to partner and upon which they depend in order to conduct
their business.”211   As a result, JobNet had more success relying on its ties with DTA. JN
physically co-located at  DTA’s Newmarket Square office in Roxbury with a complete array of
core and employment services. According to JobNet,
the logistics of being physically located near inner city neighborhoods and community
based organizations provides an opportunity to interact with a variety of entities in
communities that are not accessible from the downtown office. This proximity to the
inner city is beneficial in enhancing JobNet’s connectivity to Boston’s neighborhoods
and supports one of our primary strategic objectives which is to increase neighborhood
access to JobNet’s services.212
                                                                                                                                                            
the center director was left without direct board oversight to reorganize operations. In the third year, the board had
one representative. In the fourth year, the board once again had two members when ABCD became a partner.
211 Charter Review Report FY’02, JobNet Progress Report, Site Visit & Strategic Plan Summary, p 8.
212 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 3.
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In addition to its relationship with ABCD and its links with DTA branch offices, JobNet also
formed “other alliances, partnerships, through letters of intent, endorsements and informal
agreements…these ‘partnerings’ have put us in touch with special populations served as well as
provided strengthened access and referral to JobNet customers.”213  JobNet’s “partnerings”
involved offering employment services, making referrals, and providing case management.214
Responding to Welfare Reform
Welfare reform implementation and the shift to categorical funding challenged JobNet, but to a
less degree and in slightly different ways than the other career centers. In some respects, the
tension between categorical and universal services had long been an issue for the Employment
Service. JobNet was able to draw on this ES experience to help balance competing demands and
expectations for services. According to JobNet, “the existence of a continuing flow of non-
categorical Wagner-Peyser customers has tempered the trend toward disparate specialization in
client categories.” 215  In addition, JobNet’s bureaucratic predisposition had already influenced
the structuring of its operations towards categorical division and reporting. As a result of
JobNet’s familiarity with categorical conditions and its organizational experiences, JobNet did
not perceive the shift to categorical funding as a radical transformation. Moreover, JobNet was
able to use its strong ties to DTA as a means to gain access to and deliver services to welfare
                                                
213 JobNet established relationships with organizations such as Operation Able, the Red Cross, Boston YMCA,
Boston Neighborhood Network, and Boston Housing Authority.
214 During 2000, JobNet staff increased their involvement in consortia involving the Job Training Alliance, the
BHA, the Suffolk County House of Correction, and the ABCD Work Pathways Program. For example, JobNet
Partnered with BHA to organize and participate in the Bromley Heath Community Happening and the South Boston
Community Event that brought together residents, employers, training vendors, and community organizations to
provide information and recruit participation in employment and training services.
215 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 10.
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recipients. JobNet established a satellite office at a local DTA office and made regular staff visits
to several other welfare offices.
However, JobNet’s focused interest in targeting welfare recipients taxed the organization’s
resources and diminished its performance due to the increased demands associated with welfare
reform. The most pressing issue for JobNet was that Structured Job Services (SJS) required by
welfare reform was very labor intensive and required significant amounts of staff time in the
delivery and documentation of SJS activities.216 Not only did SJS require extra time and services,
but it was also stressful for JobNet’s staff. According to a JobNet 1998 memo:
The difficulties of working with individuals with multiple barriers to employment, the
psychological pressure on clients facing cessation of benefits, and the issues faced by
DTA staff and management with regard to the responsibility of having to make life
changing decisions all exacerbate the performance problems.217
For JobNet, the time required in the delivery of SJS services was compounded by the efforts
involved in collecting and managing information.218 It was largely due to SJS and the demands
of welfare reform that influenced JobNet’s information systems strategies. Transitioning to
DET’s information management system provided better compatibility with the DTA system than
the former Career Center systems. Requesting data entry equipment from DET at three DTA
sites reduced data collection time and increased time for service delivery. As a result, JobNet
requested and implemented new data collection procedures and training from DET as a way to
improve JobNet’s reports to state agencies as well as JobNet’s placement rates.
                                                
216 Massachusetts’ version of welfare reform involved requiring welfare recipients to participate in a Structured Job
Search (SJS) program with a minimum of 20 hours devoted to employment services and search activities.
217 Corrective Action Plan—DTA Placement Program, JobNet Career Center. December 31, 1998. Page 2. Charter
Review Report Fiscal Year 2000.
218 DTA required that each client case contain the following list of documents: membership form, career action plan,
cover letter, talent bank form, sample application, transportation form, case notes, ESP-7s, job leads, data entry
forms, ad hoc letters (banks, referral to support services, etc.), and summary evaluation forms.
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“Boutiques of Services”
For JobNet, adapting to welfare reform and categorical funding also involved increasingly
bureaucratic formal and informal processes. At the same time, JobNet acknowledged that the
overall trend of categorical funding threatened integrated staffing services. Like the other career
centers, JobNet reconciled the tension between universal and categorical services within the
context of its organizational orientation. For JobNet, this meant emphasizing bureaucratic
specialization while accommodating generalist flexibility.
Bureaucratic functionalism was the dominant form of organizational structure and regulatory
control at JobNet. According to JobNet,
staff are organized by categorical and targeted programs and functions as
specialists…Within the center, staff are also organized into a number of ongoing teams
grouped by program function…The purpose of the teams is to assist team members to
stay current with procedures, processes, and program regulations and to effectively work
toward continuous quality improvement in their respective content areas. 219
So as to minimize its bureaucratic legacy, JobNet referred to its categorical divisions as
“boutiques of services.” More than a name change, the boutique concept was intended less to
convey the separateness of services than to focus on customized services to particular groups.
JobNet’s tendency toward bureaucratic control persisted through its various efforts to de-
emphasize this orientation.
JobNet was notable not only for its own bureaucratic tendencies but also for how easily it
internally accommodated other bureaucratic agencies. Several units and departments operating at
JobNet were not directly supervised under JobNet management. With the exception of Veterans’
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Services representatives rotating through all Boston centers, this situation was unique among the
Boston career centers. 220  For example, staff in the Job Corps Unit did not report directly to
JobNet’s director and did not get paid through JobNet’s funding allocations, yet they attended
general staff meetings, conducted center orientations, and participated in center-wide activities.
JobNet’s attempts to structure its internal processes around team-based approaches also
illustrated its tendencies toward hierarchical control.221 In an attempt to counter-act its
hierarchical tendencies and to communicate and promote whole team concepts, JobNet
selectively used CQI processes to develop cross-functional process improvement teams that
worked collaboratively. At the same time, JobNet used CQI to reinforce its DET-inherited legacy
of civil service and union-based staffing structural characteristics such as stability and seniority.
According to JobNet’s director, “staff longevity, collegiality, and professionalism” have
contributed to JobNet’s ability to provide quality services despite JobNet’s challenges. One
indicator of staff stability is that JobNet had the lowest staff turnover among the Boston career
centers, losing only three staff in its first three years. JobNet used several methods to support
staff cohesion and development.222 The REB observed that JobNet “valued employee
                                                                                                                                                            
219 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 2.
220 All three Boston career centers provided space to representatives of the Department of Veterans’ Services of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. However, these representatives were more integrated within JobNet’s operations
than the other centers. At JobNet, the representatives attended general staff meetings, participated in CQI teams, and
conducted basic skills assessments and career center orientations for new members. At the same time, they did not
report directly to the JobNet director and were not paid out of the center’s funding.
221 To manage its staff, JobNet developed organizing mechanisms such as “Whole Team” (full staff) and “Program
Team” (specialized groups or “boutiques”) meetings and processes.
222 JobNet used an Employee Performance Review System as a structured mechanism for communicating roles,
responsibilities and expectations regarding job duties and responsibilities. JobNet also used “Management by
Walking Around” as a less formal approach to gauge employee satisfaction and performance by “visiting” staff at
their workstations, after workshop delivery, and in break rooms to gather feedback on day-to-day issues and
suggestions. JobNet also conducted an annual retreat at the home of a staff person.  for the last two years.
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development as a vehicle to support work innovation, service quality and work satisfaction.”223
To this end, JobNet developed several standardized processes for staff development. Consistent
with its bureaucratic tendencies, JobNet’s internal staff development processes emphasized
procedures promoting stability, order, and control.224 Likewise, even JobNet’s CQI training
tended toward standardization. JobNet contracted for CQI training and certification.225
Prioritizing and Restructuring Information Systems
During 1999 and 2000, JobNet’s reliance on DET for its information technology services yielded
both advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, JobNet was able to better adapt to the
increased reporting requirements associated with welfare reform and categorical funding. JobNet
was also able to rely on DET for staff training in PC applications and systems technology as well
as to receive technical assistance from the Labor Exchange Operations (LEO) Department at the
DET for “setting up mechanisms and using appropriate instruments and analytical systems to
track and measure impact results.”226 On the other hand, JobNet was restricted by the limitations
of DET’s support for information systems.227 For example, JobNet fully converted to DET’s
automated data system Job Service Matching System (JSMS) from the Career Center data
                                                
223 Charter Review FY ’00, JobNet Business Plan, p. 8.
224 JobNet developed a structure for transitional development of a new staff member which is intended to provide the
new employee with growth experiences to achieve full proficiency (to deliver quality core services) within
approximately three months on the job. The structure includes: 1) Attending two Welcome to JobNet  Orientation
programs conducted by different experienced staff members; 2) Conducting Welcome to JobNet Orientation
monitored by experience staff; 3) Attending each of the “seven step” job search workshops listed on monthly
schedule; 4) Conducting at least one “seven step” workshop within first month of employment; 5) Achieving
proficiency in at least two workshops within three months; 6) Developing an area of specialty involving delivery of
services, enabling categorical services to be provided to at least three customers within the first three months.
225 Whereas BCL had hired private nonprofit consultants who specialized in CQI training for nonprofit social service
providers, JobNet contracted with a state agency department that specialized in providing CQI certification to state
agencies.  Also, unlike BCL, JobNet (like The Work Place) had “quality improvement” responsibilities assigned to a
senior management position.
226 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 4.
227 For example, in 2000, JobNet had to wait a year to have broken bar code readers repaired.
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system (IMS). The change consolidated a considerable amount of data collection, but JobNet still
had to do dual data entry for dislocated worker and adult skills training programs.
Due to JobNet’s dependence on DET, JobNet was deeply involved in the development and
implementation of a state-wide information system for career centers in 2000.228  According to
JobNet,
probably the single most significant event for the career center this past year has been the
transition from a variety of information management systems to a single data
management system MOSES—the Massachusetts One Stop Employment System. Since
implementation on July 5, 2000, the MOSES system has significantly impacted day to
day operations…We estimate that we are currently using about 30 to 40 percent of the
MOSES system potential and even at that level of utilization, MOSES is meeting the core
data needs of the center.229
Although JobNet was focused on adopting and restructuring its data collection and reporting
systems in accordance with DET’s state-wide career center technological overhaul, JobNet
remained challenged in its efforts to utilize information in support of its internal operations. The
REB observed that
the reporting and tracking mandates of the state still largely influence JobNet’s use of
data. As a result, there were data requested for this report that the organization could not
provide. JobNet does not yet appear to be using service data or other historical
information to identify trends or potential opportunities. While the organization
administers workshop evaluations, the data is used informally; not analyzed in a rigorous
way to improve services. The organization continues to conduct its monthly follow-up
mailing but has not yet tabulated the customer satisfaction feedback from this source.230
Regarding its use of information, JobNet’s continued to emphasize data collection for the
purposes of meeting the reporting requirements of government contracts and programs. So, while
                                                
228 The Commonwealth’s Division of Employment and Training launched a new management information system
(MIS) system, the Massachusetts One-Stop Employment System (MOSES) on July 1, 2000. While the system
accurately stored and reported demographic data, the system was initially less developed in its ability to produce
accurate volume and placement reports.
229 Charter Review FY ’02, JobNet Career Center Progress Report, p. 2.
230 Charter Review FY ’01, Progress Report, Site Visit Summary, p. 31
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it dedicated considerable resources to adopting and maintaining government-based information
systems for reporting purposes, JobNet was less attentive to conducting data analysis in support
of strategic planning or program diagnosis.
Limited Employer Services
Just as JobNet collected lots of data but conducted little analysis, JobNet also accumulated many
employer job postings but provided relatively few customized services. According to the REB,
“with the exception of the job fair held as part of its work with the Suffolk County House of
Corrections (a program that all centers participated in) it appears that JobNet has made little
progress in developing services to employers.”231 One reason for JobNet’s underdeveloped
services to employer is that JobNet had relatively passive and weak connections to employers.
In comparison to The Work Place that had developed varied levels of professional and peer
relationships with employers, JobNet’s relationships with employers tended to be distant and
perfunctory.  JobNet was even challenged in its efforts to identify and invite employers to
participate in meetings out of professional courtesy. According to the REB,
JobNet has lagged in its ability to understand and respond to the needs of employer
customers for services that extend beyond job postings. Its difficulty to develop a solid
employer customer base, despite significant staff effort, was most tellingly reflected in its
difficulty identifying employer customers it could refer to PIC-facilitated employer focus
groups.232
JobNet was aware of some of its limitations regarding employer relationships and services.
Indeed, one of the criteria that JobNet had listed for selecting a new partner was that the new
partner would have experience and relationships with employers to enhance JobNet’s services to
employer. ABCD was chosen as a partner partially because ABCD had a long history of
                                                
231 Charter Review Report FY’02, JobNet Progress Report, Site Visit & Strategic Plan Summary, p 7.
232 Charter Review Report FY’02, JobNet Progress Report, Site Visit & Strategic Plan Summary, p 1.
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involvement with employers as part of ABCD’s education and training programs. Initially,
JobNet and ABCD planned to consolidate their resources in order to strengthen services to
employers. JobNet stated in its business plan for fiscal year 2001 that, “through a focused and
coordinated effort, JobNet and ABCD job development staff and resources will be organized and
consolidated to function as one single unit.”233 The plan entailed using ABCD’s Learning Works
as a base of operations to support JobNet’s services to employers as well as services to a “variety
of departments/units throughout the larger ABCD organization.”234  The plan’s main objectives
were to “strategically increase involvement within the Greater Boston Business Community” and
to develop fee-based revenues. To implement the plan, a coordinator of Employer Services was
newly hired in 1999 and reported out of ABCD/Learning Works.  However, that person resigned
from the position in early 2000. So, JobNet lost not only its employer services link with ABCD,
but also a way to carry out its plan to improve employer services.235 Meanwhile, ABCD
continued to develop its own programs with employers.236
On its own, JobNet continued to emphasize procedural relationships with employers rather than
relationships focused on employer needs. According to JobNet,  “one important aspect of our
approach to quality service involves ‘the JobNet never have them guessing communication
strategy’ [original italics] this requires anticipating process intersections where an employer
could be left to guess what is going on.”237  JobNet’s interpretation of quality services to
                                                
233 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 5.
234 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 5.
235 A new employer services coordinator at Learning Works was hired in January 2001.
236 For example, in 1999 and 2000, ABCD organized 10 area banking institutions and the New England College of
Finance to provide training and employment opportunities to low income, inner city residents to enter banking jobs.
237 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 6.
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employers meant that employers could expect consistent and documented responses to job
postings. That is,
when an employer requests the posting of his/her employment opportunity they receive a
job posting form to complete and fax back to JobNet. After faxing the form to JobNet, the
employer may have to guess if in fact the form was received. To alleviate this guess-work
and instill customer service within the process, employers whose jobs are posted receive
a faxed Job Posting Confirmation Form that provides pertinent information enabling the
employer to locate and review his/her job posting.238
JobNet’s procedural emphasis regarding employer services persisted through 1999 and 2000.
One reason for this was related to JobNet’s historical and institutional connections to the old
“unemployment offices” and Employment Services. Due to this association, JobNet continued to
receive high numbers of job postings because employers had become accustomed to posting jobs
with those entities as a means of fulfilling federal employment notification requirements for
equal opportunity purposes. As a result, JobNet had inherited a reactive and passive relationship
with employers from the old Employment Service. JobNet struggled with this legacy as it
attempted to identify and treat employers as customers. According to JobNet in its progress
report about activities in 2000,
the Business Services Team has recognized the need for consistent and proactive
activities designed to recognize and promote the concept of ‘employer as customer.’ As a
result of this radical thinking, Business Services staff have taken steps to insure that
employers receive multiple contacts in the course of receiving core services.239
Yet, even as JobNet acknowledged that the “employer as customer” concept represented “radical
thinking” at JobNet, the center maintained an interpretation of customer service that emphasized
procedural consistency.240
                                                
238 Charter Review FY ’01, JobNet Business Plan, p. 6.
239 Charter Review FY ’02, JobNet Career Center Progress Report, p. 6.
240 JobNet’s procedurally consistent interpretation of customer service to employers emphasized the job posting
process. This process involved 1) sending a “Job Posting Confirmation Letter” within 48 hours after a employer
posted a job; 2) conducting a telephone follow-up call 14 and 30 days later to inquire about the status of the position;
3) if a position remained open two weeks after its posting, a JobNet staff person browsed the talent bank to identify
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JobNet’s ambivalence about developing customized employer services also extended to a
discomfort in generating fee-based revenue from services to employers. JobNet did not share The
Work Place’s perception that fee-based services to employers was a indicator of meeting
customer needs as well as strategic opportunity to diversify revenue. Neither did JobNet share
Boston Career Link’s approach of organizing employer fee-based job fairs as a means to
financially support its efforts targeting specialized job-seekers. Instead, JobNet decided to offer
job fairs but not charge employers because “to charge for this service without an adequate supply
of candidates may reap small benefit in the short term, yet adversely impact our reputation in the
long term.”241 There were several motivations behind the decision not to charge employers fees
for participating in job fairs. One reason JobNet did not charge fees was to minimize the costs to
employers of accessing JobNet’s job-seekers, many of whom were lower skilled. Another reason
was that by providing free job fairs, JobNet was held less accountable for job fair outcomes and
therefore less likely that employers would be disappointed in its services and less discouraged
from using its services in the future.
During 1999 and 2000, JobNet reported in its progress reports and strategic plans that it needed
to improve its employer services. Yet, despite its many plans, JobNet also acknowledged that it
usually did not follow-up and implement them. For example, JobNet stated that while a priority
had been the “enhancement of the labor exchange process,” the “necessary operational changes,
                                                                                                                                                            
potential candidates; 4) at the two week mark, a JobNet staff person would also advise the employer of JobNet’s On-
Site/Off-Site recruiting service where a JobNet recruiter actively recruited, screened, and referred candidates.
241 Charter Review FY ’02, JobNet Career Center Progress Report, p. 7.
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staff assignments or staff training relative to this priority have not yet been addressed.”242 JobNet
recognized that strengthening services to employers was not only immediately important in a
tight labor market, but that it was also necessary to improve its labor exchange because
“although the market economy remains robust, indicators are evident that major downsizing has
been set in motion.”243 By the end of 2000, the REB observed that JobNet once again expressed
an interest to end its “long struggle to develop a discrete set of services for employers” and to
“draw a line in the sand,” and that “this represents the organization’s full realization of a change
in role from a former state Employment Service office to a local career center that values the
employer as customer.”244  Despite JobNet’s self-awareness of its need to extend better services
to employers, such improvements would continue to lag compared to JobNet’s priorities of
developing services, procedures, and information systems focused on government-funded
categorical job-seekers.
Populations and Placements
In 1999 and 2000, JobNet served the largest percentage of job-seekers with the least educational
attainment. In fiscal year 1999, 70 percent of JobNet’s new job-seekers had a high school degree
or less, compared to 43 percent at TWP and 40 percent at BCL (See Appendix Table 8). With the
advancement of welfare reform and categorical funding, JobNet’s percentage of less educated
job-seekers increased. In fiscal year 2000, 75 percent of JobNet’s new job-seekers had a high
school degree or less, compared to 40 percent at BCL and 47 percent at TWP. JobNet also had
much higher percentages of disadvantaged job-seekers without high school degrees or
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243 JobNet Career Center, Business Plan, FY 2001, p. 12.
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equivalents. In 2000, high school drop-outs comprised 39 percent of JobNet’s customers
compared to 26 percent at TWP and 17 percent at BCL. JobNet also had significantly fewer job-
seekers with college degrees. In 2000, only 2 percent of JobNet’s job-seekers held a bachelors or
advanced degree compared with 33 percent at BCL and 26 percent at TWP.  While JobNet’s
percentage of linguistic minorities decreased from 33 percent in 1999 to 23 percent in 2000, it
continued to have the highest percentage among the career centers. JobNet also served 50
percent of all the unemployed job-seekers among the three career centers.
Historically, JobNet served the largest number of job-seekers among the career centers and had
the largest share of system volume (See Appendix Table 7). In 1999, JobNet served 40 percent of
all job-seekers at the three centers. JobNet served 56 percent more job-seekers than BCL in
1999, and 19 percent more than TWP in 1999. Even though the number of JobNet’s job-seekers
decreased 34 percent between 1999 and 2000 from 4458 to 2942, JobNet still served larger
numbers of job-seekers than the other career centers. In 2000, JobNet served approximately 24
percent more job-seekers than TWP or BCL.  The overall decrease in job-seeking customers
among career centers between 1999 and 2000 partially reflected when the unemployment rate
reached its lowest levels. During this time, the relative ease of finding jobs using other methods
meant that many people required less use of career center job search resources.
Even as job-seekers used career centers less, employers increased their utilization of career
centers during the tight labor market. At JobNet, new employer accounts increased from 358 in
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1999 to 1662 in 2000, and posted positions increased from 816 in 1999 to 2884 in 2000 (See
Appendix Table 6).245
JobNet’s job posting activity increased significantly between 1999 and 2000 as a result of the
tight labor market and JobNet’s focus on collecting and reporting data systems. JobNet was the
only Boston career center that totally converted to DET’s Job Service Matching System which
improved data entry of employer activity. In addition, it appeared JobNet “devoted minimal
resources to new business development, concentrating nearly all of its employer services
resources on posting new positions.”246 JobNet’s procedural emphasis on streamlining the job
posting process also contributed to the center’s majority share of officially reported job postings
among the career centers.247  In 2000, 72 percent of all jobs positions posted at Boston career
centers were posted at JobNet (See Appendix Table 6).
Corresponding to its higher numbers of job-seekers and posted positions, JobNet also had a high
number of actual job placements. While JobNet historically had higher placement numbers than
TWP, it was only in 2000 that JobNet surpassed BCL in the number of job placements (See
Appendix Table 5). During the very low unemployment period of 2000, JobNet was responsible
for nearly half of all placements among the centers. In 2000, JobNet had 128 percent more
placements than TWP, and 71 percent more placements than BCL.
                                                
245 JobNet’s relatively lower numbers of job postings in fiscal years 1997 and 1999 were mostly due to data
collection problems associated with installing and adopting new information systems.
246 Charter Review FY ’01, Progress Report, Site Visit Summary, p. 27
247 Official job postings were those entered into the career center data system. This approach tended to under-
represent job listings in venues where there was less formal data collection such as job fairs. For example, if job
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Interestingly, before JobNet’s significant increase in placement numbers in 2000, JobNet’s
placement rates during its first three years of operation were comparable to those of the old
Employment Service.248 Whereas the Employment Service averaged 20 percent placement rates,
JobNet’s initial placement rate was 15 percent in 1997, and remained at 21 percent for fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 (See Appendix Table 4). Indeed, until 2000, JobNet’s placement rate had
lagged behind both BCL and TWP.  However, between 1999 and 2000, JobNet’s placement rate
jumped 18 percentage points from 21 percent to 39 percent.
Several factors contributed to JobNet’s increased placement rate between 1999 and 2000. One
reason is that JobNet improved its data capture and information system processes. Another
reason is that as JobNet had fewer job-seekers and more employer customers and postings, it was
able to devote more resources to helping job-seekers get job placements. During the same time
that JobNet’s job-seeker population decreased by 34 percent, JobNet’s placement rate bounced
up 18 percentage points. According to the REB, “this decrease may have permitted the
organization to focus more intensively on its customer base; that it’s stunning increase in
placement rate occurred while its volume was decreasing significantly may not be entirely
coincidental.”249 A similar relationship seems evident at TWP, where, between 1999 and 2000,
the placement rate increased 9 percent during the time that the job-seeker population decreased
37 percent.
                                                                                                                                                            
positions offered at job fairs were counted in 1999, the total number of jobs listed with TWP was 1259 rather than
the official count of 800 posted positions.
248 Placement rates are calculated for unemployed job-seekers who used at least three career center services before
being hired. This method enabled career centers to benchmark their placement rates against the previous
Employment Service system, that had average placement rates of 20 percent.
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The relationship between higher placement rates and lower numbers of job-seekers is also
evidenced in a comparison between JobNet and BCL. BCL historically had significantly fewer
numbers of job-seekers and higher placement rates than the other centers. Compared to BCL in
1999, JobNet had 36 percent more job-seekers and a 110 percent lower placement rate.250
JobNet narrowed these differences in 2000. Compared to BCL in 2000, JobNet had 20 percent
more job-seekers and only a 2 percent lower placement rate. In 2000, as fewer numbers of job-
seekers used its services, JobNet was able to increase its reported placement rate. At the same
time, however, JobNet continued to have much higher numbers of disadvantaged job-seekers
than either BCL or TWP. As the REB noted about JobNet’s placement rate in 2000, “the
organization achieved a stunning improvement in its placement rate last year while continuing to
serve what may be the most challenging job seeking customer profile in the city in terms of
educational attainment, linguistic challenges, and labor force attachment.”251 Among the three
career centers in 1999 and 2000, JobNet had the largest number of job-seekers—and the most
disadvantaged job-seekers, the highest number of job postings, the highest number of
placements, and still managed to have the second highest placement rate.
Summary
Compared to the other career centers, JobNet reacted less directly to welfare reform and
categorical funding, and to the tight labor market. In some respects, JobNet was both more
resilient and less adaptive to these external conditions because of its Employment Services
legacy. During 1999 and 2000, JobNet was primarily occupied with developing a partnership
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250 Compared to TWP in 1999, BCL had 24 percent fewer job-seekers and a 83 percent higher placement rate.
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with ABCD and with integrating new information systems. After its fitful efforts in 1999 to
include ABCD as a “full partner” in running JobNet, ABCD settled into a “limited partner” role.
One aspect of this relationship was that ABCD tended to treat JobNet as one of ABCD’s many
contracted services and programs. As a consequence, JobNet was not strongly influenced by
ABCD and continued operating with an overall bureaucratic orientation. Although the attempts
to develop a partnership relationship were time-consuming and somewhat disruptive for JobNet
managers, JobNet remained organizationally stable.
In addition to not being a strong co-operator, the ABCD relationship also fell short for JobNet by
not providing two other sought after capacities: strong connections to neighborhood-based
organizations and access to employers. As a result, JobNet primarily relied upon its established
institutional links with government agencies while seeking out “partnerings” with community
based service organizations. Overall, JobNet continued developing and implementing the
operational procedures and information systems that contributed to JobNet having the highest
numbers of job-seekers, position postings, and highest placement rates among the centers.
Chapter Review
Examining indicators for the three career center system during the tightening labor market
provides context for the career centers’ activities. The system reached its highest ever 38 percent
placement rate of unemployed customers in Fiscal Year 2000. This rate was ten percent higher
than the previous year. The high rate is noteworthy because it occurred with lower numbers of
job-seekers and higher percentages of less-educated job-seekers.  In FY 2000 the Boston centers
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placed 2,265 customers in jobs, compared to 2,073 in the previous year. However, the centers
enrolled 7,638 new job-seeking customers in FY 2000, which was a 31 percent decline from the
11,062 new customers enrolled in FY’99.  The decline in new job-seekers is mostly attributed to
the robust economy in that fewer people looked for jobs, and that, for those searching for jobs,
there were relatively plentiful ways besides career centers for finding employment. The
proportion of customers who did not complete high school rose in FY 2000 from 19 percent to
26 percent. There was a 10 percent decline in the proportion of customers with four-year college
and advanced degrees from 28 percent of all customers in FY1999 to 18 percent in FY2000. The
race and ethnicity of new customers remained relatively constant between FY1999 and FY2000.
Unemployed customers grew as a proportion of the population from 76 percent to 82 percent as
employed customers decreased from 24 percent of the population to 18 percent.
The strong economy enabled the career centers in their efforts to help welfare recipients find jobs
and to help employers find relatively lower-paid—though less experienced and less skilled—
workers. Each career center exceeded its contracted goal for placing welfare recipients in jobs
during FY2000, helping 612 welfare recipients to find jobs. BCL had the highest number of
placements of welfare recipients in the state. In FY1999, Boston’s centers placed 717 welfare
recipients, exceeding the number of job placements for welfare recipient FY1998 by 174, a 32
percent increase. At the same time, the average hourly wage of welfare recipients placed in jobs
in FY1999 was $8.65. The relatively low average hourly wage rate reflects that many of the
positions were often low-skill entry-level jobs—positions expected for welfare recipients—but
also that they paid above the minimum wage.
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During the era of a tight labor market and welfare reform, each organization adapted to its
institutional environment by making distinctive strategic choices. Examining career centers’
focus on employers is a good way to highlight strategy differences because, more so than job-
seeker customers, the career centers have more discretion regarding the level and scope of
services provided to employers. Looking at how career centers related to employers is also
illustrative of different strategies because, during the tight labor market, more employers were
involved and interested in working with career centers in order to meet their labor demand.252 At
BCL, services to employers tended to reflect an interest in developing informational and
networking relationships (e.g., industry briefings, job match café, thematic job fairs) that were
fashioned around BCL’s niche strategy of enlisting its extensive network of community
resources to focus on special groups of disadvantaged job-seekers. One aspect of BCL’s niche
strategy was that, compared to other centers, BCL tended to provide specialized services to fewer
numbers of job-seekers that resulted in higher placement rates.  At TWP, services to employers
tended to emphasize fee-based arrangements (e.g., job fairs) and a focus on addressing the
particular labor demands of employer customers. TWP tended to prioritize services to employers
rather than job-seekers, in contrast to BCL and JN that prioritized job-seekers.  Although TWP
initially failed to meet its contracted DTA placement goals, it soon realigned its services and
cultivated relationships with public and community agencies so that it continued serving
traditional categorical populations while also pursuing employers to whom to market and provide
access to its categorical job-seekers. JobNet’s Employment Services legacy provided it with
passive but prolific connections to employers who posted significantly more job positions with
JobNet than with the other centers. JobNet’s attempt to develop closer and neighborhood-based
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employer relationships by selecting ABCD as an operator resulted in mixed success. As a result,
JobNet developed few customized services for employers during the tight labor market, but
continued generating many job postings.
During the tight labor market, welfare reform represented the major institutional change related
to public policy that affected the career centers during 1999 and 2000. The career centers
experienced welfare reform as an aspect of the larger institutional issue of categorical funding
versus service integration. Even though self-directed job-seekers continued to represent
approximately two-thirds of job-seeker customers in 1999 and 2000, the centers’ focused a
majority of staff resources on special populations because a majority of center funding was tied
to delivering categorical services to groups such as welfare recipients, economically
disadvantaged, and the disabled.  Indeed, one reason why categorical programs increasingly used
the career centers as entry points for services was because the one-stop mission was to integrate
and coordinate services. However, as more programs were funneled though career centers, the
more the centers experienced duplication of assessments, case management, and services. These
potential redundancies also put pressure on centers’ internal communication and reporting
coordination. To address these issues, the centers assigned staff and resources in varied ways to
develop processes to reduce the redundancies .
Just as they had for employers, the three career centers evolved distinctive strategies for job-
seekers. The outcome of BCL’s strategic planning process was that specialized job-seeker
populations became BCL’s strategic priority. In particular, BCL identified disadvantaged groups
such as low-income, disabled, or residents of the Empowerment Zone as targeted populations for
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its services. This priority also influenced BCL to target employers and industries that tended to
hire from these populations. TWP’s emphasis on universal services for all its job-seeker
customers shifted slightly in 2000 as it increased its services to welfare/categorical customers in
pursuit of contract-based revenue. TWP also targeted high skilled job-seekers sought after by
employer and likely to pay for fee-based services. JobNet continued its strategy of focusing on
the most disadvantaged job-seekers, especially those already connected to governmental
programs, at the same time as providing services to large volumes of “self-directed” job-seekers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
WIA & Weakened Labor Market Era: Recent Years (2001-2002)
Overview
During 2001 and 2002, the career centers responded to a changing institutional environment
highlighted by the implementation of the Workforce Investment Act and by the tightened labor
market brought on by economic recession. As the economy worsened, many more job-seekers
used career center services at the same time that employers had fewer job openings and need for
center services. This situation stretched and strained the organizational resources of the career
centers. And, as general funding for career centers continued to decline, more categorical
programs used the one-stops as entry points for services. Moreover, WIA altered the career
centers’ relationship to many employment training providers from that of a referral partner to one
of administrator and arbiter of training vouchers. In this environment, the centers continued to be
confronted by the conflicting demands of providing universal access while also addressing the
needs of categorically-funded job-seekers. All three career centers responded to the changing
conditions through planning and practices that more intensely exhibited the traits associated with
their strategic orientation. Boston Career Link emphasized stronger collaborations with its
operators and its network of community services, as well as refocused attention to specialized
disadvantaged populations. The Work Place prioritized business development as a management
orientation, provided more customized services to employers, and initiated strategic partnerships
with community and public agencies. JobNet strengthened its ties to DET and formalized more
procedures related to service delivery and data collection.
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Boston Career Link
Planning and Practice
Change in Governance, Structure, and Location
BCL experienced several major changes in 2001 and 2002 that involved new governance by
Goodwill, another round of restructuring staff, and a move to another location. Although
Goodwill took over direct fiscal and managerial responsibility of BCL on January 1, 2001, BCL
did not complete restructuring career center operations until the end of 2001. In the intervening
year, BCL experienced managerial flux. Interim leadership was provided by BCL’s acting
executive director and operators as they worked to restructure BCL in accordance with the
strategic priorities developed in Fall 2000. Following months of planning discussions, BCL
moved in September 2001 to Goodwill’s large building complex in the Roxbury neighborhood
within the Empowerment Zone, and occupied office space alongside several other programs
administered by Goodwill. The next month—October 2001—Goodwill replaced BCL’s acting
director with the hire of  Joanne Pokaski as BCL’s new director.253
In the same month that BCL’s new director was hired—October 2001, the three operators
formed an Advisory Committee comprised of about a dozen members representing job-seekers,
employers, training agencies, and community organizations.  The REB noted that “members of
the Advisory Committee were selected based on their access to job-seeker and employer
                                                
253 Pokaski had formerly managed Goodwill’s community and government relations as well as several special
projects for several years prior to her new assignment as BCL’s director. Goodwill’s decision to hire Pokaski as
BCL’s director was supported by Dimock and WEIU, and was consistent with the operators’ Fall 2000 strategic
priorities that emphasized enhancing services to special disadvantaged groups and strengthening relationships with
community and government agencies.
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customers whose needs and resources align with the strategic imperatives.”254 That is, criteria for
membership in the Advisory Committee was based on BCL’s strategic priority of targeting
specialized disadvantaged populations. Within a month of hiring a new director and developing
new governance arrangements, BCL created a new management structure and also set up three
cross-functional teams to address the three issues that had most challenged BCL since its
opening: marketing, computer-based job matching, and tracking job-seekers’ membership and
placement information.255
Sensing Data
Even as BCL reconfigured its organizational structure, it did not substantially alter its basic
operating processes. For example, BCL did not adopt the formal structure of CQI teams. Instead,
BCL selectively used CQI group process methods for what BCL termed “rapid improvement” or
“local experiments.” In general, BCL continued its ad hoc approach to finding and reacting to
problems. As noted by the REB, BCL
identifies issues, moves to gather some information about the nature of the problem and
then designs and tries a solution. If the solution works, it stays. If not, the product or
service is modified or something else is tried…The use of this model may be both a
strength and a liability at BCL. The strength is BCL’s ability to move quickly once it
recognizes a need for improvement. The liability lies in the fact that the continuing
reliance on informal methods and lack of use of formal CQI teams may leave the
organization slow to recognize such opportunities.256
BCL continued its ingrained pattern of emphasizing “sensing” modes for gathering and
interpreting information. In some ways, BCL’s relocation within Goodwill—a traditional social
                                                
254 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 12.
255 One result of its organizational changes was that BCL had the most ethnically and linguistically diverse
management team in its history.
256 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 11.
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services agency, re-enforced BCL’s tendency to mix up social casework and using data for
system management.  For example, as noted by the REB of a site visit to BCL in January 2002,
the organization presented even small attempts to meet customer needs (rooms too hot,
someone needing clothing for an interview, individual experiencing particular difficulty
with the interview process getting extra help) as using customer feedback to meet
customer needs. Solving individual problems on a case-by-case basis (case management)
is an important component of quality service. But unless the data is aggregated and
analyzed with root causes of system-wide problems identified, solutions prioritized,
measures implemented and evaluated for their impact and effectiveness, this remains
more a social casework and not a CQI model.257
 The strength of BCL’s case management was that it focused attention on meeting individual
needs. The weakness was that, without systemic data, BCL sometimes missed opportunities to
make best use of its resources for system improvement.
BCL’s reorganization did not fundamentally change the kind of information that BCL
emphasized in its operations. BCL continued to rely on “sensing” approaches in gathering and
interpreting information. As noted by the REB,
Historically, the organization focused on basic tracking for invoicing and performance
outcomes with little focus on formal data collection and analysis for quality
improvement…BCL has always relied heavily on informal organizational ‘sensing’
methodologies and review of workshop and other activity/event evaluations to guide
service delivery designs and improvements. There has been little formal cumulative data
collection, quantification and analysis of customer satisfaction.258
Although BCL did use computer-based information systems to some extent, BCL did so in a
style consistent with its prior consultative and particularistic manner. BCL, like other career
centers in Massachusetts, were compelled to adopt MOSES—the statewide information system
designed expressly for one-stop career centers. However, BCL did not actually fully integrate the
system within its operations. In 2001 and 2002, BCL hired a consulting company to run reports
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from MOSES.259 Indeed, during BCL’s transition year of 2001, BCL had no Team Leader for
Information Systems and Administrative Services. Instead, consultants and MMGI staff provided
these services. Nevertheless, BCL had an increased its information systems capacity due to the
availability of MOSES-based data and the administrative capability of BCL’s new director.260
Closer Collaboration to Serve Populations in Greatest Need
Following its strategic planning process in late 2000, BCL undertook a variety of follow-up
activities during 2001 and 2002. BCL focused on four key areas that involved “realignment” of
its services: focusing on populations in greatest need of career center services, working more
closely with three collaborating agencies, adapting to WIA, and targeting certain employer
populations. BCL’s highest realignment priorities were targeting specific populations and
integrating BCL deeper with its operators. These priorities were inextricably combined both in
concept and in execution.
Several issues were associated with BCL’s priority of increased collaboration among the three
operators. To begin with, as part of its strategic planning process, BCL’s operators determined
that BCL had developed too much autonomy based on the belief that it could someday be spun-
off as its own independent nonprofit entity. BCL’s operators abandoned this assumption and
consequently permitted Goodwill to increasingly integrate the career center into its operations.
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259 In late 2002, Goodwill began the process of hiring someone to produce reports from databases and run analyses
for all Goodwill’s training and career services programs, including running MOSES reports for BCL.
260 With access to MOSES standardized and streamlined data collection and reporting, BCL requested that its
consultant analyze patterns of service utilization. The REB observed in 2002 that, for the first time, BCL reported
patterns such as that young people and Hispanics were more likely to attend job fairs but not industry briefings,
while women, Caucasians, and people with disabilities were more likely to attend industry briefings but not job
fairs. Even in its analytical priorities, BCL continued to focus on service trends among particular populations.
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Unlike Dimock that, as BCL’s former fiscal agent, had enabled BCL to be jointly governed by
the three operators, Goodwill assumed full managerial control of BCL. Goodwill and BCL also
increasingly blended programmatically.261 According to BCL, “a workgroup of BCL and
Goodwill training programs managers has been created to explore and maximize synergies
between the two.”262  Another aspect of BCL’s closer alignment with Goodwill—as well as with
Dimock and WEIU, was that BCL’s job-seeker populations began to more closely resemble
those of its operators. BCL’s relocation to Roxbury was a key strategy in this “realignment.”
According to BCL,
Focus on the Population Most in Need of Career Services meant targeting BCL’s efforts
on communities of color, low income job seekers, people with language barriers, those
with little work history, those without computers at home, individuals with disabilities
and those without a job network. Demographic data are showing that BCL’s move from
its former site…to its current site…has brought about changes in BCL’s demographics in
the way we had hoped.263
While BCL’s move and closer connection with Goodwill increased the career center’s population
of disadvantaged job-seekers, there was a trade-off to these actions. On the one hand, having its
offices within Goodwill made BCL more accessible to people with disabilities who received
Goodwill services. Also, its location in the Empowerment Zone put BCL closer to
neighborhoods with higher rates of unemployment and lower incomes. BCL believed that its
proximity to different groups of disadvantaged job-seekers—particularly those living in the
neighborhood—enabled such job-seekers to receive more focused services. On the other hand,
BCL was less accessible to many city residents because BCL was no longer centrally located in
Boston or easily accessible by the subway system. And, unlike its former commercial storefront
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provide post-placement support citywide in 2002.
262 Boston Career Link, Progress Report, Fiscal Year 2003, page 5.
263 Boston Career Link, Progress Report, Fiscal Year 2003, page 2.
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site that indicated “universal access,” BCL was now situated next to Goodwill’s used clothing
and merchandise store that communicated “social services.” Considering the initial symbolic
importance that the REB had placed on appropriate venues for career centers, BCL’s move
signaled a major change of identity.
 Adapting to WIA
Following its renewed focus on specific populations and closer collaboration with operators,
BCL’s next priority was adapting to WIA. WIA implementation began formally on July 1, 2001,
and represented an overhaul of the workforce development system. WIA’s major changes
included eliminating contract-based training; instituting a voucher-based “Individual Training
Account” system; enlarging the pool of non-profit and for-profit training providers; broadening
the eligibility criteria for training; and decreasing the amount of available training funds.264  WIA
also established the one-stop career centers as the mandated connecting hubs of local workforce
development systems.
There were three dimensions to how BCL adjusted to its role as modified by WIA. First, career
centers were expected to administer the process by which training vouchers were issued to job-
seekers. This meant that center staff conducted initial assessments of a job-seeker’s
employability. If the customer was eligible and could benefit from training, then the career center
referred the person to several training providers on an approved “vendor list.” Due to WIA’s
emphasis on “customer choice,” the customer was required to visit several providers before
selecting one. The customer then returned to the career center, which processed the voucher
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paperwork. As a result of the career centers’ new relationship to training providers, center staff
were expected to act as neutral administrators. As noted by the REB, implementing WIA at BCL
“has led to a redefinition of the counselor role from advisor/advocate for job seekers to now
include that of arbiter of resource allocation.”265 This added a slight constraint on BCL staff, who
were accustomed to having a more active advocacy relationship with job-seekers.
A second dimension of BCL’s adjustment to WIA was that BCL had to devote dedicated
resources to WIA-related services. BCL increased the amounts of staff time and career center
space dedicated to WIA information sessions, individual counseling for eligibility determination
and follow-up, and coordination with training providers. These added demands on BCL’s
resources strained its already stretched capacity resulting from consecutive years of reduced
career center funding. A third aspect of adapting to WIA was that BCL was expected to provide
job-seekers as well as employers with current and projected labor market information. Although
BCL had previously accessed labor market information to provide context for its services, it was
less necessary due to the strong labor market that yielded jobs in many industries at many skill
levels. In the WIA environment, BCL was expected to have more specific knowledge about labor
market conditions because a job-seeker’s current “employability” was a criteria in whether s/he
was eligible for a training voucher. As a result, BCL was confronted with the challenge “to
gather better labor market information to understand where hiring opportunities lay in an
economic downturn.266 However, compared to the other two career centers, BCL not only had
the least direct access to governmental sources of data, but also was the least oriented to
systematic data collection and analysis.
                                                
265 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 2.
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Service Delivery and Labor Matching in a Weakened Labor Market
During 2000 and 2001, despite its major organizational restructuring, BCL’s services for job-
seekers remained mostly stable. BCL continued to offer workshops that, while generally similar
to those offered by the other career centers, tended to reflect more psycho-social leanings.267
BCL maintained its outreach to DTA offices, while providing actual services at BCL. Many of
BCL’s specialized programs continued, though some grant-funded programs ended.268 BCL also
kept on offering its support group (“Job Seeker Success Group”) for job-seekers.
Like the other career centers, BCL continued its attempts to reconcile the provision of seamless
and universal access with the increased delivery of categorical services associated with welfare
reform and WIA. BCL’s response to these competing expectations entailed providing more
counseling services as well as more overlapping services.269 For BCL, “this repetition of
information about the breadth of services available is a way to address the effects of funding
“silos” on service delivery.”270 Instead of having planned and formalized mechanisms for
connecting categorical services, BCL relied on offering redundant cross-referential information
to customers. This approach offered counselors and customers multiple opportunities to
selectively pursue services that seemed appropriate to individual needs. However, this approach
                                                                                                                                                            
266 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 2.
267 Workshop titles included Informational Interviewing, Clarifying Your Job Values, Skills Identification, The Job
Interview, How to Write a Resume and Cover Letter, Assertive Communication, Positive Thinking for Success, and
Negotiating the Job Offer.
268 For example, the three-year contract to operate the Phoenix Program—an AIDS/HIV employment services
contract run by BCL and Dimock—ended in 2002.
269 In 2001, BCL introduced new “Ask the Counselor” sessions where customers signed up for fifteen minute check-
in and advice sessions. BCL initially offered the sessions from 4-5 p.m. but had low response, and so moved the
sessions to 1-2 p.m.
270  Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 4.
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also caused BCL to expend additional staff resources due to its non-systematic performance of
duplicative tasks and referrals.
BCL’s fourth and least developed priority involved targeting employers. Even as BCL
recognized that “this realignment is critical to the center’s success,”  BCL stated that “of the four
realignments, this one has been the least realized” during 2001 and 2002.271  One of BCL’s main
challenges was that it had previously developed relationships with employers that had been
suitable matches with its predominately college-educated job-seekers. As BCL shifted its focus
and location to increase its pool of disadvantaged job-seekers, BCL found that it did not have
extensive connections to employers that hired many lower-educated and lower-skilled job-
seekers. BCL stated that as its job-seeker population changed, “there grew an increasing gap
between job seeker skill sets and interests and the employment opportunities available with the
employers with whom we have long-standing relationships.”272 BCL’s emphasis on relying upon
its strong relationships with community organizations for access and services to job-seekers and
with employers for hiring had worked well during the tight labor market. This was a particularly
effective practice for BCL’s many employment-ready job-seekers when the economy was
booming. However, BCL had less history and fewer strong relationships with businesses able to
employ disadvantaged workers.
Another challenge to BCL’s efforts targeting employers was that the economic recession that
began in 2001 caused many firms to slow their hiring of workers. In this environment, BCL
found it more difficult to help disadvantaged job-seekers get job placements. Even so, some
                                                
271 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 3.
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businesses continued to hire—especially entry level workers—and BCL re-focused its  services
to target them.  However, developing relationships with employers in an economic downturn
required more attention than during the economic boom when many employers sought out career
center services. Recognizing that it needed to focus more attention on employers during a loose
labor market, BCL re-organized its employer services.
In 2002, BCL made several changes to “re-align” its employer services. First, BCL changed the
name of its Employer Services team to Employment Opportunities Team. Second, BCL created a
new position to manage its employer services. Third, in a departure from its previous cross-
functional approach, the reconfigured Employment Opportunities Team was solely focused on
employer customers. As a result, employers were essentially framed as members of a targeted
group that would received “specialized services.” Fourth, BCL developed, for the first time,
performance goals for its employer services that supported the organization’s overall goals. Fifth,
BCL prioritized industries (i.e., retail, food services, health care, and hospitality) that seemed to
offer the most appropriate employment opportunities for disadvantaged job-seekers.  Sixth, BCL
redesigned and increased the frequency of its employer events.
As part of its employer services realignment, BCL reassessed and revised what had been its main
direct connection between employers and job-seekers: the Industry Briefing—a two-hour
monthly event with a panel of up to six employers, usually from same industry. The REB noted:
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After four years of offering this product as the equivalent of a large ‘informational
interview’ BCL noted in evaluations that job-seekers were interested in more than
information—they wanted to see employers that actually had jobs.273
BCL continued to offer the briefings, but increased the frequency to twice a month and made
them available to BCL registered customers only.274 And, in a departure from past practice, BCL
made stronger efforts to invite employers who actually had jobs they were looking to fill.
Another aspect of BCL’s realignment of employer services was BCL’s efforts to further develop
collaborations with its operators and partners in pursuit of better relationships with employers.
For example, BCL sought to take advantage of its closer relationship with Goodwill by
piggybacking on its relationships with employers of disadvantaged workers.275 BCL planned to
use such opportunities to “build more deep relationships with a number of employers, similar to
the relationships Goodwill has with TJ Max, CVS, and Jiffy Lube.”276 Similarly, BCL continued
developing relationships in the health care industry through program partnerships with Dimock.
In addition to its general attempts to improve employer services, BCL also tried to strengthen its
ability to link local residents and businesses.  BCL hired a Job Developer/Account Executive to
exclusively work with employers in the neighborhood “who offer jobs that are conveniently
located for local residents.”277 BCL’s neighborhood focus contributed to the fact that it
administered the most Empowerment Zone training vouchers of any of the career centers.
                                                
273 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 6.
274 During the summer months when industry briefings were not offered, BCL offered its Job Match Café. Although
the Job Match Café infrequently produced job hires, BCL kept is as a way to keep access between employers and
job-seekers during summer months when no industry briefings offered.
275 In October 2002, BCL and Goodwill were jointly awarded a US Department of Education grant to place people
with disabilities into competitive employment.
276 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 4.
277 Charter Review Report FY’03, Boston Career Link, page 3.
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However, one of the disadvantages of BCL’s focus on targeted industries, specialized
populations, and specific neighborhoods was that it was less prepared than the other career
centers to respond to the employment needs of a wide spectrum of job-seekers and employers
affected by the economic downturn. For example, the closing of the Power One electronics
assembly plant in Allston resulted in more than 300 layoffs of mostly Asians with limited
English proficiency. All three career centers were involved in providing employment and
training services to the dislocated workers. However, the situation revealed that BCL was the
only Boston career center without Chinese language capacity. To address the influx of Chinese
speaking customers, BCL used translator services and later hired the translator as a regular
employee.
Populations and Placements
During 2001 and 2002, BCL’s job-seeker demographics changed as a result of its realignment of
services to specific disadvantaged groups and its move to the low-income Dorchester
neighborhood. However, during this same time the economic downturn resulted in more skilled
and educated job-seekers utilizing career center services. As a consequence, BCL experienced a
surge in the numbers and types of job-seekers.
BCL’s percentage of people with a high school diploma or less increased from 40 percent in
fiscal year 2000 to 42 percent in fiscal year 2001 (See Appendix Table 8). After its realignments,
BCL’s percentage of job-seekers with a high school degree or less jumped to 49 percent in 2002.
The increase in this population is especially noteworthy because the other career centers
experienced a percentage decline in this group as a result of serving more higher educated job-
seekers in a worsened labor market. BCL experienced a relative decline in the percentage of
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higher educated job-seekers in 2002, while the other centers had percentage increases. BCL’s
job-seekers with a bachelors degree or higher decreased from 33 percent in fiscal year 2000, to
25 percent in fiscal year 2001, to 24 percent in fiscal year 2002. Meanwhile, the percentage of
JobNet’s job-seekers with a bachelor’s degree or higher increased from 13 percent in 2001 to 18
percent in 2002, and TWP’s percentage increased from 20 percent in 2001 to 26 percent in 2002.
BCL’s major realignments and its move in 2001 contributed to a significant change in BCL’s
placement rate as BCL increasingly served harder to place job-seekers.. BCL’s placement rate
declined being the system’s highest in 2000 at 41 percent to being the lowest in 2001 at 25
percent (See Appendix Table 4). Another indication that BCL’s job-seeker population
characteristics had changed was that BCL’s share of system unemployed increased from 27
percent in 2000 to 34 percent in 2001; and the share of unemployed among BCL’s own
population increased from 69 percent to 77 percent in 2001.  However, as BCL settled into its
new location and refocused its services on specialized disadvantaged populations, its
performance improved. BCL’s placement rate changed from being the lowest in fiscal year 2001
at 25 percent to tying with JobNet for having the highest placement rate in fiscal year 2002 at 30
percent. BCL’s pattern of placement numbers mirrored that of its placement rate and reflected
that BCL had more job-seekers with barriers to employment. Even as the number of jobs posted
at BCL increased from 279 in 2000 to 706 in 2001, the number of job placements declined from
655 in 2000 to 516 in 2001 (See Appendix Table 5). However, as its realignments became more
developed in 2002, BCL’s performance improved. Even though it had more job-seekers, fewer
job postings, and worsened economy in 2002, BCL’s number of placements and its placement
rate increased between 2001 and 2002. Between 2001 and 2002, BCL’s number of job
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placements increased from 516 to 706, and its placement rate increased from 25 percent to 30
percent.  Another indication that BCL’s was implementing its realignments was that BCL went
from performing worst against goal among Boston career centers on its performance based
Employment Assistance Services (welfare to work) contract in fiscal year 2001 to performing
best against goal in fiscal year 2002.
Summary
During 2001 and 2002, BCL experienced major internal changes due to the restructuring of its
governance and management, and several realignments due to its strategic planning process in
2000. BCL also had to adapt to changes in the external environment most notably related to the
implementation of WIA and to an economic downturn. BCL relocation to Goodwill’s facility
and BCL’s refocus on specific job-seeker populations signaled a shift in the services and
customers it serviced. At the same time, BCL continued to fundamentally orient its services and
operations through social casework and relationship approaches. BCL’s specialized services
enabled it to provide higher quality customized services. However, it did so un-systematically.
BCL remained a “high-touch” and “organic” organization that could be flexible and adaptive, but
at the expense of redundant overlapping resources and with potentially missed opportunities for
system enhancement.  Nevertheless, BCL’s social casework approach and its extensive ties to
networks of community-based service organizations enabled BCL to provide “customizable”
services to targeted specialized populations. However, BCL’s placement rate decreased as it
increasingly served disadvantaged job-seekers. The net effect was that as it served larger
percentages of disadvantaged job-seeker groups, but in comparable ratios as the other career
centers, BCL’s placement rates became more similar to the other centers.
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The Work Place
During 2001 and 2002, The Work Place adjusted its services in response to increased numbers of
job-seekers and decreased levels of employer demand resulting from the recession and economic
downturn. TWP remained organizationally stable, though it continued to formulate modifications
to its services. For its job-seekers, TWP tailored employment transition services for people
recently unemployed as well as for those with more long-term employment barriers. For its
employers, TWP maintained connections by switching some fee services to free services, and
exploring new services such as career progression and outplacement assistance. In response to
WIA, TWP worked harder to develop relationships with training providers as well as public and
community social service agencies.
Planning and Practice
Reprioritizing Services to Employers
During 2001 and 2002, TWP’s governance remained stable compared to the significantly
restructured operating partnerships at BCL and JobNet.278 However, more so than BCL or JN,
TWP experienced a relatively high level of staff change. Almost half of TWP’s usual
complement of approximately 32 staff-members turned over in 2001.279  More notably, TWP
modified its management structure to accommodate the increased importance of WIA and
                                                
278 TWP continued to engage in frequent operational and strategic discussions with JVS and the Mayor’s Office of
Jobs and Community Services.
279 In 2001, 14 of TWP’s usual complement of approximately 32 staff members were new hires, including a new
assistant director and a new career services coordinator. In many cases, the new hires filled positions of departing
staff. At the same time, however, TWP hired new staff to expand or create new capacity as TWP “moved
aggressively” into new areas of services,  such as for populations involved in the criminal justice system and ready
to re-enter the workforce. TWP also hired staff that increased its ability to serve diverse communities. By the
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welfare reform, as well as to revise its employers services in response to the new economic
reality of reduced employer demand. In 2001, TWP expanded its leadership team to include a
Access to Training (WIA) Services Manager and a Transitional Services/Justice Resources
Manager. TWP’s most important management adjustment involved the reorganization of its
employer services.
In 2001, TWP hired a new employer service manager, changed the group’s name to Business
Development Team, and more closely integrated the team services with those of career services.
There were several reasons for these changes. First, WP concluded that it needed to refocus and
streamline its services in an economic recession during which employers’ needs were changing
and in which they were more selective and less likely to pay for services. In this environment,
TWP decided to reassess and, if necessary, to reinvent its delivery of services to employers.
Related to this and in its continuing efforts to enhance services to employers, TWP hired a new
manager of employer services, who had experience in both the nonprofit and for-profit worlds,
brought an outsider’s “fresh eyes” to TWP. The new manager recommended that employer
services be renamed Business Development to reflect  nomenclature in use by the business
community and to signal to employers that TWP “spoke their language.” Moreover, the name
change served the strategic and symbolic purpose of helping TWP reframe its approach to
employer services as part of the most comprehensive organizational restructuring in its history.
Since its inception, TWP had examined the successes and failures of its approach to employer
services and had adjusted it so suit internal and external conditions.  However, the economic
                                                                                                                                                            
beginning of 2002, half of TWP’s staff were bilingual speakers, 62 percent were minority, and 63 percent of
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downturn compelled TWP to more sharply refocus and realign its approach and services to
employers. As the economy progressively soured during 2001, TWP reassessed its employer
services and determined that, in its zeal to prioritize its services to employers, it had not fully
integrated services to employers with services to job-seekers. That is, unlike the other Boston
career centers, TWP had chosen to dedicate separate resources on employers. In the words of
TWP, “historically, Job Developers worked exclusively with our DTA clients and the primary
focus for Employer Account Representatives (EARs) was their work with employers.”280 In this
respect, TWP had chosen a different tack than the other career centers. As noted by the REB,
While all the Boston centers adopted an account management structure for servicing
employer customers, TWP was unique in establishing the position of the ‘Employer
Account Representative’ (EAR) and the employer services group as a position and a unit
that was distinct from the ‘job developer’… The organization was determined to establish
a function that viewed the employer as the primary customer.281
After several years of offering  parallel services to job-seekers and employers that intersected
incidentally, TWP’s CQI-based assessment processes revealed systemic problems with that
approach.282 TWP found that job developers and EARS often competed for job leads and were
sometimes confused about who had authority or received credit for successful job referrals. TWP
identified another issue that was even more problematic regarding TWP’s drive to generate fee-
based services.  Employers frequently interacted with job developers offering free services and
available job candidates that were supported by categorical funding while, at often at the same
time, the employers were asked to pay for services by EARs. Following its re-assessment of
                                                                                                                                                            
supervisors were from minority populations.
280 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 5.
281 Charter Review Report FY’03, The Work Place, page 2.
282 As part of its analysis, TWP also identified “lessons learned” that included the difference between posting a job
and serving a customer, the cultivating a relationship with an employer, and that employers use career centers to
solve problems.
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employer services, TWP consolidated job developers and EARs into the Business Development
Team in November 2001. According to TWP,
The newly constituted Business Development Team is founded on the belief that the
object of labor exchange is not the ‘sale’ of a worker to an employer, nor is it the ‘sale‘ of
a job to a job-seeker. The true object of labor exchange is the brokerage of a win-win
relationship between an employer and a job seeker.283
On the one hand, TWP’s reconstituted Business Development Team shared similarities with the
co-mingled job developer/employment services positions at the other career centers. As noted by
the REB, “the structure of TWP’s Business Development Team resembles the structure of the
employer services teams at the other centers. In this sense, TWP has ‘come full circle.’”284
However, there were important differences. TWP continued to assert the primacy of an employer
services orientation. This was most evidently seen by how TWP changed its organizational
structure as part of its Business Development Team  restructuring. TWP altered its organizational
structure so that the Business Development Coordinator and the Career Services Coordinator
reported directly to the Manager of the Business Development Team. Even as the functions of
job developers and EARs were blended, and were connected to job-seeker services, all these
activities were framed under the purview and authority of business development. That is, all job-
seeker and employers services served the organizational priority of business development.
Another difference between TWP and the other centers was TWP’s focus on enhancing
employer services and TWP’s heavy reliance on CQI-based experimentation in developing its
particular blend of services. Over a period of six months, TWP convened three teams to facilitate
the merger of the Business Development and Job Development units. As described by the REB,
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these teams examined three aspects of the job seeker/employer interface with TWP (employer
services, job development, and talent bank), developed three different organizational models
which were ‘test driven’ or piloted prior to a final decision on the reorganization which was
initiated in December [2001] and continues to ‘roll out.’285
Whereas BCL’s and JN’s major changes in 2001 and 2002 were focused on improving services
for job seekers, TWP’s major organizational changes were associated with improving services to
employers. Although TWP’s most extensive CQI efforts were related to its reassessment and
redesign of employer services, TWP also used CQI processes to integrate employer services with
job-seeker services, and to continually assess and improve its operations.
TWP was distinguished from the other career centers not only on what it predominantly focused
upon using CQI, but also in how TWP used CQI. As noted by the REB,
The Work Place’s commitment to CQI is comprehensive. It incorporates both the
structural elements (most notably teams) and the methods of (formal data gathering,
scientific surveys, statistical analysis of results, etc.) in a careful, methodical approach to
problem identification, problem solving, and strategic planning.
 At TWP, CQI was used hand in hand with data analysis to guide the development and
refinement of services. These processes underlay the strategic planning approaches and language
that permeated TWP discussions and activities. For example, TWP often conducted “SWOT”
exercises to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats surrounding its current
or proposed services. In these ways, TWP emulated a entrepreneurial firm’s practice of
uncovering and pursuing market opportunities. An example of this is TWP’s development of
services to job-seekers and agencies involved in the criminal justice system.
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Ex-offenders as a Niche Market
Several factors contributed to TWP’s development of services to ex-offenders as a niche market.
To begin with, TWP initially organized job fairs within the Suffolk County House of Corrections
(SCHOC) in order to respond to employer demand for workers during the tight labor market.286
TWP also sought to develop an under-served market comprised of inmates and non-custodial
fathers within the criminal justice system that were about to “re-enter” the workforce but that had
limited ties to the labor market. Over time, TWP built a track record with government agencies,
inmates, and employers as well as cultivated relationships with organizations that enabled
experimentation with job fairs and other services. TWP also gained expertise through its own
services and program referrals so that TWP was able to “minimize employer risks” and to
successfully expedite the hire of newly released ex-offenders.
At the same time that TWP innovated services to ex-offenders and employers, TWP also learned
that there were opportunities to receive grant funds to support and expand these services. TWP
recognized that the prison industry was stable and growing. And, for many years, TWP sought to
diversify its revenue streams in order to balance the shrinking financial support for general career
center operations and the fluctuating resources tied to categorical services. In particular, TWP
saw that ex-offender non-custodial fathers represented a niche market with the potential to
diversify and stabilize TWP’s revenue. At the same time, TWP saw an opportunity to expand
services to under-served job-seekers and to connect employers to an under-tapped labor pool.
                                                
286 During this time, as part of a demonstration grant, all three career centers provided pre-release and post-release
job readiness training and job search assistance to inmates. However, TWP pursued this opportunity more
assertively than the other career centers. The best evidence of this is TWP’s job fair within SCHOC between inmates
and employers, the first time such an event had occurred. Following the demonstration grant, SCHOC received
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Consequently, TWP cultivated partnerships with public agencies in the criminal justice system
that enabled TWP to be awarded grants and contracts. And, under the brand name “Fatherhood
Connections,” TWP developed a “product line” of employment services for non-custodial fathers
within the criminal justice system about to re-enter the labor force.
TWP’s expansion into the ex-offender market resulted in the establishment of formal
relationships with three agencies where TWP located staff.287 TWP’s success in developing
organizational partnerships and securing resources demonstrated that TWP had a sophisticated
capacity for strategic planning and marketing.288 However, TWP’s initial expansion of ex-
offender services also illustrated that TWP had an under-developed capacity for delivering
specialized services to ex-offenders.  In its first attempts to provide services to non-custodial
fathers within the criminal justice system, TWP relied upon some of its established approaches to
employment services for disadvantaged job-seekers. It soon turned out that TWP made several
errors in how it conceived and delivered services. According to TWP,
Although we believed we knew something about the men we wanted to serve and what
they needed and wanted, we were not prepared for the pressure they felt to “get a job
now,” for the low threshold they had for “process,” or for the lack of trust they had that
any “institution” could or would listen to and help them. We also believed that the
relationships we had relationships we had established for recruitment would be a solid
                                                                                                                                                            
funding to continue employment services for inmates, and selected TWP. Subsequently, TWP assigned a full-time
staff person at SCHOC to provide services.
287 At SCHOC, TWP stationed a full-time staff person who provided pre-release job training and job search services.
At the Suffolk County Family and Probate Courthouse (SCFPC), an on-site TWP staff person provided assessment,
referral, and counseling services for men at the court. The staff person also facilitated the referral connection to
TWP’s main office and access to a full range of employment services including welfare-to-work, WIA, and
customized services. At The Brooke House—a pre-release center and halfway house for re-entering offenders—
TWP stationed a staff person to provide job readiness training and job development services as part of collaboration
with the Ella J. Baker House and with Bunker Hill Community College.
288 Relatedly, TWP “made the case” and brokered an agreement with the SCFPC, the Probation Department, and the
Department of Revenue so that enabled TWP to provide employment services to non-custodial fathers so that they
could meet their child support obligations.
241
base of referrals and that intensive outreach would not be needed. Again, we were
mistaken.289
TWP also found that its intake process—designed “to gather as much information about the
‘whole’ individual” as possible, was “too long, intimidating, and stressful” for ex-offenders who
said “all I need is a job.”290 Consequently, TWP lost customers at each of the assessment and
placement process. For TWP, delivering services to ex-offender non-custodial fathers was a
“tremendous learning opportunity.” TWP discovered that
these men had a profound mistrust of any system or institution. They were frequently
products of fractured families, failure at school, failed relationships, incarceration, etc.,
and they did not believe than any system or program could provide genuine assistance
and a positive experience. It became clear to us that we needed to find other
“messengers” to deliver the Fatherhood Connection’s vision and mission.291
To address the problems with its ex-offender services, TWP relied on its relationships with
community-based nonprofit social service organizations. According to TWP, “working with our
partners (e.g., Family Services of Greater Boston, Ella J. Baker House), we developed a plan for
extensive community outreach that tapped the connections and relationships of all three
Fatherhood Connection partner organizations.”292  TWP streamlined the intake process in
coordination with its CBO partners, who also became more involved in the program by
providing structured workshops and by hanging “around for casual chat with customers so that
they may further develop relationships with customers.”293 Through its Fatherhood Connections
program, TWP learned that in its eagerness to expand its product line, TWP had developed
contract-based resource-focused organizational relationships but had under-developed
community-based supports-focused organizational relationships.
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291 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 7.
292 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 7.
293 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 8.
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TWP’s re-constituted Business Development Team and TWP’s lessons from marketing services
to ex-offenders demonstrated TWP’s continuing entrepreneurial orientation. They also reveal
that, despite TWP’s ability to learn and moderate its practices, there are drawbacks to an over-
emphasis on expanding and marketing new product lines and an under-emphasis on collegial and
supportive relationships with community and public organizations. This is not to suggest,
however, that TWP had undervalued the importance of relationships with other organizations
involved in the workforce development system. Rather, similar to how it viewed its relationships
with employers, TWP tended to treat its relationships with community organizations strategically
and instrumentally.  This was illustrated in how TWP framed its connections to community
organizations and training providers as it prepared and responded to the implementation of WIA.
Preparing and Adapting to WIA
TWP saw WIA as an opportunity “to reconsider and revise” several of its job-seeker services and
consequently “evaluated and improved upon internal practices given the new parameters and
relationships designed in the WIA legislation.”294  After assessing the expectations and
requirements associated with WIA, TWP worked to adjust and develop appropriate services and
relationships. TWP determined that one of WIA’s most significant changes was the broadening
of eligibility for training. To illustrate the difference, TWP contrasted the characteristics of job-
seeking customers under JTPA (Jobs Training and Partnership Act) and WIA. Under JTPA,
TWP’s job-seeker customers were mostly dislocated workers with work histories, high school
diplomas and/or some college education, and had varying marketable occupational skills.
                                                
294 The Work Place FY 2001 Strategic Plan, page 18.
243
However, under WIA and related to the diverse layoffs of the recession and throughout 2002 ,
TWP reported that its customer profile had “changed drastically” and that
customers seeking training are more diverse in age, ethnicity, education, and skill level.
We see airline pilots laid-off after the September 11 terrorist attacks and CFOs of failed
dot coms, to immigrants with no English skills who have lost their jobs when their
factory moved overseas, and nearly every kind of worker in-between.295
In particular, TWP noted that there were “significant numbers of individuals being served under
WIA who have the highest barriers to employment” including customers who were homeless,
mentally and physically challenged, low income, long-termed unemployment, and youth ages
18-24.296 TWP perceived WIA as a second wave of government funding that demanded the
delivery of specialized services. Yet, unlike welfare reform, TWP saw WIA as opening the
floodgates to specialized services for a multitude of different populations.
For TWP, WIA represented a proliferation of specialized services that threatened to the career
center’s universal services approach. As summarized by Ford, “one-stop career centers are
always going to be generalists, if we become too specialized, we fail; so, we partner with
specialists.”297 TWP’s primary strategic response to WIA was to strengthen and build
relationships with nonprofit agencies with specialized expertise. In particular, TWP emphasized
developing close relationships with organizations advocating for the homeless, working with
teen mothers/fathers, serving youth, providing mental health services, and offering a variety of
social supports. According to TWP,
We have decided to build stronger bridges with community-based organizations that will
provide access to the following services: housing, mental health, childcare, clothing, and
food…Forming strategic partnerships with other community based “specialists” offers us
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244
an opportunity to assist our customers with their basic needs while working towards
meeting their short and long-term educational goals.298
In addition to increased demands for specialized services, TWP saw other challenges associated
with WIA.  According to TWP,
We were concerned about our ability to manage the potential flow of customers seeking
training. We were also worried that Boston residents most in need of training might not
be using Career Centers; with broader eligibility criteria, we were afraid that by the time
the neediest training seekers learned how to access ITAs, none would be left. In addition,
we are sensitive to the concerns of training providers, and are determined to redefine our
relationship with them. In this new funding environment, the training provider is our
customer.299
TWP also determined that WIA implementation required closer working relationships between
training providers and career centers. In an attempt to address many of its concerns at the same
time with limited staff, TWP organized a training fair (modeled after job fairs) that brought
together “needy training seekers,” training vendors, and other stakeholders involved in the new
training voucher system. TWP conceived and took lead responsibility for organizing the first
joint “Training Fair” between career centers and training program providers in July 2001.  In
partnership with other stakeholder organizations, TWP invited all the vendors approved to
provide training in Boston.300 TWP also sent invitations to selected groups of “needy training
seekers.”301 As a result of the training fair, TWP reported that 150 training seekers connected
with more than 40 training programs, almost 70 ITAs were issued, training vendors gauged
                                                
298 The Work Place FY 2001 Strategic Plan, page 18.
299 The Work Place Career Center FY 2002 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 4.
300 TWP partnered with the other Boston career centers and with the Job Training Alliance, the Boston Housing
Authority, the Boston Welfare Office Directors, and the State Unemployment system.
301 TWP sent invitations to housing authority residents in Boston’s poorest neighborhoods, welfare recipients with
time left on assistance to make training an option, Unemployment Insurance recipients with more than 15 weeks of
benefits remaining, and families participating in Head Start and Fuel Assistance programs.  Group orientations were
held prior to the training fare to assure participants were eligible and interested in training.
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levels of interest in their programs, and “career centers had the opportunity to begin to develop
closer relationships with training providers.”302
As WIA implementation unfolded during 2001 and 2002, TWP continued to build relationships
with community based organizations and training vendors. TWP worked more closely with
partners to develop new and enhanced services for its job-seeker customers, including youth,
limited English speakers, welfare recipients, college graduates, and dislocated workers with
advanced degrees and skills. TWP also tried harder to “search for and hire staff members that
reflect the population, which we are currently serving or are in need of targeting.”303  By
strategically replacing staff or filling new positions, TWP increased staff demographic so that
about half of staff were bilingual with a total of 15 languages spoken and 62 percent of staff
represented communities of color.
TWP also modified its job placement services and its follow-up and post-placement services to
address the demands of WIA and categorical customers.304 In both its planning and delivery of
services, TWP continued to resist the “push and pull” of categorical funding by trying to assert
the prioritization of universal services and customer choice. As described by TWP,
At The Work Place we do not manage programs; we have customers with needs and we
have resources available. Our role is to assess the customer’s needs and to match the
appropriate resources to address those needs to assist each customer to be a better job
seeker and employee. By looking at a customer’s individual needs, and TWP resources,
                                                
302 The Work Place Career Center FY 2002 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 4.
303 The Work Place FY 2001 Strategic Plan, page 10.
304 For example, TWP designed a quarterly progress evaluation report for training providers to complete, required
that training voucher recipient check-in with TWP staff monthly, and polled graduating customers about their
marketability.
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we are able to offer each customer the fullest possible menu of services and avoid pigeon
holing customers by “category.”305
As it established new product lines and expanded it programs, TWP developed an array of cross-
cutting services and referral systems. TWP described the process as a way to move customers
quickly through the “front door” to “vestibule” service providers who could more intensively
assess customer needs and suggest programs that might address those needs and move them
efficiently and effectively towards the customer’s employment goal. According to TWP,
Customers are never told what they must do, but are offered suggestions as to how best
they can use the resources available to them. Customers are always offered the most
choices appropriate to their circumstances, as the more information the customer has the
more informed and creative will be the customer’s decision making. It is always the
policy of The Work Place that it is the customer’s choice, not ours.306
One consequence of TWP’s approach was that it had many “front doors” and “vestibules” of
service.  In fact, according to the REB, “TWP is unique among the Boston centers in the number
of remote sites it operates…it manages multiple ‘front doors’ in the community.”307 Related to
its efforts to develop relationships with nonprofit and governmental organizations, TWP had six
other locations in different communities where it provided services.308  According to TWP,
Building and managing successful partnerships internally at TWP and with other
agencies has been key to managing our changing environment and to responding to our
customers’ needs…Building and maintaining partnerships with agencies with different
service sets who are interested in serving populations in transitions has been an important
part of our success and is increasingly important as resources dwindle and customer
needs increase.309
                                                
305 The Work Place quoted in Charter Review Report FY’03 The Work Place, page 5.
306 The Work Place quoted in Charter Review Report FY’03 The Work Place, page 5.
307 Charter Review Report FY ’03, page 11.
308 During 2001 and 2002, TWP operated in six locations: DTA Dorchester Office, DTA Roslindale Office (closed
January 2002), Roxbury Resource Center (opened January 2002), South Boston Resource Center, Suffolk County
House of Correction (SCHOC), Brooke House (pre-release center for the SCHOC), and the Suffolk County Family
and Probate Courthouse.
309 The Work Place, FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 9.
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TWP increasingly developed and relied upon its partnerships with nonprofit and government
agencies as the economy stalled. The relationships became more important during the second
year of WIA implementation when more customers and more competition for training vouchers
tapped WIA’s relatively limited resources. In 2001, TWP saw 5 people for every 1 voucher. In
2002, TWP saw 10 people for every 1 voucher. And, while the demand for vouchers doubled
between 2001 and 2002, the drop out rate declined. Even when TWP could not issue a voucher
to a customer, TWP still made referrals to other community and public services. At the same
time, TWP maintained and cultivated its relationships with employers so that it could connect
job-seekers with employment. However, sustaining employer connections during the economic
downturn was challenge. In contrast to the economic boom when employers readily sought
TWP’s services, the taciturn economy required that TWP work harder and more creatively to
maintain relationships and to continue providing services to employers.
Refocusing Employer Services in a Weakened Labor Market
As a result of the weakened labor market conditions in 2001 and 2002, TWP modified its
services and connections to employers. Rather than emphasizing fee-based services that
employers were purchasing less frequently, TWP invested in creating, maintaining, and
cultivating relationships with employers. According to TWP,
This past year, the Business Development Team has focused considerable time and effort
on building and growing relationships with employers and within our own departments at
TWP. The work being done with employers has been somewhat different than in past
years. With the downturn in the economy, fee services in general decreased in demand.
The Business Development Team has taken advantage of this lull by being more strategic
and creative in terms of building relationships with employers.310
                                                
310 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 5.
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As part of this strategy, TWP invited employers with whom it had long-standing relationships—
as well as emergent relationships—to deliver workshops to job-seeking customers. And, while
TWP produced fewer job fairs, it increased the number of on-site recruitment sessions from 10 in
2001 to 28 in 2002. During this time, TWP continued to build new employer relationships. TWP
organized frequent breakfasts for employers at its main office.311 TWP found the events an
“effective way to network and keep relationships going through the slow economic time.”312
TWP also worked more closely with its operating partner’s parent agency, the Boston
Redevelopment Agency, to co-sponsor a Backstreets Employer Breakfast in November 2002.313
Another illustrative example of how TWP adapted its services and relationship to employers
during the weakened labor market involves Massport. TWP significantly reconfigured its
services and relationship to Massport. Since TWP’s first year of operation, it had developed a
strong relationship with Massport. This was most evident in the annual job fair that TWP
produced for all the tenants at Logan Airport. Due to the economic downturn and the events of
September 11, Massport faced reduced labor needs and found less benefit from job fairs. In
particular, Logan Airport’s labor situation changed from experiencing chronic worker shortages
to undergoing layoffs, transitioning from private to government security personnel, and
increasing demands for workers able to pass security background checks. As Logan’s labor
conditions changed, TWP assessed the emergent opportunities for its services and strategically
responded. TWP took the lead in assisting security screeners prepare for the transition to the
                                                
311 TWP targeted small and mid-size businesses and community based organizations located in Downtown Crossing,
Roxbury, Dorchester, and Jamaica Plain.
312 The Work Place FY 2004 Charter Review Process Progress Report, page 5.
313 The Boston Redevelopment Authority’s Backstreets Initiative aimed to support the economic development of
4,000 businesses employing 100,000 workers in Boston’s wholesale, construction, commercial services, and food
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Transportation Security Administration. TWP provided assessment, counseling, and out
placement services for the private security workforce at Logan. TWP helped non-citizens by
offering an intensive citizenship training program at the airport, in partnership with JVS. For
pilots dislocated due to reduced flight schedules, TWP facilitated pilots’ access to certification
training for “in-demand” aircraft and got them flying again soon. TWP out-stationed a staff
person at Logan to provide outreach, intake, and assessment to screeners as well as “downsized”
airline employees (e.g., United, US Airways). TWP also proposed and began developing a career
ladders initiative that would create career opportunities among airport employers when those
opportunities did not exist within specific companies.
In addition to cultivating its ties with employers, TWP sought to generate new services
appropriate to the changing economic situation. After conducting employer focus groups and
forecasting increased layoffs, TWP developed a product line of outplacement services for
medium-sized businesses.  TWP also offered outplacement services to nonprofit organizations
after assessing that government cutbacks were reducing social service agency staff. Ford noted
that TWP continually sought out opportunities to provide fee-based services, and that “we live in
a nonprofit world, but we still try to be entrepreneurial.”314
Populations and Placements
During 2001 and 2002, the combination of a weakened labor market and the implementation of
WIA contributed to a large increase in the number of TWP’s job-seeker customers. At the same
time that it served larger numbers of job-seekers, the distribution of its customers’ characteristics
                                                                                                                                                            
processing industries located in South Boston, New Market, Hyde Park, Charlestown, Neoponset, Allston-Brighton,
East Boston, and Jamaica Plain.
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remained relatively stable, with the exception of having a larger percentage of higher educated
job-seekers. Between 2000 (tight labor market) and 2002 (weakened labor market), the number
of TWP’s new job-seeker customers increased 107 percent (2547) from 2363 to 4920 (See
Appendix Table 7).315  As a result, even as its job-seeker demographics shifted, TWP saw many
more customers from different cross-sections of job-seekers. The proportion of job seekers with
the lowest and highest levels of educational attainment shifted slightly. Customers with a high
school diploma or less slightly increased from 47 percent in fiscal year 2000 to 50 percent in
2001, and then slightly decreased to 49 percent in 2002 (See Appendix Table 8). Likewise,
customers with a bachelors degree or higher dropped from 26 percent to 20 percent in 2001, but
then increased back to 26 percent in 2002. That is, as the economy worsened, TWP saw more
educated and skilled job-seekers as layoffs rippled through higher skilled occupations. In
addition, customers from linguistic minority groups declined from 26 percent in 2000 to 20
percent in 2002 as more English dominant customers sought employment through TWP. The
racial and ethnic composition of TWP’s customers remained relatively constant through 2002.
During the worsening economy of 2001 and 2002, TWP experienced many more people
searching for jobs and fewer available employment openings.  At the same time, TWP continued
to cultivate its relationships with employers. Between 2000 and 2001, the number of job
positions posted at TWP declined from 849 to 646 while it increased at the other career centers
(See Appendix Table 6).316 Unlike the other centers, TWP emphasized its job fairs as its main
                                                                                                                                                            
314 Tom Ford, Site Visit, January 14, 2003.
315 Between 2000 and 2002, the number of JobNet’s new job-seekers increased 77 percent (2255) from 2942 to
5197, and BCL’s new job-seekers increased 90 percent (2112) from 2368 to 4480.
316 Between 2000 and 2001, the number of posted jobs increased from 279 to 706 at BCL, and increased 2884 to
4770 at JobNet.
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venue for marketing available jobs; and available employment positions at job fairs are not
calculated in the official tabulations of posted job positions.317 That is, counts of job postings
tend to undercount career centers’ customized services to employers, especially those provided
by TWP.  That said, TWP’s job postings increased from 646 in 2001 to 778 in 2002, while
JobNet’s and BCL’s job postings decreased.318  Indeed, as the labor market worsened between
2001 and 2002, the number of TWP’s job postings increased 20 percent while JobNet’s job
postings decreased 4 percent and BCL’s job postings decreased 42 percent. TWP’s increased
number of job postings was an indication of TWP’s strong employer relationships and services.
There are several other indicators of how TWP  weathered the economic downturn more
effectively than the other centers. As previously noted, TWP had a higher percentage increase of
job-seekers compared to the other centers. Between 2000 (tight labor market) and 2002
(weakened labor market), TWP’s new job-seeker population increased 107 percent compared to
77 percent at JobNet and 90 percent at BCL (See Appendix Table 7). During this same time, the
number of TWP’s job placements increased 25 percent, while JobNet’s decreased 19 percent,
and BCL’s increased 8 percent. Even though TWP had the largest increase in job-seeker
customers, it also had the largest increase in job placements, despite a weakened labor market.
Also, while the placement rates declined at all three centers between 2000 and 2002, TWP
experienced the least percentage change. Between 2000 and 2002, TWP’s placement rate
declined nine percentage points from 33 percent to 26 percent (See Appendix Table 4). In
comparison, between 2000 and 2002, JobNet’s placement rate declined 9 percentage points from
                                                
317 The REB uses jobs posted to MOSES for its official tally of job postings.
318 Between 2001 and 2002, JobNet’s job postings decreased from 4770 to 4562 and BCL’s job postings decreased
from 706 to 408.
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39 percent to 30 percent, and BCL’s placement rate declined 11 percentage points from 41
percent to 30 percent. Although its new employer activity declined in 2001 and 2002, TWP had
more “repeat customers” than the other career centers. Nearly 70 percent of its employers did
repeat business with TWP in 2001, compared to 40 percent at JobNet (BCL did not report repeat
business). TWP’s high repeat business with employers is an indication of TWP’s strong
connections with employers. Indeed, TWP repeatedly emphasized in most of its progress reports
and strategic plans that it considered its customized services and strong relationships with
employers as an organizational priority.
Summary
Although its governance remained stable during 2001 and 2002, TWP restructured its
management so that its Business Development operations provided the overall frame for its
operations. Related to the weakened economy and of WIA’s widened training eligibility criteria,
TWP experienced a significant increase in the numbers and diversity of job-seeker and training
customers. In response, TWP established strategic partnerships with community and government
agencies that provided specialized services. TWP also partnered with agencies so that career
services could be provided at community-based locations. TWP also experimented with
developing services for niche markets such as ex-offender non-custodial fathers. To maintain and
build relationships with employers during the economic downturn, TWP initiated more
networking events as well as formally launched its Corporate Partnership program—fee-based
membership services for selected business firms.319
                                                
319 The Work Place originally developed the idea for the Corporate Partnership program during the economic boom.
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JobNet
During 2001 and 2002, both JobNet’s governance and management structures were relatively
stable. In its operating relationship with JobNet, ABCD’s role remained that of the silent partner,
while DET’s influence increased. In response to increased demands on its services due to the
economic downturn and WIA implementation, JobNet primarily made procedural changes to
streamline its intake and service flows. Service lines at JobNet continued to be separated as
“boutiques” with modest levels of integration. JobNet’s procedural emphasis on data
collection/reporting and service delivery contributed to its ability to manage the highest volumes
of both job-seeker and employer customers among the career centers.
Planning and Practice
Institutional Embeddedness
Compared to its first year challenges of integrating ABCD as a co-operator, JobNet’s
relationship with ABCD during 2001 and 2002 was mostly characterized by a settled pattern of
limited partnership. Although the JobNet/ABCD Operations Groups continued to meet quarterly
to coordinate service delivery and review initiatives, ABCD did not take an active leadership role
in JobNet.  And, while DET did not have a direct active role in providing leadership to JobNet,
DET did impose procedural requirements tied to the extensive administrative, fiscal, and
technological resources it provided to JobNet.320 In addition to being directly embedded within
                                                
320 For example, DET provided JobNet with contract and payroll services, and computer and office machine
technical support.
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DET, JobNet was also institutionally embedded within bureaucratic and city and state
governmental systems.
With DET’s strong influence, ABCD’s silent partnership, and with JobNet’s director and
assistant director in charge of operations, there were few mechanisms in place for guidance and
information from other sources. JobNet had been historically challenged in developing a
governing “board of directors” akin to those of the other career center. The REB went so far as to
note that “a classic non-profit board structure may not be an appropriate ‘fit’ with an
organization whose lead partner is a large state bureaucracy.”321  Nevertheless, after some stalled
attempts, JobNet convened the first meeting of its Advisory Board in 2001, inviting a DET
representative, the ABCD Education and Training Director, employers, and representatives of
training providers and other community based organizations.322 The Advisory Board met
intermittently and discussed JobNet issues, but lacked legal or administrative authority as well as
a clear role. As noted by the REB, “the resources, support, expertise and broader community
perspective that a board can bring to strategic planning and program operations remains lacking
at JobNet.”323 During 2002, the Advisory Board’s membership re-shuffled and shrank, leaving it
with representatives from three government agencies (i.e., DET, DTA, BHA), two
community/workforce development associations, and ABCD.324 The Board had no employer
representatives. Consequently, four of the six Board members represented large bureaucratic
organizations, and the remaining two members primarily dealt with the city and state
                                                
321 Charter Review Report FY’03, JobNet, page 9.
322 JobNet’s initial conception of the Advisory Group included inviting representatives of virtually every stakeholder
group involved in Boston’s workforce development system. This approach was soon abandoned after the REB and
JobNet determined that the proposed group lacked clear purpose.
323 Charter Review Report FY’03, JobNet, page 9.
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governmental policy-making apparatus. Once again, governmental and bureaucratic interests,
more so than community or business interests, influenced JobNet. This situation was less a
reflection of happenstance as of organizational priorities. JobNet stated that it made no
“concerted effort on re-building the Board” in 2002 due to budgetary constraints and staff-
redeployment, but that it “expect[ed] to re-establish the Board and its activities” in early 2003.325
In addition to being institutionally connected to governmental and bureaucratic interests via its
Advisory Board members, JobNet was also shaped by its direct embedded relationship with
DET. For example, in 2002, JobNet assumed administrative oversight for Unemployment
Insurance (UI) Walk-In staff.326 This was a flashback to the old Employment Service offices that
had similar responsibility for UI local services and hence, became known as the “local
unemployment office.” This administrative decision affected JobNet, but not The Work Place or
Boston Career Link which operated more independently from DET than JobNet.327
Consequently, JobNet modified its reporting structure into two major categories—Counseling
Services and Operations. Career Associates reported to the assistant director, while
administrative and UI reported to the business services manager.328 Thus, at least with regard to
UI, JobNet had reverted in some ways to its ES roots. In addition to assuming one of the main
programs formerly administered by the ES, JobNet’s organizational structure somewhat
                                                                                                                                                            
324 Advisory Board members included leaders of the Boston Workforce Development Coalition and the
Massachusetts Association of Community Development Corporations.
325 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 2.
326 In October 2002, DET re-assigned Unemployment Insurance (UI) Walk-In staff to report directly to One-Stop
Career Centers throughout Massachusetts. Nearly all of the 28 career centers that were directly administered through
DET were given program responsibility for UI. Although it was not directly administered by DET, JobNet was
included in this change because of its strong indirect relationship to DET.
327 Of the 32 One Stop Career Centers in Massachusetts, four (including Boston Career Link and The Work Place)
were operated independently from DET.
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resembled the traditional hierarchical, categorical, and procedural characteristics of the old set-
up.
“Tried and True Structure”
Even with the integration of UI and some staffing adjustment, JobNet’s overall structure
remained relatively stable.329 As noted by JobNet in December 2002,
“the organizational structure has remained in tact. This tried and true
structure…continues to operate in tandem to ensure that quality services are not only
delivered but are tailored to meet the ever-changing needs of our customers.”330
Though JobNet represented itself to the REB as a team-oriented organization, the center’s
director and assistant director managed most of the career center’s activities.331 According to
JobNet, “while the Senior Management Team provides direction and develops agency-wide
policy and procedures, it is informed by a “Whole Team” process (general staff meetings) and by
program specific and project specific teams.”332 This statement is notable for indicating that
JobNet’s leaders set policy and procedures and that functional separation in both work process
and service delivery was a chief characteristic of JobNet’s organization.
                                                                                                                                                            
328 Assuming responsibilities for UI and administration was familiar to the business services manager because he
had formerly directed an Unemployment Office/Employment Services local office.
329 In 2002, due to decreased funding that resulted in four fewer positions, JobNet made some staffing re-
adjustments. Instead of replacing four exiting staff, JobNet re-assigned staff but loss positions formerly assigned to
WIA, EAS, and Wagner-Peyser.
330 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 1.
331 For example, when JobNet’s Branch Office Manager was transferred to another DET area in July 2001, JobNet’s
director and assistant director assumed the supervision and day-to-day management for the branch office. For almost
seven months until a new branch manager was hired, they met regularly with the staff at the location to develop
strategies, provide support, and respond to branch issues.
332 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 1.
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Evidence of JobNet’s functional divisions was illustrated by the separation of staff members into
“program specific teams” that administer “boutiques of services.”333 Program specific teams
primarily dealt with day-to-day operation of categorical programs.334 During a 2001 REB site
visit, JobNet presented graphics of a “corridor of opportunity” that emphasized separation of
boutiques as well as “key interfaces” showing service and population overlap.  The REB noted
that “this is the clearest articulation of the tension between the ‘boutique’ approach and service
integration in JobNet’s development.”335  The integration of categorical services was further
complicated in that some boutiques (Vets, Job Corps, Employment Connections) had dual
reporting relationships to their home agency and to JobNet.336
In an attempt to reconcile the competing demands and divisions associated with categorical and
universal services, JobNet formed two project specific teams focused on front door “intake”
processes and on the orientation process. There were several reasons why JobNet focused on
these two issues. First, JobNet experienced a surge in job-seekers using its services because of
the weakened labor market. Second, WIA had directed more people looking for training to the
center. Third, due to decreased funding, JobNet had to reallocate tasks and re-deploy fewer staff
members. The sum effect of these conditions,  particularly the “ever-increasing volume of job
seekers utilizing the center,” compelled JobNet to  determine that “it was important to work more
                                                
333 In addition to the customary categorical programs, JobNet also considered “Self-directed Job-Seekers” as
boutiques.
334 In 2002, Program Specific Teams included Training (WIA), Employment Assistance Services for welfare
recipients, Rehabilitation Services, Veterans Services, and Business Services.
335 Charter Review Report FY’03, JobNet, page 8.
336 Categorical staff in these “boutiques” were not paid from JobNet’s payroll but still participated in general staff
(Whole Team) meetings, CQI teams, and conducted skills assessment and orientations.
258
efficiently.”337 Indeed, “Do More With Less” became the “imposed mantra of the career centers
during 2002, according to JobNet.338
JobNet’s responded with three procedural adjustments. First, the front desk or “customer help
desk,” as the first point of contact, “was targeted for more standardization and consistency.”339
The redesign involved development of “Customer Focused Quality Standards,” an eleven point
set of instructions emphasizing completion of enrollment forms, MOSES data entry, and record
keeping. A second procedural change consisted of a redesigned orientation. Unlike previous
orientations that were offered by rotating teams of staff members (as a mechanism for cross-
training), the new “Welcome to JobNet” orientation process was conducted by a select group of
staff members. JobNet noted that, “his group is responsible for standardizing the orientation
presentation to ensure that full and comprehensive information is shared and that an initial
assessment is conducted within this seminar.”340 As part of this process, JobNet developed two
checklist forms: a “Customer Needs Checklist” and a “Next Step Voucher.341 The third
procedural adjustment consisted of providing more center services in group formats. JobNet
wrote that “conducting more group services such as workshops, industry briefings, and seminars
was a strategy utilized to deliver services to more people while economizing on the use of staff
                                                
337  JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 4.
338  JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 1.
339 For several years, JobNet had emphasized that “everyone is an assessor” and rotated staff through the front desk,
where “every interaction is opportunity assess the needs of customer and help identify appropriate services.”
340 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 5.
341 The “Customer Needs Checklist” was a form consisting of 14 different job search needs and corresponding
services, workshops, or staff members recommended by JobNet. Following this “self-sort,” customers were
encouraged to attend an Intake session in which a counselor helped assess identify employment goals, barriers and
appropriate services. From this point, customers were issued “Next Step Voucher” slips as they progressed along the
“job-readiness continuum.” The “Next Step Voucher” was designed to indicate the next service recommended or
expected.  They were issued after intake sessions and after each subsequent activity (e.g., Training Information
Briefing, Workshops, Resume Critiques, Industry Briefings).
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resources.”342   While indicating that this approach was useful in providing services to increased
numbers of customers, JobNet acknowledged that its “group activities and service
methodologies” hindered it from tending to individual needs. In December 2002, JobNet
reported that,
The high levels of frustration among job seeking customers (because of long-term
unemployment) and the low levels of job search skills among many has made this
endeavor significantly more difficult. Even those customers who may have higher levels
of job seeking skills are becoming frustrated and are in need of additional support.343
In making its procedural adjustments, JobNet only selectively used the CQI approach. That is,
JobNet adopted the terminology and structural concepts of CQI—teams and process flow
diagrams to diagnose problems and identify potential solutions, but did not rely on systemic data
gathering and analysis. The REB observed that “JobNet continues to rely on informal data
gathering and structural CQI methods” but “has made only intermittent progress on using
cumulative, quantified data analysis to address the root causes of organizational issues and to
methodically address issues of customer satisfaction.”344 Although JobNet did not collect
information to systematically inform its services and operations, JobNet did invest resources in
attempting to strengthen its formal data collection capacity.
Data In and…Data Out?
On the one hand, JobNet continued its long-standing interest and investment in enhancing its
ability to gather data and generate standardized reports. On the other hand, JobNet remained
challenged in its ability to generate analytical reports. Indeed, JobNet historically had a problem
providing timely data to WIB and using data for improving services.  In the past, this was
                                                
342 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 5.
343 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 4.
344 Charter Review Report FY’03, JobNet, page 9.
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attributed to technology problems outside of JobNet’s control. That is, JobNet’s reliance on DET
for information technology meant that DET’s related problems became JobNet’s problems. For
example, for some time, DET’s job seeker tracking system and job matching technology did not
match. Later, JobNet was challenged in managing five different state information systems.
However, even after data were consolidated into MOSES, the problems persisted. In 2001,
JobNet attributed its problems to DET’s system-wide connectivity difficulties, but BCL and
TWP had the same problems and were still able to generate timely and complete data to the
WIB.  The REB observed that it typically took multiple iterations of data requests and data
exchange before JobNet provided complete data, even when data templates provided. According
to the REB,
even when JobNet has provided requested data, it often has been incomplete. Finally, the
persistence of difficulty in data provision and the interpretation of data requests is unique
to JobNet.345
JobNet was challenged in providing analytical data because, associated with its bureaucratic
orientation, JobNet emphasized data collection procedures and standardized, routine data reports.
Indeed, JobNet used extensive data to generate varied reports.346 However, JobNet tended not to
systematically collect and analyze data for process improvement.
Instead of developing its data capacity to support its internal systems improvement, JobNet
prioritized and showed leadership in improving the data collection and reporting system itself.
JobNet expressed concern about the quality of postings to MOSES due to inconsistencies in
                                                
345 Charter Review Process for Charter Continuation through FY 2003, page 5.
346 During REB site visits at JobNet in 2001 and 2002, the information technology manager made a presentation that
listed an assortment of reports using MOSES data, including an Airline Related Impact Report, Client Activity
Report, Welfare Enrollments, Employment Outcomes, and Status Updates and Completions.
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posting procedures, job description language, and even font utilization.347  With the support of
the REB and its representative to the statewide MOSES Policy Work Group, JobNet convened a
statewide work group to improve the processes through which employers receive existing
services as well as serve as the sounding board for initiatives related to or impacting employer
community.348 In addition to its efforts to improve job posting systems and employer-related
procedures, JobNet also made some changes to its services for employer customers.
Employer Services in a Weakened Labor Market
After several years of lagging behind The Work Place and Boston Career Link in offering
employer services, JobNet addressed employer complaints and suggestions by shifting its
employer services from relatively passive to more active. As a first step, JobNet renamed its
Employer Services to Business Services, mimicking TWP’s similar name one year prior. Next,
JobNet re-specified its Business Services staff as a “Program Specific Team.” This essentially re-
framed Business Services as a categorical services department similar to JobNet’s other Program
Specific Teams.349 In addition, JobNet made attempts to increased the number and familiarity of
its relationships with employer by more frequently visiting employers.
JobNet’s biggest modification to its actual services involved modifying JobNet’s version of an
“Industry Briefing” from a passive labor market information session to a stronger recruitment
opportunity. This revision consisted of changing some procedures as well as increasing the
number of employers with available jobs. In the revamped session, employers not only provided
                                                
347 In addition, employers had complained that filled positions were not quickly de-listed from the system.
348 The Massachusetts Employer Relations Learning Opportunities Team (MERLOT) work group, comprised by
managers and employer representatives from career centers across the state began meeting in fall 2001.
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job-seekers with an overview of the industry, the firm, and a specific occupation, but also .
interviewed candidates for current unfilled openings.350 JobNet also began a series of “Employer
Quorums,” which were occasional informational marketing efforts to employers and other
related associations that focused on government programs supporting incumbent worker training
and development.351 Another service change occurred in response to employer complaints that
many of the candidates that JobNet referred needed improved interviewing skills. To address
this, JobNet introduced a videotaped “Mock Interview” as a free service to job-seekers. JobNet
also developed a follow-up data gathering tool for employers to complete in which they
evaluated job candidates’ interviewing skills.
As a result of JobNet adjusting its services to employer customers, the REB noted that, compared
to its history of weak services and relations with employers, JobNet made “significant progress
in articulating and focusing its efforts to outreach to and engage a broader community of
employers.”352 However, JobNet acknowledged that the economic downturn presented a
challenged to its ability to maintain the large number of employer contacts that had previously
been “very easily attained” due to its relationship with DET.353 As a response, JobNet stated that
it was “developing the reporting capacity to identify employers that have used our services.”354
                                                                                                                                                            
349 JobNet’s Program Specific Teams included Training (WIA), Employment Assistance Services for welfare
recipients (EAS), Rehabilitation Services, and Veterans services.
350 In 2001, JobNet conducted eight briefings that were attended by a total of 226 job-seekers, and of whom 53 were
hired.  The largest briefing was attended by 95 job seekers and include employers from industries such as shipping,
telecommunications, health care, human services, and security.
351 Public programs discussed include unemployment insurance, Worker Opportunity Tax Credit, Workforce
Training Fund, and the recently initiated state “Building Essential Skills through Training” (BEST) initiative.
352 Charter Review Report FY’03, JobNet, page 10.
353 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 11.
354 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 11.
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Related to its efforts to improve its connections to employers, JobNet also attempted to expand
its outreach efforts to job-seekers as a way to meet employer and job-seeker needs.
Weak Connections to Community Organizations
JobNet made several attempts to strengthen its connections to community organizations as a way
to find workers for employers and as a means to access the diverse supportive services offered by
nonprofits. In coordination with ABCD and its network of neighborhood centers, JobNet held a
meeting in spring 2001 with neighborhood-based community based organizations as a
community outreach effort.  However, JobNet determined that it would be difficult to dedicate
the staff resources required to convene monthly meetings. Instead, JobNet used the sign-up list to
create a broadcast email list (list serve) of job leads.355 Subsequently, JobNet developed a set of
procedures to send its “JobNet Jobs” email on a daily basis.356 However, JobNet reported that the
email effort became “somewhat disappointing” in 2002 because it appeared that “when budget
crunches hit some of the first to get axed are the job developers/counselors.”357 This became a
problem since the emails were sent to individuals who no longer worked there and whose email
addresses were often terminated.358 In this illustration, JobNet demonstrated its tendency towards
operational procedures in its relationships with community organizations rather than the
reciprocal and embedded relations that characterized BCL’s networks and TWP’s strategic
alliances. In general, JobNet was more likely to closely collaborate with other bureaucratically
                                                
355 Before it developed the broadcast email list, JobNet tried to find a job seeker to match a job posting from its own
database and if it didn’t, it would go to go to other organizations such as skills training programs.
356As soon as a job was posted in MOSES,  JobNet sent the broadcast email to a variety of community agencies that
included Family Services of Greater Boston, Bruce Wall Ministries, Mattapan Family Services, Parker Hill
Community Services Program, and ABCD
357 JobNet Career Center Progress Report, December 2002, page 10.
358 Nevertheless, JobNet reported that it continued to identify other community organizations to add to the list,
which sometimes posted as many as 35 new job leads every day.
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inclined public agencies. For example, JobNet coordinated with the Boston Housing Authority
(BHA) to sponsor job fairs in public housing development sites.359
Populations and Placements
The weakened labor market contributed to significant shifts in the job-seeker profile at JobNet.
More White, Non-Hispanic job-seekers used JobNet services in 2001 and 2002. Between 2000
and 2001, the percentage of JobNet’s African Americans job-seeker customers decreased from
37 percent to 31 percent. Historically, due to its location near Chinatown and its multi-lingual
staff, JobNet had a larger percentage of linguistic minority job-seeker customers than the other
centers. JobNet’s share of the system’s job-seeker population that was linguistic minority rose
from 43 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2001. And, as a share of its base, linguistic minorities
increased from 23 percent to 27 percent at JobNet in 2001, the largest of any Boston career
center.360 JobNet’s percentage of linguistic minority customers declined as other populations
increasingly used its services during the weakened economy, and as other centers developed
linguistic minority language capacity and services. In 2001, 67 percent of all Asian customers
receiving at least one service at a Boston career center used JobNet. In 2002, this percentage
declined to 51 percent.
Before the economy weakened, JobNet had historically had higher percentages of job-seekers
with lower educational attainment compared to the other career centers. Indeed, JobNet usually
                                                
359 JobNet partnered with the BHA, the Committee for Boston Public Housing, and the Franklin Field and Franklin
Hill housing development Tenant Task Forces to hold a community-focused job fair with more than 18 employers
and community organizations that was attended by more than 300 community residents.
360 Linguistic minority job-seekers represented 17 percent of BCL’s base and 20 percent of TWP’s base in 2001.
265
had in excess of 60 percent more such job-seekers than BCL or TWP (See Appendix Table 8).361
However, in 2001 and 2002, JobNet’s percentage of job-seekers with less educational attainment
began to resemble that of the other centers as the economy weakened. The percentage of
JobNet’s job-seekers with a high school degree or less decreased from 75 percent in 2000 to 56
percent in 2001, and to 48 percent in 2002. In 2002, at both BCL and TWP, 49 percent of job-
seekers had a high school degree or less. JobNet job-seekers with a Bachelors degree or higher
increased from 2 percent in 2000 to 18 percent in 2002. Meanwhile, BCL’s percentage of job-
seekers with a Bachelors degree or higher decreased from 33 percent in 2000 to 24 percent in
2002; and TWP’s percentage of 26 percent remained the same between 2000 and 2002. So, while
JobNet saw similar percentages of less educated job-seekers as the other centers, it saw a fewer
percentage of highly educated job-seekers. At the same time, however, JobNet had higher
numbers of job-seekers than the other centers.
JobNet, like the other centers, registered more new job-seekers as the economy worsened.
Between the peak of the tight labor market in 2000 and the weak labor market in 2002, the
number of JobNet’s new job-seekers increased by 2255 or 77 percent—from 2942 in 2000 to
5197 in 2002 (See Appendix Table 7). Although the other centers had higher percentage
increases, JobNet continued in 2001 and 2002 to have consistently larger total numbers of job-
seekers.362 Consequently, JobNet also consistently had bigger shares of total system job-seeker
                                                
361 In 2000, JobNet customers with a high school degree or less constituted 75 percent of job-seeker population,
compared to 47 percent at TWP and 40 percent at BCL.
362 In comparison, the number of BCL’s new job-seekers increased 90 percent, from 2368 in 2000 to 4480 in 2002;
and TWP’s new job-seekers increased 107 percent from 2363 in 2000 to 4910 in 2002.
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volume. During 2001 and 2002, as in previous years, JobNet saw more than one-third of all new
job-seekers registered at the three centers.363
In addition to having higher numbers of job-seekers, JobNet also had large numbers of job
postings. JobNet’s new job postings increased from 2884 in 2000 to 4770 in 2001 (See Appendix
Table 6).364 At the same time, however, the number of JobNet’s new employer accounts declined
from 1662 in 2000 to 872 in 2001, reflecting both a weakened economy as well as a large
established base of employer accounts. Despite the increased amount of job postings, JobNet’s
job placement numbers decreased. From its all-time career center high of 1119 placements in
2000, JobNet placement numbers decreased to 903 in 2002 (See Appendix Table 4). However,
JobNet still made more placements than the other centers. JobNet made 291 or 48 percent more
placements than TWP in 2002, and 197 or 28 percent more placements than BCL 2002 (See
Appendix Table 5). Just as it historically had larger numbers of job-seeker customers, JobNet
also consistently made larger numbers of job placements than the other centers.365 JobNet made
two of every five (40 percent) job placement among the three career centers in 2002. Partially
due to the increased size of its job-seeker populations and to the worsened labor market,
however, JobNet’s placement rate declined. JobNet’s placement rate of 39 percent in 2000
declined to 33 percent in 2001, and to 30 percent in 2002. JobNet tied with BCL for the highest
placement rate in 2002.366  In addition, the proportion of JobNet’s customers placed into full-
time jobs increased from 82 percent in 2001 to 84 percent in 2002.
                                                
363 JobNet job-seeker customers represented 37 percent of system volume in 2001, and 36 percent in 2002.
364 While JobNet’s job posting increased by 1886 between 2000 and 2001, BCL’s job posting increased by 427 and
TWP’s job postings decreased by 203.
365 In 2002, Job made 903 job placements compared to 706 at BCL and 612 at TWP.
366 TWP’s placement rate in 2002 was 26 percent.
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Summary
During 2001 and 2002, most of JobNet’s governance and operations remained consistent. DET’s
influence on JobNet increased due to ABCD’s silent partnership and to limited external guidance
from JobNet’s Advisory Board.  JobNet’s bureaucratic orientation surfaced in its continued
efforts to standardize intake, service, and data collection procedures. Similarly, JobNet’s
“boutiques of services” was an indication of the career center’s functional separation of
categorical services. However, partly due to its procedural and departmental emphasis, JobNet
was able to accommodate the administrative and referral requirements associated with WIA
implementation. JobNet’s standardized processes also enabled it to adapt to the significantly
increased numbers of job-seekers looking for employment in the weakened economy. JobNet’s
procedural emphasis on data collection/reporting and service delivery contributed to its ability to
manage the highest volumes of both job-seeker and employer customers among the career
centers. In addition, JobNet formalized its connections to employers and procedurally revamped
its industry briefing into high volume events. In an attempted outreach to job-seekers and
community-based service agencies, JobNet sought to leverage ABCD’s strong connections to
neighborhood-based organizational networks. However, rather than embrace the neighborhood
organizations as BCL did organically and TWP did opportunistically, JobNet—per its
bureaucratic orientation—offered the community organizations an arms-length and impersonal
broadcast email list. JobNet had more success partnering with a government bureaucracy such as
the Boston Housing Authority, with which it sponsored job fairs in public housing developments.
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Chapter Review
In 2001 and 2002, the career centers encountered major shifts in their operating context
associated with the economic downturn and WIA. There are several ways in which these
changing external conditions affected the centers. Basically, the careers experienced a surge in
job-seeker customer demand for jobs and a drop in the centers’ job placements. Between 2000
and 2001, the number of new job-seekers at all three centers jumped 41 percent from 7673 to
10,815.367  At the same time, the number of job placements among the centers decreased 25
percent from 2265 to 1688.368  The largest share of decreased job placements occurred at JobNet,
which dropped from 1119 placements in 2000 to 678 in 2001. JobNet’s significant drop in
placements partially reflects that JobNet, compared to the other centers, had the weakest
relationships with employers.369 Overall, the gender, age and ethnic proportions of its customers
remained similar, while the proportion of customers with higher educational attainment and
higher skill levels increased.370
The most visible consequence of the combined effects of the economic downturn and WIA was
the significant increase in the numbers and variety of job-seekers at all three career centers. More
so than during the tight labor market, the centers encountered a wide range of job-seekers in
terms of educational levels, skills, and employment experience. Career centers were required to
deliver an increased number and range of services to surging numbers of customers. Also as
                                                
367 Charter Review Report FY’03, Executive Overview, page 8.
368 The number of job positions posted at all three centers increased from 4012 in 2000 to 6122 in 2001. However,
this increase is mostly due to improved data collection associated with the adoption of MOSES.
369 BCL had 51 fewer placements in 2001 than 2000. TWP had the closest employer relationships and had similar
placements (491) in 2000 as in 2001 (494).
370 The number of Asian and Latino customers for all career centers increased by 59 percent from 1,560 customers in
FY2000 to 2,476 in FY2001, while the proportion of this population as a share of the system rose from 22 percent to
24 percent.
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result of weakened economy, the centers needed to work harder at relationships with employers.
In response to these conditions, the career centers made several internal and external changes to
their planning and practices that were generally consistent with their strategic orientations.
In addition to the transformed economic landscape, the career centers also experienced a
different governmental institutional context. WIA had supplanted welfare reform as the main
public policy “shock” in 2001 and 2002. Welfare reform, which had loomed large in the previous
era (1999-2000), had receded as a major influence on the centers in 2001 and 2002. Due to
TANF’s time limits and emphasis on finding employment, the number of welfare recipients
decreased significantly in the first years of implementing welfare reform in 1999 and 2000. After
the initial influx of welfare recipients looking for jobs, smaller numbers of TANF recipients used
career center services. As part of its retrenchment, DTA had only two offices in Boston by the
end of 2002. Although the career centers still had DTA contracts, the resources for these services
decreased. For example, in 2002, mid-year budget cuts eliminated structured job services for
TANF recipients. Subsequently, twelve career center staff members paid through these contracts
lost their positions in 2002.371
Even though welfare reform itself had become less urgent, the career centers continued to be
challenged by the demands of providing services to categorical customers. Indeed, compared to
the relative ease of finding jobs for the first wave of TANF recipients—many of whom had some
employment skills and experience—in the tight labor market,  many remaining TANF customers
                                                
371 Consequently, career centers could not provide the 20 hours of structured job search services required by DTA to
meet TANF recipients’ work requirements. Instead, the centers made available workshops and resource library
resources.
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facing time limits had more employment barriers and faced a tougher labor market. Likewise, the
centers continued to expend a disproportionate amount of their resources on providing services
to categorical customers. Though WIA was framed as a re-commitment to providing universal
services, in many ways it was a second wave, after welfare reform, of demanding specialized
services of the career centers.
WIA refocused and reconnected the career centers to employment training beyond that defined
as available to the most disadvantaged job-seeker. That is, the centers were expected to develop
expertise on the employability and training requirements for a wide range of job-seekers having
diverse employment skills and experience. This increased the level of specialized knowledge
required of career center staff. Concomitantly, as the assessment and referral locus for training
vouchers, the career centers were compelled to strengthen their relationships to a diverse set of
nonprofit and for-profit training providers. However, WIA’s emphasis on customer choice also
positioned career centers as relatively neutral administrators. This role constrained the ability of
the centers to advocate on behalf of customers and to leverage the centers’ established
relationships with training providers. In addition, WIA compelled the centers to modify staffing
and services to accommodate their mandated responsibilities for assessment and administration.
In their adaptation of organizational planning and practice to WIA—and to the changed labor
market—the career centers responded in ways consistent with their strategic orientations. BCL’s
strategic plan clearly raised in relief its tendencies toward particularistic, relational, and
communicative modes. This was evidenced by its focus on targeted populations, strengthened
operator relationships, and facilitative social casework. Even as BCL implemented its refocused
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strategic priorities, it continued to experience managerial instability and exhibit signs of “chronic
crisis.” BCL’s approach to CQI revealed that BCL continued to mostly rely on “sensing” and
“interpreting” information rather than systemic data collection and analysis. However, BCL was
able to take advantage of improved information systems that were developed and administered
by external providers such as MOSES and outside consultants.
TWP asserted business development as its general management goal and subsequently re-
integrated its job development and employer services, transitioned many fee to free services,
delivered more customized services, and increased its employer outreach and networking
activities. By reorganizing its management and service structure in this way, TWP attempted to
maintain its priority of employer and fee-based services despite the challenges presented by WIA
and reduced employer demand. TWP provided further indication of its entrepreneurial
orientation through its creation of Corporate Partners, customized services to Massport, and
development of ex-offenders as a niche market. TWP’s approach to CQI revealed its ongoing
utilization of extensive systemic data and analysis to identify strengths, weaknesses, and
opportunities. In adapting to WIA, TWP determined that career center staff were more
appropriately positioned as generalists that then required the specialized supportive services
available in community-based nonprofit organizations—and to a lesser extent in public agencies.
Consequently, TWP initiated a variety of strategic partnerships and alliances with nonprofit and
governmental organizations. In many instances, these relationships tended to be based on grant
and contract-based programs.
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JobNet’s management of an Unemployment Insurance Walk-In Center was both a symbolic and
physical representation of JobNet’s Employment Services legacy. With a silent partner, a
dysfunctional advisory board, and an embedded relationship within DET, JobNet continued to
operate with bureaucratic stability, efficiency, and resiliency. In its job-seeker and employers,
JobNet tended to emphasize procedural (e.g., standardizing data entry for MOSES) and
departmental (“Boutiques of Services”) modes. JobNet’s approach to CQI revealed a focus on
standardized data collection and reporting, but little data analysis. On the one hand, JobNet
demonstrated relatively weak and impersonal relationships with job-seekers, employers, and
community organizations. On the other hand, JobNet was deeply embedded in governmental
bureaucratic systems that enabled JobNet to serve much higher numbers of job-seekers and
employers than the other career centers. In this regard, JobNet was relatively more “efficient” in
offering services, though not as “effective” as BCL in providing specialized services to job-
seekers, or as “effective” as TWP in customizing services to employers.
In their adaptation to the altered economic and institutional environment of 2001 and 2002, all
three career centers shared a common response in that each of the centers fell back upon their
operators for resources and relationships in support of WIA implementation as well as employer
outreach. BCL piggybacked on Goodwill as well as its other operators for access to long-
established community-based organization and employer relationships—often related to serving
targeted job-seeker populations. TWP initiated, for the first time in its history, CQI teams with
JVS to identify best practices on outreach and marketing to employers. TWP also worked with
the BRA to co-host networking breakfasts with “Backstreets” employers. As it continued its
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“limited partnership” with ABCD, JobNet deepened its institutional embeddedness within DET
through its adoption of DET information systems and administration of UI walk-in centers.
Another common response among the career centers during this era of economic recession was
that the centers reassessed and redesigned their employer services. Like other aspects of their
adaptation, each of the career centers modified their planning and practice in ways consistent
with their strategic orientation. BCL adapted its services (e.g., job fairs) as well as targeted
employers based on their location (e.g., Empowerment Zone) and likelihood of hiring
disadvantaged jobseekers. BCL refocused its employer services with a manager, targeted
services, performance goals, and changes to industry briefings and job fairs. However, BCL
made these changes in the context of refocused strategic priorities on specialized populations and
related targeted industries, as well as strengthening relationships with familiar employers. TWP
restructured its organization around business development. TWP sought to sustain and develop
employer relationships by shifting some fee to free services, providing more customized services
(e.g., Massport), and even offering “special” access to services (e.g., Corporate Partner). JobNet
made procedural enhancements to its employer interactions and data collection and conducted
higher volume job fairs. JobNet was able to use its position and influence within DET to help
improve the state’s job posting information system (i.e., MOSES) based on employer
suggestions and complaints. Independently, each career center exhibited a distinctive orientation
with associated advantages and disadvantages regarding their operations and adaptation in terms
of their planning, practice, and performance. Combined, the centers operated together to form a
dynamic system that enabled organizational learning, adaptation, and innovation. These issues
are discussed in the following final chapter.
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CHAPTER SIX
Research Conclusions and Implications
Findings
Set in the context of labor market restructuring, public policy reform, and blurring
government/nonprofit boundaries, this study investigated Boston’s One-Stop Career Centers.
Along with other types of labor market intermediaries (LMIs), One-Stop Career Centers have
arisen as sites of organizational and institutional innovation in mediating the labor matching
process. However, compared to other LMIs, much less is known about career centers’
employment brokering operations. This study helps address this research gap by providing a
detailed analysis of three career centers. This investigation set out and answered three research
questions related to the 1) functions; 2) adaptation; and 3) performance of the career centers. In
doing so, the study developed a conceptual framework based on strategic orientation that helps to
clarify and categorize organizational processes, change, and performance.
The preceding chapters documented the planning, practice, and performance of Boston’s career
centers between 1996 and 2002. During these six years, the centers experienced three eras of
changing labor market and public policy conditions. In these time periods, the centers exhibited
difference approaches—related to their strategic orientation—in their management, their service
delivery, their relationships with job-seeker and employer customers, and their network ties to
other organizations. Correspondingly, the centers adapted to the transforming economic and
institutional landscape in different ways. These findings are summarized in Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Summary of Boston One-Stop Career Centers, 1996-2003
ERA 1
Start-Up
(1996-1998)
ERA 2
TANF &Tight Labor Market
(1999-2000)
ERA 3
WIA & Loose Labor
Market (2001-2002)
Boston Career
Link
(community)
Planning
Management crisis; tactical
coordination; weak CQI;
data & IT instrumental for
contract compliance; strong
CBO & weak employer
relations
Management and staff
turnover; strategic
realignment process; weak
and episodic CQI; focus on
contract compliance;
“sensing” information
New governance, location;
service refocus; CBO
advisors; focus on
disadvantaged jobseekers;
more CBO partnerships
and ties;  superficial CQI
Practice
Services focused on
categorical job-seekers; case
management approach; ad
hoc service delivery
Ties to DTA workers/offices;
categorical customers focus;
CBO referral & contract ties;
employer info (briefings) ties
specialized populations
refocus; more CBO
referrals; job-seeker-based
employer ties
Performance
Jagged placement rate
performance; most high
educated & least low
educated jobseekers
Significantly higher
placement rates; most high
educated & least low educated
jobseekers
Decreased placement
rates; more less educated
but still many high
educated jobseekers
JobNet
(bureaucratic)
Planning
Little board or community
oversight; focus and struggle
with IT; emergent
bureaucratic structures
Bureaucratic coordination;
data collection and reporting
focus; procedural
management; relatively easy
transition to welfare reform
Increased DET influence;
weak external governance;
stable management;
categorical teams &
boutiques; limited CQI
Practice
Focus on categorical
customers; strong ties to
welfare offices; passive but
extensive employer ties
 Procedural emphasis; strong
ties to public agencies and
weak ties to CBOs influence
services; weak employer ties
Standardized practices and
procedures; state IT
systems implemented;
mimetic employer services
Performance
Low to moderate placement
rates; large percentage of
less educated jobseekers
mid-level placement rates;
high numbers of job-seekers
and employers; most least
educated jobseekers
Largest customer volumes;
least high-educated
jobseekers; highest
placement rates
The Work Place
(entrepreneurial)
Planning
Strategic coordination,
Team-based management;
strong CQI use; technology
innovation
Consistent management
structure and CQI data &
technology processes; shift re
categorical funding
Business development as
management priority;
niche markets focus; closer
ties with JVS & BRA
Practice
Customer-driven;
development of fee-based
services; priority on
employer services
Team restructuring; new
jobseeker markets; more fee-
based services for customers;
temp agency ties; job fairs
Employer networking; fee
to free services;  Corporate
Partners; partnerships with
CBOs and public agencies
Performance
Fastest to high placement
rate; balanced performance
regarding placement and fee-
based services; balanced
demographics
moderate placement rates;
increased fee-based services;
mixed job-seeker education
levels; lower job seeker and
higher employer volumes
Increased volume; higher
proportion of high
educated jobseekers;
strong placement
performance
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Based on the documented evidence, the following sections further analyze the process, practice
and adaptation of the career centers as well as discuss the strategic orientation framework
typology and its implications for research and policy. As part of this discussion, the bureaucratic
orientation is elaborated as an analytical lens that may help explain “stereotypical” or common
career centers elsewhere in the country. The strategic orientation framework is also applied
theoretically to deconstruct and re-interpret the network dynamics of a local workforce
development system. Following these analyses, the chapter concludes with suggested directions
for future research and policy.
Boston Career Link’s Processes, Performance, and Adaptation
As the community-oriented career center, Boston Career Link had deep roots in Boston’s
neighborhoods and nonprofit social service agencies as reflected in the statement of an early
BCL director that BCL’s operators “collectively represented 300 years of social service.” This
depiction suggested that, by association, BCL followed a historical tradition of commitment to
disenfranchised communities. It also represented the collectivity of BCL’s operators and a
general consensus among them in social mission and operations. Through most of its existence,
BCL’s governance and management was similarly group-centered rather than leader-centered or
strategy-centered. That is, BCL mostly relied upon its networked relationships with others in the
community to share information, resources, and service delivery. On the one hand, BCL’s inter-
dependence on its community networks tended to impede its own strategic planning because of
the planning and managerial challenges associated with coordinating many disparate
organizational interests and actors. On the other hand, BCL’s network ties enabled it to shift and
share resources as needs arose. In this regard, BCL’s experience highlighted the network trade-
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off of multi-party involvement (and flexible information and resource exchange) versus strategic
coordination.
A psycho-social casework counseling approach dominated service delivery and, to some extent,
it also influenced the reporting and management relations within BCL. This approach prioritized
“sensing” rather than analysis in regard to data. As a result, BCL tended to emphasize immediate
tactical responses rather than long-term strategic planning. Consequently, several staff and
observers noted that BCL seemed to operate in chronic crisis mode. Symptomatic of
organizations in crisis, BCL had high staff turnover. Indeed, BCL has the highest turnover
among the career centers of both staff and managers. One of BCL’s reactions was to hire an
organizational consultant who counseled BCL to function more “rationally.” After repeated crisis
interventions and restructuring attempts, the cumulative effects of several years of crisis
contributed to BCL’s major strategic “realignment.” Although it did not have internal capacity
for strategic planning, BCL was able to draw upon its network ties to bring in consultants. BCL’s
ability to do so demonstrated one of the advantages of being deeply embedded within a dense
organizational field. Based on the counsel of consultants, BCL developed a strategic plan that
essentially reflected the priorities of its operators. BCL’s strategic realignments mirrored the
established patterns of its operators by focusing on disadvantaged groups, locating in a particular
low-income neighborhood, and increasing collaboration amongst operators and community
partners. With limited capacity to manage incremental organizational adjustments, BCL was
compelled to refocus its practices only as the result of an organizational “revolution” that
returned BCL to its operators’ roots as service providers to specialized disadvantaged
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populations. In this upheaval, BCL changed its operator governance, its location, and its relations
to job-seekers and employers.
BCL’s focus on relationships and immediacy extended to its practices. BCL exhibited a tendency
to provide highly customized services that matched the individualized needs of its job-seeker
customers. BCL not only had internal expertise to do so, but also drew upon its overlapping
membership in diverse networks of community-based organizations for particularized
information and resources to address the interests of distinct populations. However, at the same
time, BCL tended to provide services to specialized populations and self-interest groups. As a
result, instead of serving a broad cross-section of the public, BCL served relatively smaller
numbers of job-seekers meeting general “selective” group-eligibility criteria. The net effect of its
particularized approach was that BCL tended to have higher placement rates than the other career
centers, while usually also serving smaller numbers of customers—and, until its last year, the
most educated and arguably the easiest to place job-seekers. Regarding its operational
performance, BCL tended to have among the highest placement rates. However, BCL also
tended to have the highest levels of educated job-seekers. This raised the possibility of
“creaming” opportunities in that BCL may have had more employable job-seekers—even those
who were members of specialized disadvantaged groups—than the other career centers.
Issues of creaming aside, BCL was the top operational performer among the centers based on the
indications of overall high placement rates and the ability to place welfare recipients. However,
BCL had the poorest organizational performance with regard to learning, innovation, and
robustness. BCL’s perpetuating crisis atmosphere undermined organizational learning as well as
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opportunities to integrate and leverage possibilities for innovation. BCL’s realignments in 2001
and 2002 were a retrenchment indicating its inability to sustain the career center goal of
universal access. Here, BCL illustrates a paradox of a community network-based orientation
regarding adaptation. During the flush times of strong labor market and institutional resources
(i.e., plentiful contracts for placing welfare recipients in jobs), BCL’s networks functioned well
in that they expanded and provided a mix of strong and weak ties that both delivered specialized
services to job-seekers as well as information connections to employers. In this volatile and
resource abundant environment, BCL’s community networks may have required little
coordination as they exploited the fast information and resource exchanges of dense, multi-
layered network structures. However, during a lean time of economic recession and reduced
public resources when there were fewer resources to flow through networks, BCL contracted to
its relationships based on its strongest ties and most dense network cores. This suggests an
environmental sensitivity that belies a robust capacity to sustain operations in the midst of
dynamic institutional change. That is, as an indicator of organizational performance, BCL had
poor system robustness because it behaved in uneven and exaggerated ways. Regarding overall
system responsiveness, BCL tended to function very well during good times, and poorly during
bad times.
The Work Place’s Processes, Performance, and Adaptation
As the entrepreneurial-oriented career center, The Work Place established a market-friendly
approach with the opening of its offices in a posh high-rise corporate tower in Boston’s financial
district. Since that time, TWP’s priorities remained providing “quality” employer services and
pursuing fee-based services. In interviews and in its “business plans” and progress reports, TWP
repeatedly used phrases such as “customer choice” and “business-like” operations to distinguish
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itself from other government programs. One indication of its attempt to deviate from
governmental rules-based practice was TWP’s adoption of CQI. TWP used CQI as an organizing
framework to use extensive data for assessing opportunities, diagnosing problems, generating
options, and experimenting with services, product lines, and marketing campaigns. TWP’s
strategies tended to reflect its main priorities of providing customized employer services and
diversifying its revenue streams. Its sustained use of CQI to monitor internal operations and
external conditions contributed to TWP having the most stable organization (among the three
career centers) in terms of operator governance, management, service delivery, and placement
performance.
Regarding its operational performance, TWP was the first career center to surpass the 20 percent
placement rate benchmark accomplished by the former Employment Services. TWP managed to
sustain these higher placement rates throughout its history without the oscillating placement rates
exhibited by BCL or JobNet. At the same time that it achieved generally middle range placement
rates—as compared to the other career centers, TWP indicated demonstrably higher operational
performance in terms of serving employer customers. Compared to the other career centers,
TWP had much higher fee-based employer revenue. Regarding its organizational performance,
TWP showed the strongest indications of learning, innovation, and robustness. TWP embraced
CQI processes as part of its self-identification as a learning organization. TWP developed
innovations in information technology as well as in new niche service markets. In terms of
system robustness, TWP, in contrast to the other centers, sustained relative stability in its
operator governance, organizational processes, and operational performance throughout
changing institutional and labor market conditions.
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TWP’s emphasis on developing customer-driven services and cultivating strong connections
with employers enabled it to respond in different ways during changing economic conditions. In
the tight labor market, TWP helped connect employers to “untapped” labor pools such as soon-
to-be-released inmates, as well to much-in-demand higher skilled workers. In the weakened labor
market, TWP offered outplacement and tailored services. On the one hand, TWP’s focus on
employers allowed it to provide innovative services that neither of the other career centers did.
On the other hand, compared to BCL, TWP had weaker network ties to community
organizations, and, compared to JobNet, had less connections to state agencies. In general, TWP
expressed the most frustration and ambivalence about providing services to very disadvantaged
job-seekers.  Nevertheless, when TWP determined that it was strategically, politically, and
financially necessary to develop such organizational partnerships, TWP initiated collaborations
with social service and governmental agencies.  Without external pressures and monitoring, it is
uncertain that TWP would have invested as it did in developing the organizational relationships
and practices associated with delivering services to the most disadvantaged job-seekers.
JobNet’s Processes, Performance, and Adaptation
As the bureaucratic-oriented career center, JobNet’s repeated proposals to be located in the same
office space as the former Employment Service was more than symbolic. These attempts
reflected a commitment to a procedural way of life. Indeed, throughout its history, JobNet
continued to be deeply embedded within DET, a classic government bureaucracy. Although its
initial one-year partnership with a corporate staffing service provided an opportunity to flirt with
a flattened organizational structure, JobNet’s leadership, staff, and resources continued to be
dominated by a hierarchical and procedural orientation. For JobNet, bureaucracy was a “tried
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and true structure” that offered several advantages such as stability (e.g., low staff turnover),
standardization (e.g., equitable and fair treatment), and efficiency (e.g., high service/product
volume at low cost). As a “government bureaucracy with a heart,” JobNet demonstrated a
tendency to offer services to all customers equally (i.e., in standard ways) even as it made special
efforts to provide services to the most disadvantaged job-seekers (e.g., least educated and
skilled). This duality reflected JobNet’s perspective that it was an agency of the State and
therefore was both an equal opportunity service provider as well as the provider of “last resort.”
In the latter role, JobNet provided services and referrals for the most needy people.
JobNet’s organizational processes reflected its public bureaucratic orientation. JobNet’s
hierarchical rule-based modes undermined its attempts to share governance with a for-profit firm
co-operator, a community-based nonprofit co-operator, as well as its attempts to convene
advisory boards. Another telling indicator of its orientation was JobNet’s procedural emphasis on
service delivery and information processing. Overall, JobNet demonstrated a tendency towards
standardization rather than customization and attention to individual needs. Consequently,
JobNet exhibited mixed operational performance. Based on its placement rates, JobNet was a
low to moderate performer compared to the other centers. However, JobNet made significantly
larger numbers of actual placements, serving both higher numbers of job-seekers and employers
than the other centers. In this regard, JobNet showed indications of higher efficiency (i.e., high
placement rate relative to cost) and lower effectiveness (i.e., less customized and personalized
services). At the same time, JobNet historically served much higher numbers of less-educated
job-seekers than served by the other centers.
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Regarding its organizational performance, JobNet showed indications of relatively moderate
learning, weak innovation, and strong robustness. JobNet’s organizational learning was
moderated by its paradoxical characteristics. In combination with its albeit limited use of CQI,
JobNet’s procedural tendencies resulted in the continuing codification of its organizational
processes. This had the advantage of building and documenting organizational knowledge and
the disadvantage of inhibiting adjustments. Similarly, tendencies toward codification were
associated with tendencies toward organizational calcification that restricted innovation.
Conversely, JobNet’s procedural emphasis contributed to a stability of organizational processes
in relation to its customers and its ties to other organizations. In turn, this stability re-enforced
JobNet’s resiliency. In this way, JobNet’s bureaucratic orientation enabled a tendency towards
laggard adjustment that, while not highly adaptive, was sufficient to sustain operations in the
midst of institutional systemic change. In a similar way that BCL retrenched into its network
core during environmental stress, so did JobNet more deeply embed itself into its bureaucratic
institutional host. The re-integration of the Unemployment Insurance Walk-In Center within
JobNet’s offices at the end of 2002 was both a symbolic and operational indicator of DET’s
bureaucratic resiliency.
Strategic Orientation Framework: Implications for Research and Policy
This study has argued that the three Boston One-Stop Career Centers provide a natural
experiment to examine career center functions, adaptation, and performance through analysis
based on a strategic orientation framework. The career centers experienced similar funding
levels, legislative mandates, institutional parameters, and labor market conditions. Of course, the
centers had many organizational processes in common. However, the centers also exhibited some
differences in their approaches and performance. A strategic orientation framework helps clarify
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and categorize these differences in such a way as to elaborate the answers to the questions posed
at the outset of this study. From a theoretical perspective, strategic orientation is an analytical
lens used in this study to raise in relief the institutional context of the career centers regarding
their planning, practice, and performance. Strategic orientation refers to a career center’s bundle
of attributes and activities (e.g., strategic priorities, management mechanisms, information use,
service delivery mode) thematically organized around a normative value set. Conceptually, these
three orientations are depicted as Weberian “idealized” organizational archetypes in Table 3.
Table 3: Strategic Orientation Value-Sets
Values Dimension Bureaucratic Entrepreneurial Community
Ideology
legislated order (e.g., state-
focus), fairness
market-focus, individualism,
innovation, efficiency
civil society focus,
humanitarian,
compassion
Goals, preferences stability, accountability,equitable treatment
value-maximization social balance,
equitable outcomes
Power and control very centralized with morereliance on rules
quasi-centralized with reliance
on teams
less centralized with
interest groups
Implicit structure hierarchical, departmental quasi-autonomous units (oftenhierarchically structured)
loosely-coupled units
Decision process
procedural, rationality,
top-down
technical, opportunistic,
middle-out
situational,
participatory,
bottom-up
Decisions
follow from programs and
routines
follow from value-maximizing
choice
result from socially
negotiated
solutions/problems
Information
requirements
reduced by use of rules
and procedures
extensive and systematic ad hoc
Rules and Norms precedent optimization,  experimentation participatory, moral,customary
Partially derived from Pfeffer (1981)
The three strategic orientations were illustrated by the Boston career centers. Overall, Boston
Career Link demonstrated a “community” strategic orientation in its organizational processes.
Indications of this were revealed in both its planning and practice which were characterized by
consultative approaches, relational interactions, tactical rather than strategic planning, network-
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embedded information and resource transactions with community-based nonprofit organizations,
services to specialized populations, and psycho-social personalized counseling. BCL’s mixed
portfolio of organizational ties provided it with an extensive repertoire of tacit and specialized
knowledge about different sub-populations. Consequently, BCL’s operational performance was
episodically effective but relatively inefficient and uneven. Its organizational performance
tended to be weak in terms of learning, innovation, and moderate in robustness. The BCL
experience suggests that a career center operated primarily by community-based organizations
may demonstrate a community strategic orientation.
The Work Place demonstrated an “entrepreneurial” strategic orientation in its organizational
processes as indicated in its planning and practice that were characterized by multi-level data-
enriched strategic analysis and planning, information technology development, focus on fee-
based services to employers, strong ties to employer networks, customer-driven approach,
opportunistic quid pro quo relationships, development of niche markets, and adoption of business
tools (i.e., CQI, SWOT). TWP’s operational performance tended to be efficient and moderately
effective. In its organizational performance, TWP tended to be strong regarding its
organizational learning, innovation, and robustness. The TWP experience suggests that a career
center operated primarily by for-profit firms, economic development agencies, or even market-
focused entrepreneurial nonprofits may demonstrate an entrepreneurial strategic orientation.
JobNet demonstrated a “bureaucratic” strategic orientation in its organizational processes as
indicated in its planning and practice that were characterized by a dominant hierarchical
governance and management, procedural focus, extensive and standardized data collection, and
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weak impersonal ties to employers, job-seekers, and community organizations. In its operational
performance, JobNet was the most efficient among the career centers in terms of serving the
highest volumes of job-seekers and employers, but otherwise tended to be less effective.
Regarding its organizational performance, JobNet tended to be uneven its organizational
learning, weak in its innovation, and moderately uneven in its robustness. The JobNet experience
suggests that a career center operated primarily by a state governmental agency, large municipal
authority, or even a very large community-based organizations may demonstrate a bureaucratic
strategic orientation.
In addition to suggesting that each strategic orientation is generally related with sets of
organizational processes and performance outcomes, the strategic orientation framework also
posits that there are associated tendencies regarding organizational change and adaptation. In an
institutional environment of increased service demands and diminished resources such as Era 3, a
community orientation suggests a career center tendency to retrench to populations, terrain,
community networks, and employers with whom the center already has familiar and strong
relations. A bureaucratic orientation suggests a career center tendency to re-strengthen
procedural processes and fall back on its institutional host. An entrepreneurial orientation
suggests a career center tendency to reduce costs while expanding markets and networks.
Strategic orientations may also be associated with organizational behavior during different
economic conditions. During a tightened labor market, an entrepreneurial orientation may be
associated with efforts to market and sell its services quickly and opportunistically, privileging
its services to employers over job-seekers. A community orientation may be associated with a
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tendency is to place more employable job-seekers first as a reaction to easily available job
opportunities, to leverage employer demand in order to place disadvantaged workers, and to
deepen its services to hard-to-place populations. At the same time, a community orientation may
be associated with a constrained ability to see and act quickly to market opportunities. A
bureaucratic orientation may be associated with a tendency to try and respond efficiently to
employer demand, to make job placements for high numbers of disadvantaged workers, but to
otherwise miss opportunities to provide services.
During weakened labor market, an entrepreneurial orientation may be associated with a career
center tendency to shift resources towards maintaining relationships with employers, to shift fee
to free services, to expand its network and market of potential customers, to customize and adjust
to employer needs, and to outreach to community and public agencies for supportive services. A
community orientation may be associated with a career center tendency to retrench to withdraw
into its networks, and to continue providing services even if not directly connected to job
placements. A bureaucratic orientation may be associated with a tendency to streamline
procedures so that it sustains organizational stability while responding to increased service
demands.
Strategic orientation is a means to examine the advantages and disadvantages of three
organizational archetypes: “community,” “entrepreneurial,” and “bureaucratic.”  Examining
differences in strategic orientation helps clarify and categorize the strategies, practices, and
relationships of the career centers, as well as illuminate the centers’ adaptation to changing
institutional and labor market conditions. The archetypal and stylized strategic orientations also
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help to situate the activities of the career centers as publicly-funded labor market intermediaries
that operate at the nexus of civil society, state, and market as mediating organizations that bridge,
translate, and facilitate information and resource exchange.
A Stereotypical One-Stop Career Center
At an empirical level, the strategic orientation framework helps elaborate the answers to the
research questions regarding Boston’s specific career centers. At a theoretical level, the
framework also provides generative metaphors to help deduce general characteristics of a
stereotypical (generic) career center’s organizational processes that tend to distinguish them
from other types of labor market intermediaries. Understanding the generalized characteristics of
a stereotypical career center is relevant because many of the One-Stop Career Centers across the
country are likely to share a central tendency towards a bureaucratic orientation. Unlike the
Boston career centers that developed in a “competitive” environment, many career centers were
reconstituted organizations based on reformulated public programs and services. That is, as a
publicly-funded labor market intermediary, a typical career center operates in an institutional
environment characterized by governmental context. In this regard, a stereotypical career center
mostly functions within parameters dominated by a governmentally-based bureaucratic
orientation. Correspondingly, planning tends to occur linearly along hierarchical and
departmental structures in relation to legislated mandates that often proscribe services, target
populations, and outcomes. In this setting, management coordination and information processing
tends to be standardized in a cascading series of procedures. Because these organizational
processes happen in a governmental context, much of the accountability imperatives tend to be
political in that they lean towards satisfying multiple interests, as well as “institutional” in that
they promulgate state edicts. This in turn influences an organizational tendency towards
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achieving outcomes based on compromise, equity/fairness, and stability. As a publicly-funded
labor market intermediary, a typical career centers seeks to achieve these outcomes for several
constituency groups: job-seekers, employers, community organizations, and other public
agencies. In the constrained resource environment that is common of government, the
stereotypical career center attempts to achieve its outcomes by maximizing its resources through
bureaucratic procedural processes that tend towards efficiency. Related to its bureaucratic
orientation, a main focus of a career center’s efficiency efforts is the efficaciousness
management of information. Consequently, this tends to be a career center’s emphasis in the
labor exchange process. Hence, a stereotypical career center’s operational performance may tend
to be relatively high in that it tends to provide relatively efficient, standardized information
services to many and diverse customers. In this regard, a career center’s organizational processes
tend towards efficiency (i.e., high volume, low cost, “impersonal” services) over effectiveness
(i.e., customized personal services). Similarly, in its organizational performance, a career center
tends to exhibit learning and innovation in organizational processes (e.g., information
processing, standardized services) related to improving efficiency rather than effectiveness. At
the same time, the career center tends to be systemically robust in that it strives towards
organizational and political stability by meeting the minimum expectations of many diverse
constituents. These propensities suggest that a career center is relatively insensitive to
environmental change unless institutional conditions change significantly. In these
circumstances, the career center may adapt, but slowly, and then mostly in relation to procedural
modification and sustaining “efficiency” outcomes.
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A stereotypical career center shares attributes with some types of labor market intermediaries but
is also distinguished in important ways. A stereotypical career center is most like other LMIs that
improve the efficiency of the labor-matching process. Although the career center is involved in
WIA-based workforce institutional change, it is less directly active in reforming supply-side
workforce development institutions as compared to some activist community-based LMIs.
Although a career center provides space and time for networking among job-seekers and with
employers, there is little evidence that the career center supports the kind of active social
networks attributed to membership-based LMIs (Benner 2000). There is no evidence that a
career center is able change employer demand or firm behavior through bargaining or altered
power relations as demonstrated by some community-based workforce intermediaries (Osterman
1999). However, in contrast to other LMIs, career centers are central hubs of changing workforce
development systems that operate in every metropolitan region. Consequently, as a publicly-
funded LMI mandated to provide “universal” access, career centers are available to almost all
urban job-seekers and employers. Relatedly, and in contrast to most other LMIs, career centers
are mandated to provide services to the most disadvantaged job-seekers. Associated with these
distinguishing features of career centers are varied opportunities and challenges. As noted
previously, a stereotypical career center has a general tendency towards relative efficiency and
ineffectiveness associated with its operation in a governmental context. However, this study
shows that career centers may demonstrate variance in their organizational processes and
performance depending on strategic orientation. Therefore, simply operating in a governmental
context is not predictive of the functions and outcomes of publicly-funded labor market
intermediaries. The opportunity to be operated by different organizational types suggests that
career centers may exhibit several strategic orientations and associated outcomes. Moreover, as
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evidenced from the Boston career center experience, there is a range of possibilities for career
centers regarding their organizational processes and performance. Consequently, policy makers
and practitioners have a range of options in the development and operation of career centers.
Strategic Orientations and Network Dynamics
Using the strategic orientation framework as an heuristic device helps illustrate that under
changing economic and institutional circumstances, all three bureaucratic, entrepreneurial, and
community orientations represent essential components of a fully functioning publicly-funded
labor market intermediary. The planning, practice, and performance of Boston’s career centers
highlight that each strategic orientation is an essential component of publicly-funded labor
market intermediaries. These workforce intermediaries operate at the nexus of state, market, and
civil society. In this way, workforce intermediaries are more likely to be effective when they
incorporate functional and institutional attributes associated with the three sectors. Having
elements of all three strategic orientations is especially important for enabling adaptation and
innovation during periods of changing institutional and economic conditions. However,
emphasizing attributes of each sectoral orientation in a career center’s organizational processes
offers distinct advantages and disadvantages.  A bureaucratic orientation offers stability,
equitable treatment, and relative efficiency, but tends to be inflexible and not responsive to
employers. An entrepreneurial orientation offers high adaptability, innovation, customer-choice,
and employer focus, but is ineffective on its own in providing services to specialized
disadvantaged populations, and must be monitored due to its opportunistic tendencies. A
community orientation offers specialized services for targeted disadvantaged groups, flexibility,
and modest to high performance results, but tends to be tactically reactive and operationally
under-organized. Each of the Boston career centers exhibited dominant tendencies associated
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with a single strategic orientation. Of course, they also shared, to some degree, elements of all
three orientations. In this regard, all three centers illustrated the increasing prevalence of blurred
boundaries between governmental, market, and civil society sectors in developing and
implementing public policies. From this perspective, the Boston career centers provide a
prismatic view of the complexity of network dynamics prevalent in many aspects of
contemporary public management.
Researchers have noted that public policy implementation sometimes occurs under uncertain
circumstances and in interaction with dynamic politics and interests (Pressman and Wildavsky
1984). Moreover, Salamon and Lund (1989, pp. 12-13) note that the proliferation of new tools of
public action and the emergence of third-party governance not only complicates program
management and accountability, they
raise questions about the adequacy of traditional theories of public administration….[that
draw] sharp lines between the public and private sectors and among levels of
government, and emphasizes hierarchic patterns of authority….It is no wonder, then, that
these forms of government action should involve immense confusion and contradiction
over who should perform what roles and in what fashion….It no longer involves simply
the running of a public agency and the management of public employees.  It also involves
the manipulation of a complex network of players and institutions over which the public
manager has only imperfect control, yet on which he or she must depend to operate an
agency’s programs [emphasis added].
To address this dilemma, some theorists have proposed network approaches as a way to make
sense of policymaking and the implementation process that occurs within complex institutional
settings.  Whether an “advocacy coalition framework” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) or
“governance and generalized political exchange” (Marin 1990a; Marin 1990b), these
perspectives provide insights into how policymakers and researchers may better understand
policy design and implementation in a complex environment.  However, network approaches
have often been generalized with a normatively positive bias as featuring: 1) reciprocal and
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interdependent relationships; 2) trust established over repeated interactions; 3) pluralistic yet
shared interests; 4) political exchange; and 5) mediated consensual agreements.  This dissertation
finds evidence supporting claims that, when successful, interest networks provide policy
responses that are responsive, effective, stable, and lasting. On the other hand, this study has also
revealed that networks may be unmanageable, unaccountable, and inefficient.
One way to understand why the disadvantages of generalized network approaches are often
overlooked is to consider that network ideas appeal to a broad range of ideological interests. The
problems of networks are sometimes filtered out through the rose-colored lens of their respective
ideological interests. For example, conservative populists may mainly see networks as a means
to reduce the role of government by expanding the role of voluntary and nongovernmental
entities. Likewise, liberal grassroots advocates may see networks as a means to channel public
resources to community and nonprofit entities functioning as social nets. Both views tend to
contrast the idealized virtues of self-organizing networks such as individual choice and pluralism
with the undesirable hierarchical rigidity of bureaucracies. However, networks may also be
dysfunctional. Although there are few empirical studies of network failure—partly due to data
and methodological constraints—some suggestive evidence indicates that networks may under-
perform or not operate as intended (Podolny, 1998). Like markets and bureaucracies, networks
have their own inherent set of potential liabilities. Networks often rely on the contingent
resources of informal relationships that may vary over time, making it difficult to sustain
networks in terms of duration, intensity, or competence. Rather than reflecting equitably
distributed resources and decision-making, networks may also potentially exhibit hazards such as
by oligopoly, manipulation, autocracy, parochialism, segregation, or discrimination. Instead of
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diversity and pluralism, networks may exhibit fragmentation, un-coordination, and redundancy.
In comparison to bureaucratic organizations that are relatively manageable, accountable, and
stable, organizational networks may be relatively unmanageable, unaccountable, and unstable. A
generalized network perspective is especially problematic in a public policy context due to
challenges associated with coordinating multiple stakeholder interests in problem definition,
decision-making, policy direction, resource distribution, service delivery, and evaluation.
A generalized network approach may mask important differences in networks that are otherwise
highlighted when framed by strategic orientation. The strategic orientation framework provides
an analytical approach that helps identify the characteristics and trade-offs of distinct dynamic
network strategies. A network that is dominated by one particular strategic orientation is likely to
accrue many of the advantages associated with that perspective. However, as this study has
illustrated, the benefits are likely to be lop-sided and the weaknesses may be exaggerated. An
alternative is combine all three strategic orientations in a way that balances and equilibrates the
strengths and weaknesses of the different orientations. A key element in the example of the
Boston career centers is the flexible role of nonprofits in being able to exhibit distinct strategic
orientations as well as being less restricted than government agencies. Mark Moore (2002, p.
314) notes that
nongovernmental organizations have this freedom to innovate and adapt to heterogeneous
clients at least in part because their operations are not wholly accountable to politics and
government but only in that part of their operations that is covered by the government
contract. In contrast, a public bureaucracy would be entirely accountable to politics and
government. As a result, when a government agency tried an innovation that failed, or
when it responded differently to differently cases, it would be vulnerable to charges of
reckless incompetence and unfairness.
However, nonprofit status alone is not sufficient to encourage experimentation and innovation, as
the Boston career centers demonstrated. One of the distinguishing features of the Boston career
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center system is a heightened level of relative variety in their approaches associated with both
their “competitive” framework and their “universal” access to diverse customers. In this regard,
the career centers are very different from the old Employment Service and the former
employment and training system (i.e., JTPA). Though both ES and JTPA programs were
ostensibly available to relatively wide range of under-employed and unemployed job-seekers, in
practice the public and nonprofit administering agencies focused on disadvantaged people. Over
time this emphasis tended to constrain the knowledge, capacity, and opportunities available to
ES and JTPA service providers since most of their interactions were with lower-skill job-seekers
and firms that hired such workers. As a result, these service providers developed relatively
narrow expertise in the low-wage end of the labor market. In contrast, the Boston career centers
developed “competitive” services to a broad array of job-seekers and employers encompassing
skill levels from low-wage to high-tech. Due to their exposure to higher-skilled job-seekers and
firms seeking such workers, Boston career center staff expanded their knowledge of the job
requirements associated with a variety of industries. By broadening and deepening their
knowledge of job-seeker and employer needs across the labor market, the career centers were
able to offer both sets of customers more informed services. Moreover, career center familiarity
with different parts of the labor market enabled staff to make innovative employment
connections. For example, The Work Place was able to broker employment arrangements
between MassPort (Logan Airport) and welfare recipients so that negotiated work schedules and
day care services would enable the single, low-income mothers to fill vacant morning-shift jobs.
For the Boston career centers, the twin policy drivers of universal customer access and
competition combined to spur a range of innovative services and responses to new opportunities.
Competition and universal access were mechanisms of institutional transformation in the Boston
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career center system. In this regard, the career centers operated within a competitive environment
far different than Boston’s previous employment and training system and different than most
other such systems in the nation.
In their review of regional employment and training systems around the country, Grubb and
McDonnell (1991) found “surprisingly little” competition in local education and training
systems. Overall, there was little evidence of overt competition among education and training
institutions, and very little overlap in services (Grubb et al. 1989; Grubb et al. 1990; Grubb and
McDonnell 1991).372 Instead of competition, Grubb and McDonnell (1991) found a general
stratification of programs, with division among institutions based primarily on types of programs
and secondarily on types of clients. They also determined that regional employment and training
systems tended to fall into well-established patterns of institutional inter-dependence. 373 They
noted that because of the “continuing tension between the relative stability of local institutions
and the proliferation and growing complexity of policy initiatives, a system-wide perspective on
work-related education and training is critical" (Grubb and McDonnell, 1991, p. 63). Indeed, one
of the goals of Boston’s competitive career center approach was to foster a more adaptive
workforce development system. While still embedded within established institutional fields, the
                                                
372 When competition occurred, it happened in two main ways: competition for students, and price competition.
There is also some competition in RFP process where organizations compete on quality criteria, reputations, prior
success with JTPA, or claims about ability to service particular populations. Some providers can offer programs at
lower costs. See Grubb and McDonell (1991).
373 Grubb and McDonnell (1991, p. 4) identified four patterns of institutional interaction: 1) a “standard model”
where linkages among institutions are relatively well-articulated and inter-connected; 2) a “parallel systems model”
where educational institutions are well-articulated but relatively independent of JTPA and welfare-to-work
programs; 3) a system where community colleges are dominant, providing most forms of education and training,
including noncredit adult education, short-term job training for JTPA and welfare clients, and customized training
for economic development initiatives; and 4) a locality of autonomous institutions where components of education
and training system is relatively independent of other institutions.
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“competitive” Boston career centers represent a more dynamic system as compared to
Employment Services and the former JTPA system.
The histories of Boston’s competitive career centers illustrate that strategic orientations influence
organizational responses to institutional and environmental change. On the one hand, this study
finds some agreement with the argument of Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p. 198) that
organizational change is episodic and is mostly due to exogenous factors. On the other hand,
while exogenous conditions may spur change, the Boston career centers suggest that endogenous
organizational factors—such as strategic orientation—also influence the scope of organizational
change. Relatedly, most research finds that change among public agencies is largely attributed to
external, coercive governmental rules. However, this study finds that hybrid public/nonprofit
organizations—at least in the case of the Boston career centers—do not always react to
government requirements as coercive directives. Indeed, these organizations exercised some
latitude in creating local modifications, unplanned changes, and innovation. This dissertation
suggests that hybrid public/nonprofit organizations have wider scope of policy interpretation and
action than that generally exhibited in conventional public agencies. Given the escalation in
blurred public/nonprofit initiatives, it is relevant to better understand internal organizational
processes and their relationship to public policy development and management. Understanding
these relationships is especially important for researchers and policy makers interested in gaining
knowledge not only about how policy conditions influence organizational and programmatic
outcomes, but also how publicly-funded programs and organizations interact as levers and
mechanisms in the dynamics of local institutions. The strategic orientation framework offers a
way to theorize such systemic complexity.
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At an abstracted level, strategic orientation may be used to parse the three sectors—state, market,
and civil society—that career centers seek to mediate. That is, the workforce development
institutional field may be theorized as including representatives of each sector: employers that
mostly function in a market environment, government agencies that mostly function in a state
environment, and nonprofits that mostly function in the civil society environment. Each sector
consists of a system of relationships characterized by a dominant type of exchange. In this
formulation, system refers to the dynamic flows of information and resources. These dynamic
flows occur through network structures. A system is comprised of a variety of network structures
with varying structural characteristics. A system may consist of several sub-systems. From this
perspective, each career center may be conceived as having a dominant sectoral orientation
associated with a degree of embeddedness in a particular sector or system. As this study argues,
each orientation has advantages and disadvantages. Similarly, each sector has its strengths and
weaknesses and may function complementarily to help address the failures inherent in each
sector (Young 1999). For example, the state may intervene in response to market failure—such
as asymmetrical information. Nonprofits and civil society may intervene in response to
governmental failure—such as an inability to address specialized individual needs. The state may
also intervene in response to civil society/nonprofit failure—such as representing special interests
rather than the public good in toto (i.e., emphasizing particularism versus universalism). In this
formulation, a highly functional and coherent workforce development system requires the
concerted interplay of all three sectors and orientations.
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A workforce development system with a single career center and dominant strategic orientation
may be unbalanced and dysfunctional in its ability to leverage the advantages and to compensate
for the failures associated with each sectoral orientation. That is, a governmentally bureaucratic
career center is unlikely to provide customized services to employers as compared to an
entrepreneurial-oriented center, or specialized services to job-seekers as compared to a
community-oriented center. Therefore, all three strategic orientations may be necessary in order
to address the demands of all three sectors. Considered together, the aggregated and cumulative
effects of having three strategic orientations may provide a means to optimize the workforce
system’s dynamics. Moreover, the concurrent and overlapping operation of the three orientations
may help to balance and equilibrate the system’s dynamics over time. Of course, managing such
a system is a challenge.
One possibility is to integrate the three orientations via a dynamic intermediary arrangement. In
the example of the Boston career centers, this role was played in part by the career center office
and staff at the Private Industry Council (PIC). This intermediary provided support for both the
overall competitive initiative and the individual centers. Notably, the intermediary staff had
background in organizational development and learning, and infused such concepts into the
system’s design and annual review process. However, the intermediary staff did not have the
same degree of formal decision-making authority as the WIB, operators, or center staff. So,
although the PIC was involved in the decision-making process—by gathering and brokering
information and conducting the annual review process—it was ultimately not responsible for
particular decisions. Rather, the intermediary’s work focused on developing relationships and
300
partnerships among multiple stakeholders through convenings as well as by providing staff
support to mediate state and local career center legislation.
The most important intermediary function of the PIC was its administration of the annual review
and re-chartering process. The PIC departed from standard evaluation practice by emphasizing
CQI processes. In contrast to formal evaluation techniques that emphasize quantifiable program
outputs, the annual CQI-esque review encouraged analysis of problems and solutions. This type
of reflective examination focused on varied issues such as governance, service delivery, and
information analysis at both operational and systemic levels. The intermediary also supported a
level of “soft” competition among the career centers that enabled the centers to differentiate
themselves in terms of organizational processes. Consequently, each of the centers developed
services and markets that arose from their strategic orientations. In this regard, the intermediary
provided an extended “policy tether” that enabled each career center to experiment, learn, and
develop within the rather generous parameters of Boston’s competitive career center
environment.  It was in this way that the intermediary attempted to manage a system that was
expected to be both “competitive” and “integrative.” In some respects, the intermediary sought to
gently cultivate different operational approaches and to minimize mimetic isomorphism—the
tendency of organizations in the same institutional field to develop similar forms and functions
over time. For example, none of the career centers ever read any other center’s annual review
and chartering reports even though the extensive documentation provided potentially valuable
information about business plans, market opportunities, and strategic and tactical lessons. Such
“competitive intelligence” was not provided to career centers mostly due to the intermediary’s
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silent and informal practice of simply not mentioning it. According to an intermediary staff
member, “no one ever asked for it.”
The flip side to encouraging operational differentiation and experimentation among the career
centers was that it may also have contributed to system redundancy and under-performance. For
example, in some cases, all three centers provided services that could have been delivered most
efficiently by only one center. Similarly, more than one center made similar service and program
“experiments” but—due to the competitive environment—did not share lessons. Consequently,
some successful practices were not shared across the system and some failed practices were
replicated when they could have been avoided based on another center’s lesson. Of course, due
to differences in strategic orientation, it was possible that the same practice could be effective in
the hands of one center and less effective in the hands of another. Indeed, a goal of the Boston
experiment in competitive services was to explore such differences.
Another drawback to having a competitive environment and different strategic orientations was
that the combination of “competition” and “fragmented” categorical government programs
challenged the overall goal of a One-Stop Career Center to provide seamless services and a
coordinated workforce development system. While each of the Boston One-Stop Career Centers
demonstrated improvement over the old Employment Service, there are still problems and trade-
offs. For example, a distinct benefit of the competitive approach was an increased diversity of
labor matching services and an increased heterogeneity of job-seeker and employer customers.
However, there are indications that some specialized disadvantaged populations may be
receiving fewer targeted services because they are being delivered through career centers rather
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than through community-based service agencies. And, while programmatic experimentation has
increased, so has service redundancy and “reinventing the wheel” regarding program
development.374 Furthermore, even with “competition” and blurred government/nonprofit
boundaries, the Boston career centers were fundamentally constrained by their governmental
institutional context.
Overall, this study contends that Boston’s “experimental” career center system has been
worthwhile and successful in several ways. First, the Boston career centers have demonstrated
improved operational and organizational performance compared to the previous Employment
Service. Although this investigation has not explicitly compared the career centers to the ES, the
evidence suggests that all the centers exceeded the ES’ 20 percent placement rate for
unemployed job-seekers. In addition to measuring higher than the ES on this operational
indicator, the career centers also exhibited much higher efficiency and effectiveness than the ES
in providing services to customers such as employers, middle-class job-seekers, and welfare
recipients that the ES historically under-served. In comparison to the Employment Service, the
career centers also displayed higher organizational performance in terms of learning, innovation,
and systemic robustness. Organizational differences between the Employment Service and the
career centers were particularly evident in the case of JobNet. With its embedded ties to DET
and it bureaucratic orientation, JobNet seemed like it would have the most in common with the
Employment Service. However, JobNet had significantly higher placement rates than reported by
the ES. Moreover, in comparison to the standard practices of the Employment Service, JobNet
                                                
374 For example, all three career centers provided services to the same DTA offices and staged job fairs. Arguably, it
may have been more resource efficient if one center had managed and delivered such services.
303
demonstrated a higher degree of experimentation and initiative regarding program development
and service delivery to a broader range of customers.
In addition to improving upon the practices of the Employment Service specifically and the
workforce development system generally in Boston, another worthwhile advantage of Boston’s
competitive approach is that it has yielded valuable lessons and insights. Boston’s career center
system has provided a laboratory to examine career center functions, adaptation, and
performance in the context of inter-sectoral institutional network adaptation and governance in
ways that are directly relevant to researchers, policymakers, and practitioners.
Research and Policy Directions
This study has argued that One-Stop Career Centers represent a distinctive dimension of the
growing phenomenon of labor market intermediaries. This investigation has not only contributed
to LMI research by providing detailed analysis of career centers, but has also contributed to LMI
theory-building by arguing for and demonstrating how an institutional and historical analysis
enriches understanding local labor market intermediation. For example, a static description of the
Boston career centers focused on a single era would have provided lop-sided findings that
overlooked variation in processes and performance. Moreover, as a line of theoretical research,
the strategic orientation framework developed in this study may also be extended to other types
of workforce intermediaries. That is, it is conceptually possible that any of the dominant strategic
orientations may be exhibited by workforce intermediaries even if their organizational type is
overtly nonprofit, governmental, or commercial. Furthermore, although this study has
emphasized three distinct strategic orientations, it may be possible for a career center or
workforce intermediary to shift orientations over time, or to blend elements of different
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orientations. While such notions are speculative at this point, continuing research that applies the
framework may help refine and sharpen understanding of the causal and correlative relationships
between the components of a strategic orientation and organizational processes and performance.
Prior to such additional theorizing, an immediate next research step may involve further testing
the conceptual framework by investigating other career centers across the country using strategic
orientation as a template. For example, a national survey could be administered that identifies a
career center’s strategic orientation based on the indications of organizational processes analyzed
in this study. Another approach may involve more deeply examining the relationship between
strategic orientation and performance in the Boston cases. For example, it may be possible to
continue mining the experiences of Boston’s career centers based on soon-to-be-available data
linking career center job-seeker customers’ service utilization and their employment outcomes
(e.g., wage rates, job tenure). Apart from pointing to additional research, this study has
immediate policy and practice implications. Although empirically-based, this dissertation has
been theoretically-focused in that it has emphasized the development of a conceptual framework
for understanding and explaining career center operations more generally. Due to its stylized and
archetypal formulation of the strategic orientation framework, the findings of this study lend
themselves to be generalized regarding their implications for public policy.
This study has implications for federal, state, and local policies related to career centers. Despite
initial attempts to encourage reform based on customer choice as part of WIA, implementation of
the legislation in almost all states has mostly resulted in co-location of public agency services
and programs. That is, most career centers do not operate in a competitive environment. As a
result, it is likely that many of the career centers across the country share many of the attributes
305
of the stereotypical career center. Consequently, the stereotypical career center discussed earlier
provides a means to understand, plan, and anticipate the range of possible organizational
processes and performance. Moreover, most centers function as the sole publicly-funded
intermediary in a city or region. To the extent that state and regional workforce development
authorities seek to experiment with different configurations of career center operators and
approaches beyond a stereotypical governmental bureaucratic form, the strategic orientation
framework may provide some guidance on potential policy and performance parameters. In this
regard, the Boston career centers provides lessons for the more than 1,900 One-Stop Career
Centers around the country that are currently operated by either government agencies, nonprofits,
and commercial entities, or by mixed partnerships of all three types.
Of course, this study does not necessarily suggest that other Workforce Investment Boards
mimic the Boston career center system. The co-existence of three career centers with distinct
strategic orientations may not be pragmatic in many settings due to reasons such as insufficient
resources, political discordance, and inappropriate institutional and labor market conditions. This
study also does not suggest that any one of the three career center strategic orientations be used
as a single best prototype to be replicated in other locales. However, this study’s findings do
suggest that the strategic orientation framework may be used as a guide to align career center
design and development with public policy objectives. A WIB particularly concerned about the
employment needs of diverse sets of disadvantaged job-seekers might consider developing a
career center with a community strategic orientation. A WIB desirous of stimulating economic
development might consider promoting a career center with an entrepreneurial strategic
orientation. A WIB interested in generally and efficiently enhancing the labor matching process
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for the maximum number of job-seekers and employers might consider establishing a career
center with a bureaucratic strategic orientation. In choosing to emphasize a particular strategic
orientation, a WIB may anticipate—based on the Boston experiment—that the advantages of a
strategic orientation are likely to be accompanied by its associated disadvantages.
It is more likely that most WIBs across the country will experience the dilemma of already
overseeing a stereotypically bureaucratically-oriented career center. Indeed, most career centers
are mainly operated by public agencies or have dominant roles in partnering arrangements. In
these cases, an alternative is to somehow programmatically combine aspects of all three
orientations within one career center. Though not a specific focus of this investigation, this
mixed-orientation transorganizational scenario may draw insights from this study’s findings. For
instance, to bolster a career center’s entrepreneurial characteristics, a WIB may emphasize or
require: 1) incentives related to performance goals (e.g., percentage of revenue from fee-based
services to employers); 2) governance influence by business representatives (e.g., employer
advisory committee); and 3) integrated use of CQI processes. To enhance a career center’s
community characteristics, a WIB may emphasize or require: 1) contractual or financial
relationships with groups or networks of community based nonprofits; 2) governance influence
by community representatives (e.g., community advisory committee); and 3) staff with
connections to neighborhood nonprofits. Interjecting and experimenting with the tactical
activities associated with different strategic orientations may be one approach to maintain a
dynamic, adaptive, and quality-focused career center. By mixing and adjusting such key factors
in the transorganizational processes of a career center, a WIB may be able to cultivate a check-
and-balance approach to career center operations.
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However, for many WIBs, the primary challenge concerning career center policy is somewhat
paradoxical. On the one hand, a WIB will likely be interested in policies that help career centers
sustain resources and services. In this regard, such policies may reinforce the main tendency of a
bureaucratic strategic orientation—stability and static equilibrium. On the other hand, a key
lesson from the Boston career centers is the necessity to adapt and innovate in order to be in
dynamic equilibrium with changing labor market and institutional conditions. Consequently,
WIBs should also be interested in policies that promote high-functioning career centers operating
dynamically within turbulent environments. That is, WIBs should encourage career centers to
exhibit high organizational performance as indicated by learning, innovation, and systemic
robustness. In this regard, WIBs are advised to explore the tactics associated with entrepreneurial
and community strategic orientations. These approaches include complementary systemic
feedback mechanisms such as “sensing” and CQI analysis, as well as customized services, urgent
responses, and reciprocating relationships.
Of course, it is possible that WIBs may face other challenges as they introduce to bureaucratic
career centers some of the approaches associated with entrepreneurial and community strategic
orientations. These challenges involve efforts to offset the negative attributes associated with
those approaches. Entrepreneurial practices will require additional monitoring to guard against
opportunistic behavior and an inclination to under-serve disadvantaged populations. Community-
oriented practices will require close observation to check for overt favoritism or “creaming” as
well as a tendency to operate non-systematically. It is possible that the most obvious
disadvantages of entrepreneurial and community orientations may be counteracted by the
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advantages of bureaucratically oriented career centers such as standardized procedures,
accountability, and equitable practice. In any case, it will require experimentation and experience
for WIBs and career centers to calibrate the optimal mixture of strategic and tactical approaches
that is appropriate to meet policy objectives in their local environment.
An overall implication of this study is that it may be possible to design and develop a career
center’s strategic orientation and therefore to more clearly conceptualize and shape appropriate
local policy parameters related to publicly-funded labor market intermediation. A key finding of
this research is that career centers potentially provide local policymakers with operational levers
to influence the inter-sectoral dynamics of workforce development networks. In order to do this,
however, it is necessary to cultivate a institutional perspective that encompasses the public,
nonprofit, and commercial sectors.  The strategic orientation framework enables such a
perspective. At the same time, the institutional perspective must also include a cognitive map of
the “network of networks” that collectively comprise the structure of the workforce development
system. An institutional perspective makes possible a more comprehensive understanding of the
local implications of transformative processes such as economic restructuring, federal policy
shifts, and blurring governmental and nonprofit boundaries. From  this perspective, local
decision-makers may better navigate the transforming institutional terrain by responding
creatively to challenges and opportunities.
Institutional insights may inform local decision-making that often occurs environments with
abundant political interests, scarce resources, and under-explored policy options. In these
contested settings with multiple stakeholders, clarifying policy choices may contribute to
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improving deliberations about programmatic trade-offs. Doing so may better target public
resources towards improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the job matching process during
turbulent times of shifting institutional and labor market conditions. Consequently, career centers
may better help employers to access diverse and under-tapped pools of workers as well as may
better help job-seekers—especially the disadvantaged—to leverage information and services in
their pursuit of enhanced employment outcomes.
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Appendix
Table 4: Job Placement Rates at Boston One-Stop Career Centers*
Fiscal Years (FY) 1997-2002
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Placement Rate Placement Rate Placement Rate
FY 2002 26% 30% 30%Era 3
FY 2001 31% 33% 25%
FY 2000 33% 39% 41%Era 2
FY 1999 24% 21% 44%
FY 1998 28% 21% 49%Era 1
FY 1997 33% 15% 16%
* Placement rates are calculated for unemployed job-seekers who used at least three career center services before
being hired. The Employment Service system had average placement rates of 20 percent using a similar benchmark.
Table 5: Number of Job Placements at Boston One-Stop Career Centers
Fiscal Years (FY) 1997-2002
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Total
(3 Career
Centers)
Number of
Placements
Percent
of Total
Number of
Placements
Percent
of Total
Number of
Placements
Percent
of Total
Number of
Placements
FY 2002 612 28% 903 41% 706 32% 2221Era 3 FY 2001 494 29% 678 40% 516 31% 1688
FY 2000 491 22% 1119 49% 655 29% 2265Era 2 FY 1999 495 24%  741 36% 837 40% 2073
FY 1998 591 28% 686 33% 812 39% 2089Era 1 FY 1997 1259 62% 207 10% 557 28% 2023
Table 6: Job Positions Posted at Boston One-Stop Career Centers
Fiscal Years (FY) 1997-2002
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Total
(3 Career
Centers)
# Positions
Posted
Percent
of Total
# Positions
Posted
Percent
of Total
# Positions
Posted
Percent of
Total
# Positions
posted
FY 2002 778 14% 4562 79% 408 7% 5748Era 3 FY 2001 646 11% 4770 78% 706 11% 6122
FY 2000 849 21% 2884 72% 279 7% 4012Era 2 FY 1999 800 33% 816 34% 778 33% 2394
FY 1998 904 29% 1486 47% 761 24% 3151Era 1 FY 1997 866 43% 429 22% 711 35% 2006
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Table 7: New Job-Seeker Customers at Boston One-Stop Career Centers
Fiscal Years (FY) 1997-2002
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Total
(3 Career
Centers)
Fiscal
Year
# Job-
Seekers
Percent of
Total
# Job-
Seekers
Percent of
Total
# Job-
Seekers
Percent of
Total
# Job-
Seekers
FY 2002 4910 34% 5197 36% 4480 31% 14587Era 3 FY 2001 2985 28% 4046 37% 3784 35% 10815
FY 2000 2363 31% 2942 38% 2368 31% 7673Era 2 FY 1999 3751 34% 4458 40% 2853 26% 11062
FY 1998 3486 32% 4592 42% 2841 26% 10919Era 1 FY 1997 6208 44% 1916 14% 5845 42% 13969
Table 8: Job-Seeker Education Levels at Boston One-Stop Career Centers
Fiscal Years (FY) 1997-2002
The Work Place JobNet Boston Career Link
Job-Seeker Education Level Percent of
Job-Seekers
Percent of
Job-Seekers
Percent of
Job-Seekers
With HS degree or less FY 2002 49% 48% 49%
E With some college FY 2002 25% 34% 28%
r With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 2002 26% 18% 24%
a With HS degree or less FY 2001 50% 56% 42%
With some college FY 2001 30% 31% 33%
3 With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 2001 20% 13% 25%
With HS degree or less FY 2000 47% 75% 40%
E With some college FY 2000 27% 23% 27%
r With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 2000 26% 2% 33%
a With HS degree or less FY 1999 43% 70% 40%
With some college FY 1999 23% 11% 21%
2 With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 1999 34% 19% 39%
With HS degree or less FY 1998 30% 71% 25%
E With some college FY 1998 25% 9% 21%
r With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 1998 45% 20% 54%
a With HS degree or less FY 1997 37% 67% 24%
With some college FY 1997 26% 9% 20%
1 With Bachelor or adv. Degree FY 1997 37% 24% 52%
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